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This thesis is in two sections. The first critically examines the tradition of harmonia mrmdi. The 
earliest complete and developed account of musica mrmdana appears in Plato, but numerous fragmented 
references appear in the pre-Socratic sources. The notion that harmonia mundi originated as an idea of 
quantitative speeds and distances of the celestial bodies, is discredited. Rather, it is shown that it more 
probably originates as an expression of an 'esoteric spiritual' teaching in which selfknowledge, death, the 
concept of harmonia, and consequently music, are related. The idea that the greatest importance of music 
rests on the relationship of music and emotion, is undermined in this context, and the relationship of music, 
emotion and experience is examined in a way that supports much of what was asserted by Hanslick in the 
nineteenth century. 
The interpretation of ancient sources is critically assessed in terms of common 'hermeneutic filters' 
which are shown to be inconsistent with the content and hence context of some of the sources. It is also 
argued that Plato should be approached not merely through the assessment of the arguments that appear in his 
discourses, but in the light of his portrayal of the life and death of Socrates. The discourses are treated as 
inexact, exoteric expressions of esoteric meaning, much of which can be gleaned from the 'symbol' and 
example of Socrates' own life and death. 
The second section presents an original music philosophy that is an entirely contemporary 
exposition of the essential meaning of the harmony of the spheres tradition, as interpreted in the first section. 
In this contemporary exposition, some of the ideas that appear in Plato concerning the relationship of soul, 
world and harmonia, are re-expressed in terms of self, world, and an original contemporary 'parable' for 
harmonia. The background to the ancient tradition, of the macrocosm-microcosm relationship, is brought into 
contemporary terms, drawing critically on some ideas of the quantum physicist David Bohm, and questions 
raised by quantum theory in general. Finally, the nature of the macrocosm-microcosm is related to parts of 
Wittgenstein 's Tractatus /ogico-plri/osoplricus. 
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The beginning of music 
We can look for some point in the past, some point in our evolution, at which music 
appeared. We can theorise that music arose because somehow, in the natural or social conditions of 
the time, it had in some way survival value for the species, or perhaps for smaller organised groups 
of humans. 
We might say that when it comes to psyche, everything about psyche, including the 
relationship of psyche and music, has its cause in the evolutionary process of survival. However, 
this would not be fully true within a theory that life and psyche evolved from lifeless matter, 
because at another level we still exist as chemical, mineral, molecule, atom, quantum, or star stuff, 
and all these things according to the theory of 'the evolution of life on earth', were around before 
what it calls 'life', evolved. We do not normally talk about a survival process in place before the 
appearance of life forms. The matter itself and the laws of physics, and any unknown laws affecting 
matter, must, in the context of this theory, be at least indirectly causal too. 
Life forms and their attendant behaviours and features evolve because life forms are 
already in a survival situation, but we do not have an agreed theory on how consciousness, self or 
self-consciousness as it appears in humans, is created from chemical, mineral, molecule, atom, 
quantum, or star stuff. Evolution theory, with its principle of survival, is not a theory of how 
consciousness arises now, in so-called 'unconscious matter'. If we say that the relationship of mind 
and matter is something that evolutionary survival brings about, this does not displace the need of 
the mind-matter relationship to be a system within the laws of physics. 
Current theories concerning physics and consciousness, particularly regarding quantum 
theory and relativity theory, sometimes involve the necessity to take a radical view of the nature of 
time, a view outside the 'intuitive' notion of it. 1 For example, it can be argued that in physics the 
passage of time is a 'feature of consciousness', with no 'objective' counterpart. This means that 
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although time is a co-ordinate relative to which evolution stages can be 'measured', the time eo-
ordinate is not something that of itself has a property of 'passing'. The time it is supposed to have 
taken for consciousness to evolve, is at another level of understanding merely a feature of that 
consciousness itself, that has been conceptualised as having passed. This of course connects with 
arguments about whether the world of matter, space, time and even celestial movement is what it 
appears to be from the sentient point of view. The physics of the relationship of consciousness and 
matter may be so radical that beside it, the concept of evolution in time is reduced to a theory of 
appearances only, and along with it, the notion of survival as the main dynamic for the arising of 
consciousness. 
Such arguments are about systems. A system is a composite object in an object-orientated2 
process of understanding. This thesis may concur with these arguments in many respects, but it is 
not however an approach from this point of view. From the subject-orientated point of view, we 
shall talk about psyche, rather than consciousness, in the first instance. Psyche is experienced as 
self, and in this thesis from the subject-orientated point of view self is presented as involved in a 
process. The relationship of self and music, and hence the actual nature of music in relation to 
psyche, is understood in terms of this process. This means: 
We address the reality of psyche from its own point of view, which is subject-orientated. 
Understanding the existence of music is not approached through the concept of evolution by 
survival, which is object-orientated. The scientific concern with evolutionary survival is a 
condition that happens to be current now, in the activity of object-orientated understanding. Whilst 
it is not wrong, it is limited. In a sense, to put psyche only in the context of evolutionary survival is 
to bring its potential down to the lowest common denominator - that of the material medium in 
which psyche appears. 
The continual development of theory about our origins in terms of evolution can easily 
create an intellectual momentum in which it is easy to forget that survival is not an explanation of 
everything. The evolution and survival of birds, for example, does not explain gravity. We have to 
be free to see that music, like everything else, may arise as part of a greater process, possibly even 
one in which ultimately, nothing survives. We might even be able to see this however, from the 
1Lockwood, M, Mind, Brain & the Quantum, Oxford, 1992, esp. p. 251 If. 
2 See appendix. 
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subject-orientated point of view. Then we might perhaps see another possibility- that it could be 
the effects of this greater process that manifest as the evolutionary world of survival that we 
physically occupy. 
What I have just suggested, is not in essence a new or modem conception. The notion of a 
'higher' process that produces effects in a 'lower' existence that Man occupies, occurs in the 
tradition of the music oft he spheres and is documented in Plato's Myth of Er, in the Republic. In its 
Platonic and later neo-Piatonic forms the tradition is not concerned with evolutionary survival of 
the species as an explanation for the existence of music, but it is concerned with survival of another 
kind - self-survival through reincarnation. There has been so much concentration on aspects of the 
tradition involving arithmetical harmonics and quantification, that this aspect of the tradition has 
often not been properly acknowledged. In due course, I will explain why even this part of the 
tradition, with its concept of survival of the soul, actually still stands as the symbol for a process in 
which nothing survives, out of which comes what we call music. For now, we only need to 
acknowledge this aspect of the tradition as it stands. 
The importance of the music of the spheres tradition lies in the context in which the 
tradition arose, and in part, continued. This discourse proposes that it did not originate as a 
speculation about physical, cosmic structure. The early transmission of communication was 
through what we have been mostly happy to call Greek 'philosophers', 'scientists' and 'poets', 
taking place from well before Plato, and stretching over a couple of thousand years before the 
renaissance neo-Platonists embraced and developed it. This transmission through all its 
ramifications, according to this thesis, can be properly recognised as including at its origin 
something often ignored - the descending transmission of an essentially mystical teaching through 
Adept, half Adepts, part Adepts, wranglers, phoneys, and finally, rejecters of the tradition like 
Aristotle. We should also recognise that in this kind of lineage, even the earliest Pythagorean part 
of the tradition itself may well have been a corruption or adaptation of an even earlier mystical 
teaching. We have also the possibility that Pythagoras himself, for all his mathematical ability, and 
despite the 'Orphic' powers attributed to him, may also have been the 'chief of wranglers' that 
Empidocles said he was. 
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The Contextual Background- music and self 
We can consider the experience of music as an experience of the feeling-emotional self. To 
tackle the question of music's subjective effects via enquiry into self, might seem to be turning the 
question of the music-feeling relationship on its head, but if so, it is with good reason that we 
should do this. The Harmony of the spheres tradition itself places music in what we might now call 
'Platonic' and 'neo-Piatonic' contexts of the knowledge of self (or in Plato's terms, 'soul'), and its 
relation to the world or universe as a whole. 
The tradition of the past however, in its concern with the existence of music and the reason 
for its being, does not centre primarily on the music-feeling relationship, but rather, gives music a 
status derived from its position in no less than a grand cosmic scheme based the idea of the 
harmony of the spheres. This notion of cosmic order can be seen not only in Ptolemy's model of 
the universe but also in many of the ideas of Boethius, and whilst it is claimed in the sources that it 
originates from Pythagoras, it could very well derive or connect with mystical influences from the 
The enquiry into the nature of self, or the idea of 'knowledge of self exists in the backdrop 
to the music of the spheres tradition in the pre-Socratic sources, and appears as the admonition 
Know Thyself delivered by the oracle of Apollo at Delphi.4 It is an edict also attributed to many 
Greek philosophers including Diogenes Laertius, Thales, Solon, Socrates - who is one of the most 
important proponents of the music of the spheres tradition- and Pythagoras himself. 
In the descriptions of the universe and its cosmogony, many of these pre-Socratic sources, 
and indeed some of Plato's works, contain discourse that in modem terms can be regarded as what 
purports to be revealed knowledge about things like the nature of Man, the nature of the universe, 
and the origins of the universe. Their content is usually referred to as doctrine, theory, or belief, but 
in their own context these discourses do not purport to be anything other than teachings of truth. 
Assertions that seem to be made on no other authority than the that of the philosopher himself, in 
which we can include many pre-Socratic sources and much of Socrates' teaching, can be regarded 
3 Pythagoras is known to have connections with the East. The name appears in sources as Pitagora or similar. 
Pitaglwra in Sanskrit derives frompitr (father) and aghora (fearlessness, and a reference to Hindu yogis). 
4 Scholarly interpretation may translate this as 'know that you are mortal and not a god'. Even to know this, 
to genuinely know it, rather than be told it, is still necessarily self-knowledge, so 'know thyselr still remains 
an admonition to attain self-knowledge. 
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in a similar light as what was later called gnosticism. They implicitly purport to arise from self-
knowledge rather than from deduction, dogma or any other kind ofreceived authority. 
Modern philosophy uses systematic rational argument and, it is said, begins by doubting. 
The ancient pre-Socratic philosopher began, it is implied, by knowing. This does not mean Greek 
philosophy is intrinsically flawed, but rather, that modern philosophy cannot include the modus 
operandi of the ancient. The lesson to be noted from this state of affairs is that the modern modus 
operandi cannot necessarily be expected to make sense of the ancient. 
What looks like revealed knowledge or even just assertions of subjective knowledge often 
have a relationship with mysticism, and this is often connected with the aspiration of 'self-
transcendence'. Some sources would thus be entitled to be regarded as possibly emerging from this 
point of view, and their meaning may be only relevant in the context of this aspiration. The failure 
to recognise this possible nature of what is said by a particular philosopher, is a possibility at any 
time, including the times at which the sources and attestations were written. 
The concepts of self and 'absence of self in perception also appear today, and are 
associated in philosophical aesthetics with things like 'aesthetic experience' and the creation of art. 
In this very sense, some of the Greek sources can indeed be seen to be art prose, rather than the 
expositions of doctrines that they otherwise appear to be. What they deal with is more profound 
than the term 'aesthetic' perhaps suggests, and they are certainly not writings merely created to be 
'aesthetically pleasing'. They make sense as art, as an expression of a certain depth of perception. 
A mere fragment of text could be a fragment of an art form that penetrates right into areas like 
those we could call mystical beauty and gnosis. 
The quantitative and qualitative tradition 
The tradition includes ways of understanding the function and purpose of music in relation 
to its effects upon the listener, and this understanding is posited in the context of universal design 
in which Man is not an incident factor, but is at the centre of the scheme. The idea of a geocentric 
universe as Ptolemy envisaged, cannot be merely regarded as having arisen in response to 
observational appearances when viewing the heavens. Geocentricity is equally if not more 
important in its symbolic placing of Man at the centre of the universe. 
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The contemplation of the universe as an independent system that can be observed by a 
subject who is incidental to it, and not essential or central to the system, even if affected by it, 
would be an object-orientated contemplation. This is the observation of a 'universe object' outside 
and the self of the subject, which it is felt is important to understand in its own right, disconnected 
from the subject, before its relationship to the subject can be understood. This is the approach of 
classical science. Conversely the contemplation of the universe or any phenomena only in its direct 
relation to the subject now, or as a universe in which the subject is essential, and possibly even the 
contemplation of it as the subject, would be more in keeping with the subject-orientated approach 
of many pre-scientific sources.5 
The ancient idea that Man is the microcosm of the universal macrocosm, is not important 
as an idea about objective structure, but is essentially subject-orientated, and occurs in a context 
that Man's knowledge of the universe is inseparable from knowledge of himself. The object-
orientated and subject-orientated facets of the tradition, do not always appear independently. The 
qualitative tradition even includes the expression of metaphysical thought through the use of 
Number, as arithmetical expression. 
In the quantitative tradition, the mathematical form in harmony is arithmetical harmonic 
ratio, and is projected onto the conception of the celestial system. Thus we are presented with 
harmonic ratios of celestial speeds and distances. However, as we shall see, the presence of 
quantification in ancient sources does not necessarily carry with it the meaning we would ascribe to 
quantified systems today, but rather, can be symbolic in subtle ways. 
In the qualitative tradition, the 'structure' of the universe is metaphysical, and seen in a 
subject-orientated context, and in an embracing picture of a non-dualistic universe. In terms of the 
duality of self and not-self, the power of music which is supposed to align the 'soul' with celestial 
harmony, amounts to an aligning of the subject's self with the celestial 'not-self. This alignment is 
supposedly possible because of the underlying non-duality of everything in the universe. There is 
in the pre-Socratic sources, and in Plato, the assertion that the vast multiplicity of objects in 
existence, all the multifarious aspects of the universe, and time itself, arise from a unity, the Being 
or 17ze One. 
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Some previous ideas of the role of self and duality in relation to 'aesthetic experience' and 
altered perception. 
The role of the self in relation to 'aesthetic experience', which includes the experience of 
music, has been given attention in modern philosophical aesthetics. The 'loss of self from the 
duality consisting of perceiving self and the perceived 'not-self art object, or surrounding 
circumstances, is particularly relevant. Whilst this has not necessarily been strictly understood as 
'non-duality' it certainly includes notions of 'self-less perception', the overcoming of self in 
relation to the art-object, a 'becoming one with the art-object', the 'removal of separation from the 
art-object', 'disinterestedness', 'will-lessness', and the minimising of 'psychical distance', all of 
which have been argued to be important in 'aesthetic experience' .6 
Aesthetic experience, it has been observed, seems to include both involvement in, and 
detachment or removal from, the object of contemplation or scene of action. It can be associated 
with 'impersonal perception' or a change in perception that affects the relationship between the 
observing subject and the thing observed. Bullough saw this change of perception in a way that 
does not require 'non-duality', but 'minimises' duality. He explored it in some degree through his 
illustration of a fog at sea. The fog can be terrifying from the position of practical self interest, but 
even whilst actually involved in the dangerous self-threatening circumstances of the fog, conscious 
awareness can suddenly switch to the perception of it with 'intense relish and enjoyment' .7 In 
Bullough's view this is achieved through a 'psychical distance', so that a non-involvement, or a 
transcendence from self involvement to 'aesthetic experience', is possible through a separation 
from the object of contemplation. However, to effect aesthetic experience this psychical distance 
must be reduced to the minimum without its disappearance. The complete loss of distance would 
result in actual self involvement and the attendant experience such as fear. 
A change of perception that removes personal emotional 'involvement' in the scene of 
action has been fully and explicitly associated with non-duality by Schopenhauer. He spoke of a 
change of perception and a 'becoming one with' the object of contemplation. In Schopenhauer it is 
the idea of 'will-less' perception that is important, and it is this that represents the state 
5 More on the object/subject orientation is found in the Appendix. 
6 Collinson, Diane, 'Aesthetic Experience', Philosophical Aesthetics: an Jntrodr~ction, ed. Oswald Hanfling, 
Oxford, 1995, p.lll. 
1 Ibid., p.l58. 
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transcendent to the condition of the world, and hence an intelligence above that which is still 
blindly identified and involved in the condition and circumstances of the situation. In this 'will-
less' perception it is not a distance between the subject and the objective circumstances that is 
important, but a removal of distance. Paradoxically it might seem, this parallels Bullough's 
'psychical distance' in that it also removes the seJrs total attachment to, and identification with the 
scene of action. This is so, because in Schopenhauer the world is a 'representation' of what he calls 
the metaphysical Will, which in his non-d11ality is also the Will of the subject. If there is a 
separation in Schopenhauer's 'aesthetic perception', it is not between the self and the 
circumstances (or the object of contemplation), but between the subject's perception now, and the 
Will, which is also his own self, and it is this that enables the subject to perceive the world as his 
own representation. Because the Will can be identified with the self, Schopenhauer is implying that 
a 'separation from se) r is possible in the subject. This is in effect, self transcendence. In both 
Bullough and Schopenhauer the subject in different senses transcends or overcomes the 
enmeshment of the emotional self in the scene of action, in order to reach the changed perception 
that is from an impersonal position beyond emotional self. In Bullough enmeshment is overcome 
through psychical distance. In Schopenhauer, the enmeshment of one's self in the world is 
overcome by the realisation that the world is one's own Will. 
The assertion of non-duality in place of the duality of self and not-self is something 
modem philosophy may well identify as 'solipsism', which is often argued to be philosophically 
and rationally untenable, and contrary to the morally and spiritually valued principle of what is 
called 'otherness'. Non-dualism is at the heart of Schopenhauer's philosophy of music expressed in 
The World as Will and Representation, and this, unfortunately, readily lays itself open to the charge 
of solipsism whether or not this is justified. Contemporaneously Hegel was more successful than 
Schopenhauer in his propounding of what is presented as a dialectical approach to dualism and 
non-dualism, which can more easily be understood without dependence upon any assertion that 
might be seen as solipsism. As different proponents of German federalism, Schopenhauer and 
Hegel represent two apparently different approaches, but they are essentially approaches to the 
same non-duality and duality. In both Schopenhauer and Hegel, it is asserted that there is only one 
'I' or Being, which is the non-duality, whereas there are may instances of self-consciousness, or 
self, and the consequences and truths that arise from this conflicting condition in the world are 
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elaborated respectively in extensive philosophies. In both Hegel and Schopenhauer the 
philosophical dynamic comes from this basic dichotomy of duality and non-duality in the world, 
and the philosophies purport to explain much of what goes on in the world of duality of self and 
not-self in terms of an underlying (teleological) spiritual purpose or goal that is the individual's 
discovery of non-duality. In He gel this is 'Absolute knowing' and in Schopenhauer it is Self 
Realisation as the discovery of the world as Will. 8 
The notion that the world is my will is central to Schopenhauer's idea of his meaning of 
mustc. According to Schopenhauer, it is the Will that pervades existence, for everything in the 
world is a 'grade of objectification or representation' of the metaphysical Will, which itself remains 
as a cause behind the existence of the world. Music is however above even the highest of the 
'grades' (which Schopenhauer links to Plato's 'Ideas') as it is a 'direct copy' of the Will. There is 
then a direct parallel between Schopenhauer's Will and the Platonic or pre-Socratic harmonia. Each 
pervades the universe, and each manifests or is represented in various forms, including music. 
However, Schopenhauer makes one particularly important proposition amongst all those that 
distinguish him from Plato, whom he explicitly acknowledged. This is that the metaphysical Will is 
8 Schopenhauer, A, The World as Will and Representation, Tr. EFJ Payne, New York, 1969; Hegel, GWF, 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Tr. AV Miller, Oxford, 1977. Both proponents of this nineteenth century 
'Transcendental Idealism' present a philosophy that is based on certain tenets concerning consciousness, 
expounding the philosophy through assertions and arguments that can be rationally approached once the 
basic tenets have been grasped. Schopenhauer in particular asserts his answer to what Kant through his own 
somewhat 'abstract' argument had considered unanswerable - knowledge of 'the thing in itself, and each 
does this on the strength of the Idealist tenets like The world is my representation. However, in this lies a 
very important problem that must be highlighted. The basic tenets like Hegel 's consciousness of Revealed 
Religion, or Absolute Knowing, or Schopenhauer's realisation that The world is my representation, are tenets 
representing a state of knowledge, realisation or consciousness that is supposed to be 'transcendental' both to 
the existential world of human affairs, and indeed, to physical existence. The implication in the philosophies 
is that this 'transcendental' state of knowing, realisation or consciousness is a possibility in Man, and, 
presumably, an actuality in the proponents of these philosophies. Now a detailed understanding, acquired 
through these works, of this 'transcendental' state of knowledge, realisation or consciousness (or what in 
mysticism or Eastern tradition is usually referred to in terms of 'higher consciousness'), is a theoretical or 
intellectual understanding of non-duality, and this, together with an understanding of the kind of 'world-
view' that is likely to be associated with it, is not at all the same thing as the actual possession of that state of 
consciousness. It does not follow that the articulation of one indicates the presence of the other in its 
articulator. The critical tenets like Revealed Religion, Absolute Knowing, or a realisation that The world is my 
representation, are not even supposed to be derived from object-orientated observations of the nature of an 
objective world. They represent a subject-orientated world view. What these philosophies describe as the 
nature of the world would surely have to be immediately and effortlessly true in the experience of the subject, 
and not just in an intellectual system of understanding which demands considerable effort to acquire, if it is 
to be complete and real as an actual state of subject-orientated knowledge. In Hegelian discourse the 
experience of duality of self and not-self is dialectically opposed to the non-dual nature of the 'I'. However, 
there is a difference and distance between what is directly true in experience, and what is upheld in the 
intellectual understanding, and it is this that provides room for Hegel's dialectic, or the understanding of 
Hegel's assertions as dialectical. Understood in this way, what Hegel describes as the 'transcendental' truth 
of non-duality or its consequences, is never something that is complete in his work as a description of that 
state of consciousness, but exists only as the perceptive but dialectical argument for it. 
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identified with the subjecf's feeling emotionality. In Schopenhauer the world is a 'representation' 
and manifestation of human feeling emotionality, and it is really, as it were, this emotional form 
that pervades existence and determines the nature of the world. Music then not only represents the 
world, but being somehow a 'direct copy of the Will', is unsurpassed in its efficacy in connecting 
with the subject's emotional self, and in its ability to represent the emotional aspect of the world. 
Schopenhauer effectively developed the non-dualism he acknowledged in the Indian Vedas and 
Upanishads, and in Plato, and presented a view of music based on emotional form, through this. 
No such declaration of all pervading emotional form is present in the Platonic and 
Pythagorean assertions of universal music or harmony. The message behind the tradition of the 
m11sic of the spheres is that something, a harmonia, pervades music in an explicit way, that also 
pervades the whole nature of existence, but there is no implication that this, in itself, parallels 
human emotional feeling. The most explicit description of it in the earliest fragments is simply as a 
'fitting together of opposites'. Schopenhauer's proposal of Will as a pervasive principle, but as 
something also connected to emotional form, is limited. The limitation of it is that there is no 
possibility of getting beyond emotion, or beyond the emotional self and a view of the world or 
reality as correlating to this emotion. The idea that a change of perception, cir that a change of 
subjective condition can be associated with the absence of self, I have already mentioned. 
Schopenhauer's 'will-lesness' is effectively this absence, but the only thing according to 
Schopenhauer that is to be perceived as a result of this shift of perception is the 'emotional'-like 
Will and its representations. What is beyond the Will is for Schopenhauer, beyond knowing. He 
says in his Epiphilosophy at the end of The World as Will that what is beyond the Will is not open 
to investigation, because knowledge itself is part of the phenomenon of the world, which is itself a 
manifestation of the Will. 9 This leads to a view of music that is limited, and assumes that 
perception cannot reach beyond what the world regards as knowledge. It is as limited as the 
perception of the world as Will, where the Will is understood in Schopenhauer's way, only in its 
connection with human emotional feeling. On the contrary, the idea of the overcoming or the 
absence of emotional self, would surely be more consistent with the idea of a perception that is 
beyond emotional self, and beyond emotional meaning. 
9 Schopenhauer, A, The World as Will and Representation, Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 642. 
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For perception to go beyond emotional self does not mean to go into abstract theoretical 
knowledge. As Bullough intuited, the overcoming of emotional and psychological self is very 
much connected with overcoming the psychological and emotional enmeshment in, or attachment 
to, the scene of action and its emotional causes. Bullough and others have suggested that this 
freeing from enmeshment can be brought about possibly as an act of will. If music is pervaded by 
something also pervading the nature of the world we occupy, then this thing, this harmonia, would 
have to be by implication vast, and it seems inconsistent that it could be perceived by a mere act of 
personal will. On the contrary, the overcoming of emotional self is much more likely to be 
associated with something vast and impersonal. The great cycle of life and death described in 
Plato's Myth of Er, the cycle itself, is impersonal, and this represents an unseen 'nature of the 
world', on a grand scale. On a lesser scale, we do approach the world in terms of our self 
experience in it. We either exist and experience for the sheer sake of experience (as in 
Schopenhauer's Will) or through experience we can reach something beyond that experience. In 
the latter case passing through the experience of emotional se! f in the world may provide the 
possibility of perception beyond emotional self. Passing intelligently through feeling experience, 
passing through the repeated experience of relating to existence through the feelings of the 
emotional self, which is the personal interpretation of the world and circumstances, may lead to an 
impersonal perception that no longer arises from the emotional self and its enmeshment in, or 
attachment to, the world. 
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Chapter 1 - The harmony of the spheres 
The idea that Man and the cosmos are governed by 'harmony' appears documented in 
Western literature two and a half thousand years ago. It is found in the writings of two pre-Socratic 
philosophers, Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. BC c.SOO), and Empidocles of Acragas (fl. BC c.450), 10 as 
well as in the philosophy of Philolaus of Croton or Tarentum (fl. BC c.480), who was a 
Pythagorean and a contemporary of Socrates. Heraclitus described harmony as being related to 
opposing tension, and he drew an analogy between Life, and the tensioned bow or lyre. 11 In 
Empidocles' poem On Nature, Love is the uniting principle and Hate the dividing principle in what 
is obviously a metaphysical cosmogony. In his poem, those parts of creation that are alike and can 
be mixed, are 'united in affection by Aphrodite', whereas the 'unlike' and 'immiscible' have been 
'wrought by Hate'. Nevertheless, the unlike can still be successfully mixed through the principle of 
harmonia. The poem also states that the elemental Sun, Earth, Heaven and Sea are all connected in 
harmony with their own parts. 12 
Most importantly, in the early sources the primary meaning of harmonia is usually a 
'fitting together' of opposing elements rather than a specifically musical concord. 13 This harmonia 
constituted a principle of universal order14 in a world whose many differing parts were derived 
from opposites created out of the originating One. Opposites played an important part in early 
Greek thought, 15 and in Pythagorean cosmogony and cosmology, the opposites of Limiteds, and the 
Unlimited, appear to have been fundamental. 16 Philolaus taught that harmonia 17 gives order to the 
cosmos, and holds together the conflicting opposites of limiters and unlimiteds by attuning them. 18 
Thus, in the appropriate context where unlimited possibilities of sound become limited by 
harmonia, musical harmony would be created. 
1° For a short synopsis on Heraclitus and Empidocles see Kassler, JC, Inner Music, London, 1995, pp. 30-33. 
Dates, and full translations of fragments relating to Heraclitus and Empidocles are in Diels, H, I 
Freeman, K (Tr.), Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A complete translation of the fragments in 
Diets, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Oxford, 1971, pp. 24-34, and 51-69, respectively. 
11 Kassler, JC, Inner Music, London, 1995, pp. 31-32; Freeman, Ancil/a, op. cit., p. 28. 
12 Freeman, Ancilla, op. cit., pp. 54-56. See also Kassler, JC, Inner Music, London, 1995, pp. 32. 
13 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1966, p. 123. 
14 Lloyd, GER, Polarity and Analogy - two types of argumentation in early Greek thought, Cambridge, 1966, 
pp. 15-85. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1966, p. 47. 
17 Huffman, CA, Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, 1993, p. 73. 
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The ancient tradition of the harmony of the spheres19 is supposed to have originated with 
Pythagoras of Samos (fl. BC 530)/0 but the assertions within the tradition itself about its own 
origins, are uncertain and misleading. The Pythagorean sect was steeped in secrecy, and the only 
extant Pythagorean writings that are thought to have existed before the time of Aristotle (BC 384-
322) are the fragments attributed to Philolaus, and those of Archytas ofTarentum (fl. BC c.375?).21 
Furthermore, in its developed form the tradition's beguiling elements distract from the issues of 
real philosophical significance that surround the Myth and its supposed point of origin. 
The tradition can be broadly divided into two notions. Firstly, there is the notion that actual 
'sound' is produced from the movement of the celestial bodies, whether they be considered as the 
visible independently moving bodies, or as objects 'inherent in' celestial spheres or 'circles' from 
which they get their motion. This sound was supposed to be musically harmonious, following from 
the fact that the principal musical intervals are governed by simple mathematical ratios. It was 
18 Ibid., p. 328. 
19 Boethius, AMS, Fundamentals of Music, Tr. CM Bower, Ed. CV Palisca, New Haven & London, 1989, p. 
9, cites seven primary sources that deal with the harmony of the heavens: Pliny, Natura/is historia 
2.22(20).84; Cicero, De republica 6.18.18; P1utarch, De musica 1147; Nicomachus, Enchiridion 3; 
Censorinus, De die natalai 12; Macrobius, In somnium Scipionis 2.1.2 & 6.1-6; Ptolemy Harmonica 
3.10-16 & 104-111. 
Schavemoch, H, Die Harmonie der Sphiiren, Munich, 1981, pp. 132-165 contains synopses of sixteen 
scholarly or philosophic works treating the subject of cosmic music or the harmony of the spheres, 
whose authors include Kepler, Fludd, Mersenne, Kircher, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Schelling, Titus-
Bode, Thomas Ring, Victor Goldschmidt, E. Zederbauer, August Boeckh, Wilhem Forester, von 
Thimus, and Rudolf Haase. 
The literary works of twenty are treated, pp. 165-184, including the authors Sir Thomas Browne, Milton, 
Friedrich Gott1ieb Klopstock, Gottfried August Biirger, Johann Gottfried Herder, Jakob Balde, Matthias 
Claudias, Goethe, Schiller, Holderlin, Nova1is, Brentano, Karoline von Gunderode, Joseph von 
Eichendorff, Heinriche Heine, Gottfried Keller, Proust, Gottfried Benn, and Hermann Hesse. 
Also pp. 184-186 gives coverage of the attention paid to the harmony of the spheres by many composers 
and composer-theorists since Bardi's "L'Armonia della sfere" in the 1589 1ntermedi. Included are 
Buxtehude and Hindemith. 
Moyer, AE, Musica Scientia, Ithaca & London, 1992, includes mention of Quintillian (p.28 IT., citing 
Quintillian, Marcus Fabius, lnstitutio Oratorio, Tr. HE Butler, London, 1921; Quintil/ian 's Institutes of 
Orat01y, Tr. JS Watson, {2 Vols}, London, 1903); Burtius (pp. 44 IT. & pp. 49-51, citing Burtius, 
Nicolaus, Musices opusculum, Tr. Clement A Miller, Musicological studies and documents 37, N.p.: 
American Institute of Musicology, 1983); Ramos de Pareja (p.52 IT.); Macrobius (p. 57); Martianus 
Capella (p. 57); Pliny (p.44); Tinctoris (p.65); Franchino GaiTurio (p. 73, & esp. pp. 86-9 on De 
hannonia muiscorum instrumentroum opus, Milan, 1518); Pietro Aron (p. 121 ); Tartag1ia (p.131 IT.); 
Luigi Dentice (p. 147); Cardano (p. 160); Zarlino (p. 207); Pietro Caetano (p. 265); Pietro Ponzio, Frate 
Angelo, Poliziano, Lefevre d'Etaples, Plutarch, Celio Rodigino (all p. 271); Fabio Paolini (p. 274); 
Gentile Riccio (p. 275), and Ercole Bottrigari (p. 278), who assumes in his 11 Me/one, Fen·ara, 1602, 
that the tradition is already dead. 
20 Date taken from Diels, H, I Freeman, K (Tr.), Ancil/a to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A complete 
translation of the fragments in Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Oxford, 1971, p. 20. 
21 Huffman, CA, Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, 1993, p. 57. The older Pythagoreans are Cerciips, Petriin, 
Bro(n)tinus, Hippasos, Calliphiin and Democedes, Parm( en)iscus. Nothing certain is known of any 
written works: vide Freeman, Ancilla, op. cit., p. 20. Accounts of Pythagorean ism derive mostly from 
the Peripatetic School (Aristoxenus, Theophrastus, Eudemus) and from the neo-Platonists (Porphyry, 
Iamblichus, Proclus, Simplicus). There are also extracts in the compilers (Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus) 
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believed that those mathematical 'harmonic ratios' existed in the quantified positions and 
motions of the celestial bodies, thereby determining that the sound produced was musically 
harmonious. Reports of this state of affairs in the heavens are usually accompanied by some 
'rational' explanation for why the celestial sound is not audible to all. Pythagoras was believed not 
only to have discovered the ratios governing the principal harmonic musical intervals, but also to 
have had the unique and divinely ordained ability to hear the harmony of the spheres. These beliefs 
in a mathematically harmonic construction of the celestial system, and sounding celestial bodies, 
constitute what I shall call the 'pseudo-scientific' notion and the 'quantitative' tradition. 
Alternatively, in the 'metaphysical' tradition, harmony or harmonia is generally held to be 
a cosmic, Divine, and originating principle, that broadly speaking is inherent in the visible heavens, 
the 'soul of the world', the individual human soul, and the phenomena presented to the senses. This 
notion does not necessarily demand that there be actual sound arising from the celestial bodies, and 
later in the tradition even accommodates the scienti fie necessity for describing the motions of the 
celestial bodies in more complex ways. The metaphysical notion is in essence, a specifically 
musical branch of a metaphysical cosmogony in which there is an originating One-ness or Unity of 
all things, and in which the principle of harmonia, operating at all levels, combines or 'tits 
together' the separate parts of the created, but divided universe. In this notion, the relationship 
between the harmony of the heavens and earthly music, is primarily one of kinship, recognisable in 
a very special context. That context is one in which there is correspondence between Man the 
microcosm, and the macrocosm of the physical universe. The ability of the human soul to respond 
to earthly music arises from the correspondence between the nature of the soul and the nature of 
musical phenomena, both being Divinely ordained, and ordered through the universal principle of 
harmony, or harmonia. Alternatively, the harmony of the spheres is taken to be something divine, 
that is normally only perceived by the soul before its imprisonment in the body. The soul's 
response to music is then seen as a 'turning to its source', and away from the body in which it is 
entombed.22 
and the lexicographers. But these accounts usually refer to the Pythagorean school rather than any 
particular member. vide Freeman, Ancilla, op. cil., p. 82. 
22 c.f. Guthrie, WKC, Orpheus and Greek religion, London, 1935, p. 223. The idea that the soul in entombed 
in the body is also found in the Philolaus fragments (c. 500 BC). See Freeman, Ancil/a, op. cit., p. 74 
(14). 
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In these metaphysical pictures, mathematical order seems to indicate the presence of the 
metaphysical principle of harmony or harmonia. The relationship between the mathematical order 
that governs harmonic musical intervals, and their subjective musical effect, is evidence of the 
underlying kinship and correspondence between all things. The correspondence, in this sense, 
between the nature of the soul and the nature of music, arises only because both have an allegiance 
to the one divine principle of harmony, or harmonia. Iamblichus, for example, denied that the soul 
actually consists of harmony and rhythm, and stated that 'the soul, before she gave herself to the 
body, was an auditor of divine harmony; and hence, when she proceeded into the body and heard 
melodies of such kind as especially preserve the divine vestige of harmony, she embraced these, 
from the recollected divine harmony, and tends and is allied to it, and as much as possible 
participates of it' .23 
These two notions, the pseudo-scientific and the metaphysical, are not necessarily 
separated in any source. In Boethius, for example, the two are present simultaneously. Boethius 
appears to have believed in both the physical sound of the 'harmony of the spheres', and an 
underlying metaphysical kinship between microcosm and macrocosm, based upon harmony. The 
harmony of the spheres is a notion that in totality includes both metaphysical and physical notions 
and embraces the mythical, the mystical, the magical, and the proto-scientific. Its true philosophical 
status cannot be appreciated merely in the context of only one of these. On the contrary, the 
relationship between the mythical, mystical, magical, and scientific, or between the metaphysical 
and the physical, are themselves important questions for which the idea of harmonia mundi stands 
as a timeless monument. The harmony of the spheres is also a notion that connects the realm of 
quantitative astronomy and scientific endeavour, with the essentially metaphysical endeavour of 
musical art. We shall begin by examining some of the evidence for harmonia mundi as a 
quantitative, astronomical proposition, and shall then move to the metaphysical aspect. 
The first, and perhaps most articulate24 description of the harmony of the spheres, in which 
the musical and astronomical components of the tradition appear fully developed,25 is in Plato's 
23 Taylor, T, Jamblichus 011 the mysteries of the Egyptia11s, Chaldea11s, and Assyria11s, London, 1821, 1968, 
pp. 133, 143. 
24 Maula, E, 'The conquest of time', Diotima, Vol. 11, 1983 p. 130. 
25 Phi lip, JA, Pythagoras a11d early Pythagorea11ism, Toronto, 1966, p. 126. 
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account of the 'Myth of Er' in the tenth book of The Republic?6 The notion of quantifiable 
musical proportion in the order of the cosmos is again implicated in Plato's description of the 
creation of the 'world soul' in Timaeus. 21 The latter is the main source of the tradition's 
mathematical impetus, and although in it Plato describes harmonic proportions mathematically, he 
makes in it no explicit reference to music or musical harmony. Further allusions to cosmic music 
appear in Phaedrus/8 and Laws.29 
The description in The Republic takes form within a story recounted by Socrates, about the 
Pamphylian warrior Er, son of Arrnenius, who was killed in battle, but was miraculously brought 
back to life on the funeral pyre, after witnessing the events in the death-world. Er was prevented 
from completing the death process which for the other souls ended in their reincarnation into a life 
of their own choosing. Unlike the other souls, he did not forget what he had seen in the 'other 
world', since he alone was forbidden to 'drink from the waters of the River of Lethe', the River of 
Forgetfulness. 
In brief form, and avoiding some of the more ambiguous or contentious aspects of Plato's 
description, the elements of the myth most closely surrounding the harmony of the spheres are: 30 
A rainbow-like shaft of light that bonds together the whole circumference or revolution of 
the heaven/ 1 
The 'Spindle of Necessity' ,32 1ike the simple spindle used for hand-spinning on earth;33 
26 Plato, The Republic, 616b- 617d, Tr. D Lee, London, 1955, 1987, pp. 388-393. 
27 Plato, Timaeus, 34-37, esp. 35a-36d, in Timaeus and Critias, Tr. D Lee, London, 1965, 1977, p. 46-49. 
28 Phaedrus, 246, E-247 c, see Heath, Sir Thomas L, Greek Astronomy, New York (originally London), 1932, 
1991, pp. 42-43. 
29 Laws, 8898-C. The concept of harmony, harmonic proportion, or concord, also appears in Symposium, 
188A, and Timaeus, 32C (in relation to the elements), and in Symposium 188A, in relation to the 
seasons. (Also cited in Boethius, AMS, Fundamentals of Music, Tr. CM Bower, Ed. CV Palisca, New 
Haven & London, 1989, p. 9, notes). 
30 The philological studies of the Myth consulted are given in Halliwell, S, Plato: Republic /0, Wiltshire, 
1988, pp. 92 ff, & Richardson, H, 'The Myth of Er (Plato, Republic, 6168)', CQ, 20, 1926, pp. 113-133. 
Also consulted: Godwin, J, Music, Mysticism and Magic, London, 1986, pp. 3-8; notes pp. 295-299. 
The synopsis given here is my rendering based firstly upon the translation of Lee, op. cit., with the 
selected alternative translations cited. 
31 Lee, op. cit., p. 388 = 'this light is the bond of heaven and holds its whole circumference together'; 
Halliwell, op. cif, p. 93 = 'this light was the binding of the sky, holding the whole revolution together'; 
Stewart, JA, Tire Myths of Plato, London, 1960, p. 148 = 'this light is that which bindeth the Heavens 
together .. [it holds] together the whole round of Heaven'; Richardson, op. cif., p. 114 ='holding all the 
revolving heaven together'. 
32 Stewart, op. cif., p. 150. Lee, Richardson, and Halliwell use a lower case 's' in 'Spindle'. Taylor, T, The 
works of Plato, London, 1804, Vol.l, pp. 466-475, reproduced in Godwin, Music. Mysticism and 
Magic, op. cif., pp. 4-8, ='distaff of necessity'. 
33 Lee, op. cif., pp. 400-404. 
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The whorl or flywheel at the lower end of the spindle which in this case is composed of 
eight nested 'hollowed-out' whorls of diminishing size, which are hemispherical and fitted 
concentrically inside one another like a nest of bowls. From the largest to the smallest they are 
numbered 1 to 8. Their visible rims form a continuous surface of concentric circles, and are of 
varying breadth. The whole spindle revolves with the same motion, but the inner seven circles 
revolve slowly in the opposite direction, at various speeds/4 
The 'lap ofNecessity' 35 in which the spindle turns; 
Eight Sirens/6 each of which stands on the top rim or circle of an individual whorl, being 
carried round with it, and singing a single note/7 the eight together composing a single harmony.38 
Three enthroned Fates, the Moirae/9 daughters of Necessity, Lachesis, Clotho, and 
Atropos, all in white, and garlanded,40 who sit round about at equal distances41 singing to the 
Sirens' harmony.42 Lachesis sings of things past, Clotho of things present, and Atropos of things to 
come. The three Fates turn the whorls, Clotho from time to time turning the outermost rim with her 
right hand,43 Atropos turning the inner rims with her left hand, and Lachesis turning the inner and 
outer rims alternately with her left and right hands.44 
34 Lee, op. cit., pp. 388-389; pp. 402-404. 
35 Lee & Stewart, op. cit.; Halliwell ='on the lap of necessity'; Taylor, op. cit. =[on] 'the knees of necessity' 
(This is the lit. tr. - See Halliwell, p. 181 ). 
36 Lee gives 'siren' without capitalisation. Halliwell, p. 181, describes Sirens as 'particularly flexible 
mythological figures, often allegorically treated'. 
37 Lee= 'utters a note of constant pitch'; Halliwell ='emitted the sound of a single note'; Stewart ='uttering 
one note at one pitch'; Taylor ='uttering one voice variegated by diverse modulations'. 
38 Lee= 'the eight notes together make up a single scale'; Halliwell = 'a unitary concord'; Stewart = 'one 
melody'; Taylor = 'But that the whole of them, being eight, composed one harmony'. The original 
(Halliwell, op. cit., p. 94) is harmonia, the meaning of which is dealt with below. 
39 The godesses of fate, in Halliwell only, op. cit., p. 94; 95; 182. 
40 Lee, op. cit. & Stewart op. cit.; Taylor ='having crowns on their heads'; Halliwell =wreaths. 
41 Halliwell = 'seated around the rim at equal intervals'; Taylor = 'at equal distance from one another'; 
Stewart = 'at equal distances apart'. 
42 Lee= 'they sing to the siren's music; Taylor = 'singing to the harmony of the Sirens'; Stewart = 'they 
chant to the melody of the Sirens'; Halliwell ='singing to the accompaniment of the Siren's concord'; 
original, Halliwell, p. 94, = ham!OIIia. 
43 Lee = 'Ciotho from time to time takes hold of the outermost rim of the spindle and helps to turn it; Taylor 
= 'Ciotho, at certain intervals, with her right hand laid hold of the spindle, and along her mother turned 
about the outer circle'; Stewart = 'Clotho with her right hand ever and anon taketh hold of the outer 
round of the spindle, and helpeth to turn it; Halliwell = 'Klotho used her right hand to touch and help 
round the outer rotation of the spindle at intervals'. 
44 Lee = 'Lachesis takes inner and outer rims with left and right hands alternately'; Taylor = 'Lachesis 
touched both of these, severally, with either hand'; Stewart = 'Lachesis with either hand taketh hold of 
outer and inner alternately'; Stewart, p. 151, n.l = 'she lays hold of outer ... and inner ... in turn, using her 
right hand for the former, and her left for the latter. 
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The confirming of destiny, in which Lachesis provides new lives and Guardian spirits45 
that the souls themselves choose on the strength of their own virtue and ignorance; Clotho ratifies 
the choice by taking it into the revolution of the spindle beneath her hand;46 and Atropos spins the 
thread of destiny or life, making it irreversible.47 
I have so far not mentioned the further details Plato gives suggesting the geometrical 
arrangement of the light and the heavens, or the details concerning eight whorls, linking them by 
allusion to the celestial bodies and their orbits. These details, together with those Plato gives in 
Timaeus regarding the construction of the 'world-soul', have long been plundered and compared, in 
numerous attempts to reconstruct an original Platonic or Pythagorean astronomical system that 
embodies a quantifiable celestial harmony.48 A conclusive interpretation along these lines has been 
prevented by the fact that Plato's descriptions, and sometimes the Greek itself, are simply too 
ambiguous. 
A purely quasi-scientific attempt to reconstruct a Platonic system of musico-astronomy 
from Plato's myths will tend to extract the mathematical and astronomical elements and treat them 
in relative isolation, and to ignore the import of qualitative symbols like 'the lap of Necessity', or 
the colour of the Fates' attire. Yet the story is actually a spiritual and moral myth about the 
meaning of life and death, and not merely a parable symbolising a proto-scientific system of 
astronomy. The details I have given so far deliberately portray the metaphysical, rather than the 
pseudo-scientific context of the Sirens' music. It should be noted that the music is not in this 
context an incidental factor, any more, say, than is the fact that the Fates are the 'daughters of 
Necessity'. It is integral to the myth both through its association with the whorls, and through the 
Fates themselves who sing to the sirens' harmony and spin the irreversible threads of fate with the 
spindle of Necessity. The musical part of the myth is nevertheless all too often treated as if it were 
a separate, added dimension, woven into the fabric of the myth, exclusively representing some 
45 Lee, op. cit.; Taylor ='daemon'; Stewart ='Angel'; Halliwell ='daimon'. 
46 Lee = 'the Guardian Spirit first led it [the soul] to Clotho, thus ratifying beneath her hand and whirling 
spindle the lot it had chosen'; Stewart = 'taketh him [the soul] beneath her hand and the revolution of 
the whirling spindle, and ratifying the Portion which the man had chosen in his turn'; Halliwell ="the 
daimon first of allied the soul to Klotho, beneath her hand and the turning of the spindles' motion, thus 
ratifying the portion oflife which the person chose". 
47 Lee= 'he [the Guardian Spirit]led it [the soul] next to where Atropos spins, so making the threads of its 
destiny irreversible'; Stewart = 'the Angel brought him [the soul] unto Atropos where she span; so did 
he [sic] make the threads of the man's life unalterable'. 
48 See, for example, Maula, E, 'The conquest of Time', Diotima, Vol. I I, 1983, pp. 130-148. 
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quantitative Pythagorean doctrine about harmonic arithmetic proportion in what we now call the 
solar system. 
The astronomical details in isolation, as given by Plato, are as follows. The associations 
with the celestial bodies are a generally agreed point of interpretation, rather than anything 
explicitly stated by Plato, and it is similarly assumed that the celestial system is geocentric: 
1st whorl: Outermost. Broadest rim. Many-coloured, spangled49 or sparkling.50 Associated 
with the sphere of fixed stars. 
2nd whorl: 8th broadest rim. Fifth in speed. Similar to 5th whorl and yellowish. Associated 
with Saturn. 
3rd whorl: 7th broadest rim. Fourth in speed. The whitest. Associated with Jupiter. 
4th whorl: 3rd broadest rim. Third in speed, appearing to move with a counter-revolution. 
Reddish. Associated with Mars. 
5th whorl: 6th broadest nm. Second fastest speed. Similar to 2nd whorl and yellowish. 
Associated with Mercury. 
6th whorl: 2nd broadest rim. Second fastest speed. Second in whiteness. Associated with 
Venus. 
7th whorl: 5th broadest rim. Second fastest speed. The brightest. Associated with the Sun. 
8th whorl: 4th broadest rim. Innermost and fastest. 111uminated by the seventh from which it 
takes its colour. Associated with the Moon. 
In Timaeus Plato tells how God constructed the soul of the world out of three constituents, 
forming what from his description appears to be something like an armillary sphere.51 We will not 
here closely scrutinise the details Plato gives, other than to say that the process involves dividing 
something called 'the whole' into proportions determined by the series of numbers 1,2,3,4,8,9 and 
27. These numbers are used in the discourse to produce 'intervals'52 in the harmonic proportions 
2/1, 3/2, 4/3, 9/8, and 256/243, which correspond to the octave, fifth, fourth, whole tone,53 and 
49 Halliwell, op. cif., p. 93. 
50 Halliwell, op. cif., p. 180. 
51 See Plato, Timeaus, Tr. Lee, op. cif., p. 47 & frontispiece. 
52 Timearts, Tr. Lee, op. cif., p. 48. 
53 A large whole tone. 
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diatonic semitone of the old Pythagorean tuning.54 This correspondence, however, 1s 
circumstantial as it appears in the text, and Plato makes no explicit reference to musical harmony. 
Cornford argued that the series was employed for reasons that have nothing to do with music.55 
Plato also describes 'circles' being made, whose motions correlate to the motions of the whorls in 
the Myth of Er. 
The quantitative, physical idea behind the general form of the harmonia mundi concept as 
it appears in the later pseudo-scientific tradition is not dependent upon the metaphysical or 
mythical notion of singing Sirens or Moirae, but prosaically assumes that the celestial bodies, being 
large and fast-moving, must produce from their movements sounds whose pitches are associated 
with their size, speed, and position. This branch of the tradition held that the bodies move at speeds 
which are related to their distances from the centre of the system, generally with the slower moving 
bodies giving the lowest notes, and the fastest moving, the highest notes. In a further extension of 
this pseudo-scientific hypothesis, the radii of the orbits and the sidereal speeds of the celestial 
bodies are said to be somehow arithmetically arranged in harmonic proportions with the result that 
the sounds produced are musically harmonious, or correspond to a musical harmony or scale.56 
This sound was sometimes said to have been audible to Pythagoras, but not audible to everyone 
because from birth everyone was exposed to it, and in the absence of genuine, contrasting silence, 
everyone was adapted and unaware of it. 
An Unlikely Story 
It is Plato's pupil, Aristotle- assumed to have been the earliest important authority on the 
Pythagoreans57 - who provides in his De caelo the first explicit exposition of this pseudo-scientific 
account,58 and he does so with the intention of disputing it. Aristotle also purported to give 
metaphysical legitimacy to the notion of concentric celestial spheres. The concept of concentric 
spheres in the heavens had appeared much earlier, in the philosophy of Anaximander (BC c.61 0-
546), and had later been developed by Eudoxus (BC c.390-340), who proposed a system 26 spheres 
54 The ratio of 256/243 which also appears in Eratosthenes' Diatonic tuning and Ptolemy's Dialonic 
Diatoniaion. See Murray Barbour, J, Tuning and Temperament, New York (originally Michigan), 1951, 
1972, pp. 19-21. 
55 Comford, FM, Plato 's Cosmology, London, 1937, p. 68. 
56 Levin, FR, The harmonics ofNicomaclws and the Pythagorean tradition, Pennsylvania, 1975. p.l. 
57 Ibid., p. 69. 
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as a mathematical model intended to explain the combined motions of the stars and planets. 59 
Eudoxus envisaged each inner sphere revolving on an axis attached to the surrounding sphere, the 
system thereby allowing complex motion. Eudoxus' pupil Callipus (BC c.370-c.300) improved the 
scheme by adding a further eight spheres.60 Aristotle then brought the conjectured number up to 54, 
but for Aristotle concentric celestial spheres are also important as an essential part of his own 
system of 'metaphysics'. They are composed of 'eternal substance', 'immovable in itself, but 
which itself moves the planets and stars, since they are incapable of moving by themselves.61 The 
celestial bodies were, Aristotle maintained, 'fastened to' or 'inherent in' the spheres that move 
them,62 an idea confirmed by Theon of Smyma and attributed to Pythagoras himself.63 The inability 
of the celestial bodies to move by themselves, and their attachment to, or inherence in the spheres, 
was seen by Aristotle as a significant factor in demolishing the doctrine of the harmony of the 
spheres. The celestial bodies could not produce sound, Aristotle argued, since there was no relative 
motion, friction, or concussion. He argues that 'A thing moving in something which is not moved 
makes a sound; but a thing moving in something which moves continuously and causes no 
concussion, cannot possibly make a sound' .64 
Aristotle thus rejected the pseudo-scientific doctrine as he understood and described it. In 
Metaphysics he repudiated the whole idea of cosmic harmony based upon number,65 and 
considered that the Pythagoreans had engaged in the spurious adaptation of 'numbers and 
harmonies' to the 'properties and parts of the heaven and its whole arrangement' .66 Alexander 
confirmed Aristotle's position in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,67 just as countless 
others must have rejected the idea since. But how authoritative was Aristotle's account in the first 
instance? 
58 De Caelo, !1, 9, 289a 11-291b 23; Tr. in Heath, Sir Thomas L, Greek Astronomy, New York, (originally 
London) 1932, 1991, p. 73 IT. 
59 O'Neal, Early astronomy from Babylonia to Copemicus, Sydney, 1986, p. 61 IT; see also Heath, Greek 
Astronomy, op. cit., pp. xliv ff. 
60 Ibid., p. 65 ff. 
61 Metaphysics, 8, 1073 a 23-b 17, Tr. in Heath, Sir Thomas L, Greek Astronomy, New York, (originally 
London) 1932, 1991, pp. 72-73. 
62 Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 79. 
63 Ibid., p. 11. 
64 Ibid., p. 79. 
65 Metaphysics, Book Alpha, 985b IT, cited in Moyer, AE, Musica Scientia, Ithaca & London, 1992, p. 19. 
66 Metaphysics, A 5, 986, a I; Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 34. 
67 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1966, pp. 123-124; Translation of Alexander's 
description of the doctrine, (Metaphysics, A 5, p. 542 a 5-18 Brandis) appears in Heath, Sir Thomas L, 
Greek Astronomy, New York, (originally London) 1932, 1991, pp. 34-35. 
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Aristotle himself speaks of, but does not disclose the alleged quantified Pythagorean 
scheme defining a relationship between musical intervals and an astronomical system. According 
to Alexander, who also offers no quantified Pythagorean scheme but instead invents his own 
example,68 Aristotle knew no details of Pythagorean cosmic harmony.69 If so, was Aristotle merely 
reiterating an existing belief, perhaps widely held, but nonetheless based only upon ignorance and 
impression? The secrecy surrounding the early Pythagorean school would scarcely make it 
unreasonable to draw this conclusion. lamblichus (250-325 AD) noted that there were very few 
Pythagoreans whose writings were then known, and said that 'their excellence in keeping secrets 
k d . . .70 provo es a mtratwn . 
Admittedly, Iamblichus does also mention three books published by Philolaus, a member 
of the Pythagorean fellowship. These were said to have been bought by Dion of Syracuse, on 
Plato's advice.71 The story thus infers that as Plato's pupil, Aristotle may possibly have seen a 
written, quantitative exposition of Pythagorean doctrine, if indeed such a doctrine existed. If we 
take Philolaus' birth to have been BC c.480, then Philolaus would probably have been in his 
seventies by the time Plato was eighteen years old. Given that we do not know when Philolaus 
died, one could argue the possibility that there is some truth in the story, and that Plato himself had 
seen a clear exposition of a quantitative doctrine by Philolaus. However, the quantitative doctrine 
Aristotle alludes to is not explicated anywhere in Plato. If we are to be pedantic, then it has to be 
said that if Philolaus' writings were in close circulation when Plato was a young man, it can be 
argued that Aristotle may have seen a written Pythagorean doctrine by Philolaus. 
All this conjecture in support of Aristotle is arguably rather weak, and there still remains a 
glaring inconsistency within Aristotle's portrayal of the Pythagoreans. It was understood by 
Aristotle that in Pythagorean cosmology the Earth was not at rest,72 but revolved around a central 
'fire'. This central 'fire' was not necessarily taken to be the visible sun, and Aristotle explicitly 
mentions the motion of the sun, in his description of the Pythagorean 'doctrine' .73 Aristotle also 
68 Huff man, CA, Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, 1993, p. 280. 
69 Burkert, W, Lore and science in ancient Pythagoreanism, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 353-354. 
7
° Clark, G, /ambliclws: On the Pythagorean Life, Livelllool, 1989, pp. 85-86. 
71 
'The notorious "three books", bought for one hundred minai, at a time when Philolaus was desperately 
poor', Ibid. 
72 De Caelo, B 13, 293 a 15-b 30; Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Also Heath, Aristarchus, 
op. cit., p.96. 
73 De Cae/o, II, 9, see Plato, Tr, Lee, op. cit., p. 400; Metaphysics, i\8, see Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., 
p. 78. 
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understood that Pythagorean cosmology included an invisible74 'counter-earth', which he says 
was only introduced in order to make the number of celestial bodies equal ten, a number that the 
Pythagoreans regarded as perfect.75 However, including the sphere of fixed stars, a system with 
both the Sun and Earth orbiting a centre would have eleven and not ten celestial orbits.76 The 
sphere of fixed stars was treated as an integral part of the rotating celestial system elsewhere in 
early Greek astronomy, and Aristotle makes no mention of the sphere of fixed stars being treated 
separately or differently by the Pythagoreans. There is no reason given in his report to suggest he 
understood Pythagorean cosmology as excluding the sphere of fixed stars from the pseudo-
scientific scheme of cosmic harmony. Burkert has stated that Nicomachus proposed a system that 
contradicted the reports of Aristotle, specifically 'because it excluded the sphere of fixed stars and 
gave the moon the highest note' .77 It might be argued that Aristotle made a simple oversight in 
mentioning the movement of the Sun, and that he actually understood the Pythagorean system as 
having the stationary visible Sun as the central 'fire'. However, if that was the case, then Aristotle's 
understanding would still be suspect, as it would in this respect then be at variance with the 
attestations of both Aetius78 and Simplicus/9 in the description of the Philolaus' cosmology.80 
Aristotle's account of Pythagorean cosmology is thus questionable, and the assertion that 
the harmony of the spheres was a quantitative, quasi-scientific notion invented by Pythagoras - an 
assertion that seems to have originated with Aristotle - begins to loose some of its credibility on 
close examination. In the later tradition there appear a number of systems that are attributed to 
Pythagoras,81 and there seems to be no reason for ascribing absolute credibility to any one over 
another. The writings of the Pythagorean Philolaus do not help clarify the matter. Philolaus' 
astronomical system has been subject to what Huffman has described as 'the widest range of 
74 The counter-earth was said to be invisible because it was continuously obscured from sight. 
75 Metaphysics, A 5, 985 a I; Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cif., p. 34. 
76 c.f. Kingsley, P, Ancient philosophy, mystery and magic, Oxford, 1995, p. 174. 
77 Burkert, W, Lore and science in ancient Pythagorean ism, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972, p. 353. 
78 Aetius, 11, 7, 7, (Diels, revised by Kranz, A16), Explicitly mentions the sun as one of the 'divine bodies' 
that move in a 'dance' around the 'middle'. See Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cif., pp. 32-33; Tr, 
Huffman, Philolaus, op. cit., pp. 237-238; Aetius, Ill, 13, 2, (Diels, revised by Kranz, A21). 
79 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1966, pp. 113-114, states that Simplicus 
reports Philolaus to have held 'The middle is first in rank. Around it move in choral dance ten divine 
bodies: the sphere of fixed stars, the five planets, sun, moon, earth, and counter-earth'. 
80 Huffman, Philolaus of Croton, op. cif., pp. 231-240, cites other attestations to the astronomical system of 
Philolaus: Aristotle, De Caelo, 2.3, 293a18ff; Metaph. 38.20, De Caelo 511.25, Simplicus, Ph. 1354.2, 
Diels, revised by Kranz, (DK) Al6 (=Aetius 2.7.7), DK A17 (=Aetius 3.11.3), DK A21 (=Aetius 
3.13.2), Eudemus, F146(=Simplicus, De Caelo 471.4 = DK 12A19), Aristotle, Met. 342b30 & 345a14. 
81 Heath, Sir Thomas L, Aristarchus ofSamos- the ancient Greek Copernicus, Oxford, 1913, 1959, p. 107 ff. 
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assessments imaginable' .82 The first detailed account that seems to be have been based upon 
something like Philolaus' system, is by Plutarch (c.50-c.l20 AD), who contradicts Aristotle by 
describing the distances of the heavenly bodies from the central fire as increasing by powers of 
three.83 Huffrnan was sceptical about Aristotle's attestations generally, stating that 'following the 
work of Chemiss (1935), many other detailed studies have shown that Aristotle is very prone to 
reformulate earlier philosophy in his own terminology and for his own dialectical purposes' .84 
Scepticism about the plausibility of a Pythagorean origin to the pseudo-scientific tradition 
is not difficult to find amongst scholars. Burkert states that a mathematical system of celestial 
harmony before Eudoxus is difficult to conceive, and dismisses as a misconception the view 'put 
forward again and again as virtually self-evident' that the notion of cosmic music was inferred 
from a scientific system. He also criticises the 'scale of the music of the spheres which in later 
times was most widely known and attributed to Pythagoras', as a 'botched version of Eratosthenes' 
exposition' .85 He argues that it is only 'in pre-scientific conceptions of order that the idea of cosmic 
music has its roots',86 and that the original doctrine was not a scientific system worked out in detail, 
and according to the earliest testimonia was not even based on any detailed astronomical system.87 
The other area of difficulty in alleging a Pythagorean quantitative or pseudo-scientific 
doctrine, concerns the mathematical ratios governing the musical intervals. The idea that it is 
arithmetic harmonic ratios inherent in the celestial system that are responsible for its alleged 
musically harmonious properties, is necessarily based upon a knowledge of the relation between 
musical harmony and arithmetical, harmonic proportions. The part of the tradition that ascribes to 
Pythagoras the discovery of the relation between the ratios 6:8:9:12 and the octave, fifth, fourth, 
and whole tone, is itself most probably spurious. Pythagoras is said to have listened to the hammers 
of four smithies, which were striking the metal and ringing out notes in the musical relation of a 
fourth, fifth, and octave. The story itself, as it is reported by Nicomachus, Iamblichus, and 
82 Huffrnan, CA, Phi/olaus of Croton, op. cit., p. 240. 
83 Ibid., p. 281. 
84 Ibid., p. 59; see also p. 202. 
85 Burkert, Waiter, Lore and science in ancient Pythagorean ism, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972, p. 352. 
86 Ibid., p. 357. 
87 Ibid., p. 355; & cited in Huffinan, Philolaus o[Croto11, op. cit., p. 279. 
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numerous others,88 is well known to be certainly fictitious because it explicitly asserts Pythagoras 
to have discovered the arithmetical ratios via acoustical laws which we know do not exist.89 
Levin put both the musical and astronomical parts of the tradition in perspective, 
emphasising that an inverse proportion exists between the quantity of extant documentation and its 
date of origin, and stating that 'despite the weight and centuries old persistence of the ancient 
tradition ascribing to Pythagoras such acoustical and astronomical discoveries as would provide a 
basis for the doctrine, it is impossible to discover any concrete evidence that might justify the 
attributions'.90 Levin argued against both AE Taylor91 and Sir Thomas Heath,92 who accepted 
Pythagoras as the discoverer of harmonic ratios, and refuted the view of A Delatte93 that the ancient 
reports are unanimous in ascribing the discovery to Pythagoras. She states that 'Despite the weight 
of these statements, the search for unanimity among the ancients reveals quite the opposite 
condition' .94 JA Phi lip confirms Levin's view, slating that 'There are no good grounds for believing 
Pythagoras discovered the three intervals [fourth, fifth and octave] .... It is more likely that the 
theory [of harmonia mundi] arose in connection with seven notes and seven planets .... ' 95 Phi lip 
suggests that the idea originated as a 'poetic insight' .96 
More specifically, it has been alternatively suggested that the source of the idea may have 
come from an association of the seven strings of the lyre with the seven planets in the geocentric 
celestial system.97 According to Boethius, music 'in the beginning' was made on only four strings, 
and remained that way until the time of Orpheus, when more strings were added.98 There is a 
traditional belief, traceable to Nicomachus, that Pythagoras added an eighth string to the seven-
88 For a tr. ofNicomachus' account in Enchiridion 6, see Levin, FR, The harmonics of Nicomachus and the 
Pythagorean tradition, Pennsylvania, 1975, p. 70. For a tr. of lamblichus' account see Clark, G, 
lamblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, Liverpool, 1989, pp. 50-54. For citations of other sources see 
Levin, FR, The harmonics of Nicomachus and the Pythagorean tradition, Pennsylvania, 1975, p. 70 IT. 
89 The story occurs in numerous other sources and asserts that Pythagoras found the weights of the hammers 
to be in the ratios 6:8:9: 12, and confmned his findings by hanging weights in the same ratios on 
tensioned strings of fixed length. The ratios would only produce the musical intervals of a fourth, fifth, 
and octave, when applied as linear divisions of the length of a tensioned string, not when applied to the 
weights or tension in the string. 
90 Levin, op. cit., p. 6. 
91 AE Taylor, A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, Oxford, 1928, pp. 164 & 489. Cited in Levin, op. cit., p. 
67. 
92 Heath, Aristarchus, op. cit., p. 46. Cited in Levin, op. cit., p. 67. 
93 A Delatte, Etudes sur la litterature Pythagoricienne, Paris, 1915, p. 259. Cited in Levin, op. cit., p. 68. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1996, p. 126. 
96 Ibid., p. 128. 
97 Burkert, Lore and science, op. cit., p. 351. 
98 Boethius, AMS, Fundamentals of Music, Tr. CM Bower, Ed. CV Palisca, New Haven & London, 1989, p. 
29. 
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string lyre, thereby creating a diatonic octave.99 A close qualitative association of actual musical 
instrument strings with the astronomical system is also evident in the thought of Claudius Ptolemy. 
Ptolemy is perhaps better known as a contributor to the quantitative tradition, and the originator of 
the geocentric celestial system that predominated for fifteen centuries until the scienti fie 
revolution, 100 but at the beginning of his extensive three-book treatise entitled Harmonics, he states 
that the student of harmonics must aim 'to preserve the hypotheses of the kanon' (a stringed 
instrument), and that the astronomer must aim 'to preserve the hypotheses concerning the 
movements of the heavenly bodies ... ' 101 
Whether or not Pythagoras did actually discover the harmonic ratios himself, the fact is 
that the earliest extant occurrence of the smithy story is the one by Nicomachus, 102 and his account 
is described by Levin as 'a real fairy-tale version, complete with a "once upon a time" and a 
miraculous circumstance, a tale that quite possibly had its roots in near Eastern legends dealing 
with the origins of music' .103 
Circumstantial Evidence 
There is thus a serious lack of solid evidence supporting the traditional claim that the 
quantitative notion and tradition of harmonia mundi is Pythagorean in origin. So, if the quantitative 
notions are connected to Pythagoras only through rumour, what kind of circumstantial fire is there 
in pre-Socratic writing, behind the vast amount of quantitative, quasi-scientific smoke that has been 
produced? 
The earliest attempt to quantify the dimensions of the lunar and solar orbits is found in the 
reported philosophy of Anaximander, 104 who was not a Pythagorean, but a member of the Ionic 
School. The details known are related to Anaximander's cosmogony. The cosmogony involves the 
formation of at least three concentric 'circles or rings' about the Earth. These were formed when a 
'sphere of flame (or fire)' that had grown 'around the air about the Earth', was 'tom off and closed 
99 Levin, op. cif., p. 75. 
100 Ptolemy's system (late 1st or early 2nd century AD) was, however, heavily indebted to Hipparchus (BC 
c.l90-c.120). 
101 Taub, LC, Ptolemy 's universe, Chicago & LaSalle, Illinois, 1993, pp. 125-126; Barker, A, Greek musical 
writings, Vo1.2, Cambridge, 1989, p. 278. On the kanon, see Barker, op. cit., pp. 278; 291; 319; 340-
345; 362 ff. 
102 Levin, op. cit., p. 101. 
103 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
104 Kahn, CH, Anaximander and the origins of Greek cosmology, New York, 1960, p. 95. 
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up into certain circles' .105 These 'wheel-like' circles of fire, are enclosed by 'compressed masses 
of air' [which by implication obscures the fire] that have 'pipe shaped passages', 'vents', 'nozzles' 
or orifices, through which the fire is 'exhaled'. 106 These form the visible sun, moon, and 'stars' 
[presumably including the planets], and eclipses occur when the vents are obstructed. According to 
Aetius, something akin to this notion of 'air' obscuring an enclosed fire, occurred in Empidocles' 
cosmology, where the enclosing 'air' or 'mist' takes on an explicitly solid, crystal-like form. 107 
Anaximander's astronomical quantifications begins with the Earth, which according to the 
reports, he held to be 'rounded, circular, like a stone pillar', or like a cylinder, one of whose plane 
surfaces is that on which we stand. The depth is one third of the breath. 108 
Next, are the attestations by Hippolytus and Aetius regarding the sun and the Earth. 
Hippolytus states in a corrupt passage109 that 'the circle of the Sun is twenty-seven times as large as 
the earth, and that of the moon is nineteen times as large as the earth. 110 
Aetius states: 
'The sun is a circle twenty-eight times the size of the 
earth .. .' 111 
'The sun is equal to the earth and the circle from which the 
sun gets its vent and by which it is borne round is twenty-
seven times the size of the earth.' 112 
'The moon is a circle nineteen times as large as the earth; it 
is like a chariot-wheel, the rim of which is hollow and full of 
fire, like the circle of the sun ... .' 113 
105 Pseudo-Piutarch, Stromal 2. See Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p.5; Kahn, Anaximander, op. cif., p. 85; 
Conche, M, Anaximandre- Fragments et Temoignagnes, Paris, 1991, p. 193. 
106 Aetius, 11, 13, 7; 20,1; 21, I; 24, 2; 25, I 29, I. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., pp. 5-7; Hippolytus, 
Refutation of all Heresies, I, 6, 4, 5. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 5. See also Kahn, 
Anaximander, op. cit., pp. 85, 87. 
107 Aetius, 11, 11, 2. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 21. 
108 Hippolytus & Pseudo-Piutarch, op. cit., Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 6; See also Kahn, 
Atuuimander, op. cit., p. 81. 
109 Conche, M, Anaximandre- Fragments et Temoignagnes, Paris, 199I, p. 209. 
110 Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies, I, 6, 5. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 6. See also Kahn, 
Anaximander, op. cit., p. 85. 
111 Aetius, 11, 20, I. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 6. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Aetius, 11, 25, I. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
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'The sun is placed highest of all, after it the moon, and under them the fixed 
stars and the planets.' 114 
The ambiguities and lack of consistency in these simultaneous statements are all too 
obvious. 115 As far as his cosmology is concerned, it is not clear whether Anaximander's 'stars' are 
formed from more than one 'circle'. If the five planets each had a sphere, then the total of eight 
spheres would potentially be musically significant, but the extant attestations quantify only two 
circles and three celestial bodies. The three obvious musically significant ratios of 2: I, 4:3, and 3:2, 
for the octave, fourth, and fifth, cannot be found in Anaximander's figures, and could only be 
generated with a great deal of inductive imagination. It must also be said, that although 
Anaximander's cosmogony contains quantification, it need not necessarily be interpreted as 
pseudo-scientific in nature, particularly in respect of the spheres of flame. It could be just as well 
argued that this is a mystical description expressed in physical terminology. We will look at this 
argument more closely, a little later. We cannot be certain one way or the other. 
Next, we come to Archytas. 
Huffman has suggested that Philolaus should be regarded as the primary Pythagorean 
source for Aristotle. 116 Philolaus would have been an important source of evidence, given that he 
lived about a century before Aristotle. But the contents of the fragments of Archytas, which are a 
Pythagorean source approximately contemporaneous with Aristotle, reveal an altogether more 
intriguing correlation with the assertions of Aristotle about the Pythagorean doctrine. However, 
what Archytas says in the Diels fragments 117 falls significantly short of confirming Aristotle's 
account. Archytas begins by praising the discernment of mathematicians, saying that they have 
'handed on to us a clear judgement' concerning the mathematical studies of astronomy, arithmetic, 
114 Aetius, II, 15, 6. Tr. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 7. 
115 See, for example, Conche, M, Anaximandre - Fragments et Temoignagnes, Paris, 1991, p. 209. An 
interpretation that fits the statements consistently is: 
a) The diameter across the centre of the celestial system, of the circle that runs along the centre of the ring 
of fire, is 28 the diameter of the Earth. 
b) The width or diameter of the fire itself, which is the same as the width of the hollow in the air enclosing 
it, is the same as the diameter of the Earth. 
c) The diameter across the centre of the celestial system, of the line along the surface of the hollow 
containing the fue, that is closest to the centre of the celestial system, is 27 times the diameter of the 
Earth. 
116 Huffman, Philolaus, op. cit., p. 58. 
117 Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 
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geometry and music, which he says 'appear to be related' .118 He then says 'They are concerned 
with things that are related, namely the two primary forms of Being'. Very significantly, or so it 
seems, he then embarks on a lengthy exposition on the physics of sound production from moving 
bodies. Notably, he also offers explanations as to why some sounds cannot be heard by us, saying 
that this can be because they are too faint, too great a distance from us, or even because they are too 
loud. Next he explains why swift motion produces high-pitched sound, and slow motion, low-
pitched sound, but in all of this discourse no mention is made of the celestial bodies producing 
sound. 119 After this acoustical thesis, we have a short section on the mathematics of music. This 
speaks about the three 'means' - arithmetic, geometric, and 'harmonic' - and is no more than a 
statement about the arithmetic rules. 120 In the next section of discourse the attention has moved on 
to other matters. Here is revealed a very pragmatic and unmystical view on the acquisition of 
knowledge, and this leads on to asserting the place of right reckoning in civil order. Lastly, a 
fragment said to be from a work entitled 'Conversations', states that in regard to wisdom, 
arithmetic seems to be far superior to all other sciences. 121 
Thus all the basic elements of the Pythagorean doctrine as alleged by Aristotle, seem to 
occur in isolation from each other in the Archytas fragments contained in Diels, but we are 
confronted with a number of critical 'missing links' that would be essential in order to interpret the 
fragments as anything other than circumstantial evidence of the quantitative doctrine. Archytas is 
certainly a good witness to the importance placed upon mathematics in Pythagoreanism. He refers 
once to Being, but there is otherwise nothing mystical or mythical in what Archytas says. Whilst 
with an inductive leap it could be inferred from what he says that the celestial bodies might 
produce harmonic sounds if their speeds were suitably related, the extant fragments contain no such 
actual assertions. 
And what ofPhilolaus? 
To construe the quantitative doctrine as being inherent in the fragments attributed to 
Philolaus, would require an even greater effort of induction. The significance of Number is 
mentioned, as are harmonic ratios and universal harmonia, but there is no inference that musical 
118 Freeman, Ancilla, op. cit., p. 78. 
119 Ibid., p. 78. 
120 Ibid., p. 79-80. 
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harmony is inherent in the heavens, either acoustically or through harmonic, arithmetical 
ratios. 122 Philolaus, as we shall see below, is far more interesting for his qualitative, metaphysical 
notions, both in the fragments attributed to him and in the later attestations. 
The pre-eminence of the metaphysical One and Harmo11ia 
What we are confronted with in the sources is a mixture of what appears to be quantitative, 
or pro to- or pseudo-scienti fie assertions, and qualitative or metaphysical discourse. The qualitative 
is mythical or mystical, and is couched in terms of the Divine, Being, Mind, soul, the creation of 
the world out of the One through opposites, and the principle of harmonia, binding together and 
ordering the opposing elements. The quantitative appears as the discussion of mathematical or 
numerical principles, or as quantitative and numerical assertions. It is not immediately apparent 
how a division between 'mystical' or 'mythical' thought, and 'scientific' thought, is to be made; 
nor is it clear how the two were connected. In the sources the two strands can be intertwined in one 
discourse. 
It has often been supposed that in Pythagoreanism a mystical significance must have been 
ascribed to mathematical order. Dividing the length of a musical string by certain simple whole 
number proportions yielded musically harmonic intervals. Surely, it is frequently argued, this was 
seen by Pythagoreans as evidence of the mystical power and significance of Number? The 
Pythagoreans were reported by Aristotle to have claimed that 'all things are Number'. Does this not 
imply that Number is the Reality or substance behind the appearance of the world? Is this not the 
Pythagorean doctrine that makes the quantitative harmonia mundi so important? This is a common 
enough assumption about Pythagoreanism, but it fails to look beneath surface appearances. The 
Pythagoreans placed great importance upon Number and recognised its quantitative and predictive 
power. They saw that certain natural physical phenomena were governed by Number. But that does 
not mean that the original Pythagoreanism celebrated Number as an ultimate mystical cause or 
'substance' in itself. Number can have more than one role in mystical thought, and its appearance 
in an ancient source is not necessarily to be taken only as an expression of what now seems like 
121 Ibid., p. 80-81. The argument in favour of arithmetic seems to be in refutation of the notion that geometry 
is superior, a belief that arises because of its ability to deal with functions that involve the irrational 
proportions that simple arithmetic is unable to express, without the aid of decimal convention. 
122 Ibid., pp. 73-77. 
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scientific, quasi-scientific, or mathematical thought. This is amply illustrated in the following 
outline of a dispute between the scholars Kahn and Dicks. 
In Anaximander and the origins of Greek cosmology, CH Kahn asks if Anaximander's 
quantifications should be considered as 'part of a mythic or a scientific point of view', 123 and 
concludes in favour of considering Anaximander as the 'earliest known type of mathematical 
physicist' outside Babylonia. 124 This view was attacked by DR Dicks in Early Greek astronomy to 
Aristotle, as a distorted picture. 125 Distorted it may or may not be, but examination of the context of 
Kahn's comment reveals something far more important. 
What Kahn was effectively asking, was if Anaximander's use of number in his cosmology 
was proto-, pseudo-, or quasi-scientific, or alternatively if he had introduced numbers as a mystical 
or metaphysical symbol. Kahn's description of Anaximander as a 'physicist', in the modem sense 
of the word, was a relative judgement made by comparing Anaximander's use of number 
specifically with the role of number in an explicitly mystical source - the Indian Vedas. 126 Sir 
Thomas Heath had previously suggested that Anaximander's three-stage cosmogony is little more 
than a reiteration of the three cosmic steps of Vis/mu from Heaven to Earth. 127 Kahn's comment, 
the comment criticised by Dicks, was part of a negative response to Heath's assertion, a response 
that ran as follows. Kahn recognised that if Anaximander's quantifications are considered as having 
been made for mythical reasons, then something is profoundly lacking in Anaximander's 
mythology and viewpoint, when compared with the Vedas, which also use quantification. 
That which Anaximander seems to be lacking, is clearly present and self-evident in the 
stature and profundity of the Vedas. Kahn's view is: 
'One cannot reduce mythic speculation as it is practised in 
the Rigveda either to poetry or superstition. The finest Vedic 
hymns clearly represent an effort to give speculative unity to 
the world as it is known to the poet and to his audience. 
There is, I think, nothing comparable in the Greek tradition, 
123 Kahn, Anaxima11der, op. cif., p. 95. 
124 Ibid., p. 97. 
125 Dicks, DR, Early Greek astronomy to Aristotle, London, 1970, p. 45. 
126 Kahn, Anaxima11der, op. cif., pp. 95-96. 
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which is in some sense already devoid of myth in Homer' .128 
Kahn goes on to iJiustrate that in the Vedas, the number 3 is significant because it 
symbolises the descent from One-ness or Unity, to duality, and thence to the world of plurality in 
general. When it is raised to the second power, the number 9, the significance is increased in the 
way we might enhance the meaning of "forever" by saying "forever and ever". 129 The use of 
number in the Vedas is part of a language that is deeply metaphysical in meaning yet quantitative in 
form, that is used for 'expressing the grandeur and perfection of the universe considered as a 
whole'. In Anaximander, numbers are not used in this way, and are not symbols in a context of the 
Divine, but are prosaic figures relating to the diameters of concentric circles. 130 
If one reads the Anaximander attestations one sees in them nothing that compares to other 
qualitative, metaphysical discourses, even of other Greek philosophers, for example Philolaus. 131 
The same thing can be said of the writings by Archytas. What Anaximander and Archytas say, 
appears to be primarily proto-physics, and has very little, if anything at aJI, to do with overtly 
metaphysical cosmogony, the mystical, or the Divine. It portrays an outlook very different from 
that of the ancient East, and distinct from that of say, Philolaus or Empidocles, who share in a 
perhaps diminished way, something of the mysticism of the Vedas. 
This suggests that although the Greek sources, in common with the Vedas, contain mystical 
or mythical prose relating to the creation of duality, and thence the world of plurality, out of the 
originating One, they are already in some degree removed from the depth of mystical vision 
inherent in the Vedas, and have also begun to exhibit in some cases an inteJiectual pre-occupation 
with the quantitative structure of the universe, as a separate branch of their concerns. Nevertheless, 
both branches of concern co-exist in the sources. The only thing that could possibly link those 
otherwise separate concerns, would be a belief, taken for granted, that quantitative order is itself a 
manifestation of Divine order, and a manifestation of harmonia. 
One of the haJimarks of Pythagoreanism (and of other pre-Socratics) seems to be the 
conjunct appearance of the mystical or mythical, with the quantitative. As we have said, many 
127 Heath, Sir Thomas, Arisfarc/ws, op. cif., p. 38. 
128 Kahn, Anaximander, op. cif., p. 95. 
129 Ibid., p. 96. 
130 Ibid. 
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would argue that the Pythagoreans ascribed a mystical significance to Number itself, usually in a 
numerological way. But even if they did, this would not conflict with an originating philosophy 
that saw Number as an important manifestation of harmonia, harmonia being the first mystical 
principle. Even explicit numerological mysticism need not automatically be interpreted as the 
belief that mathematical order in itself, is the Divine, the Real, or an ultimate structure or cause, 
rather than the working of Divinely ordained harmonia, fitting together and ordering the many fold 
parts of a universe created through opposites, out of the One. 
Thus, the Pythagorean concern with Number, can be seen as partly a quantitative, 
predictive order, and partly as a qualitative, mystical symbol. This does not imply that Pythagoras 
must have held Number itself to be the highest mystical reality. There is no reason why 'The One' 
should be seen as having been demoted from this position. 'The One is the beginning of 
everything' says Philolaus. 132 
Can we not argue that 'the One' is itself a numerical concept? Philolaus gives us no reason 
to assume this, and some very good reasons to reject such an idea. In one fragment Philolaus states 
'The first composite, the One, which is in the centre of the sphere, is called the Hearth' .133 'The 
Hearth' is reported in the attestations that mention it, to be the centre of the Philolaic celestial 
system. If it is part of the celestial system then it is not an abstract numerical concept. It would still 
be safer to accept 'The One' as a metaphysical concept linked with Being, just as it is in other 
sources, East and West. We then have to ask the more interesting question 'how can 'The Hearth', 
or 'The 'One', if it is really a 'metaphysical' concept, also be a physical concept, with a physical 
position at the centre of the physical celestial system?' 
An answer to this is that there is no reason why the 'One' should not be regarded as the 
'Hearth' at the centre of the physical celestial system, at the same time as being the metaphysical 
'origin of all', as long as the celestial system is not primarily seen as some 'Reality' in its own 
right, but rather, is regarded as merely a material representation, or symbol, of a more fundamental 
metaphysical reality. This is not some bizarre idea I have concocted in order to resolve the 
problem, it is an idea commonly found in mystical and metaphysical thought. In this sense, the 
131 I have no reason to doubt the scholarship of the translators to whose work I make reference, all of whom 
are cited here. 
132 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 74. 
133 Ibid. 
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Pythagorean view of the universe would be somewhat similar to the view presented by the 
ancient East, and it would certainly be consistent with Plato's view. 
Did Philolaus perhaps merely mean that the universe physically came out of this 
originating 'One', or 'the Hearth', like planets out of a sun? Is this what he meant by saying 'The 
one is the beginning of everything'. We could argue this if we are looking for Philolaus the 
scientific cosmogonist. But if we look to Philolaus the mystic we could just as easily say that the 
'Hearth' is a mystical entity. Its status as the origin or beginning of physical existence is then 
symbolised by the fact that the celestial bodies revolve around it. In this way, the system of celestial 
bodies is not so important as a physical system, but is important in that symbolises the metaphysical 
hierarchy behind it. 
Confusion at source 
Even though the early Greek sources may exhibit an interest in Number and quantitative 
structure that is often distinct from mythical or mystical ideas, the qualitative and quantitative faces 
of the philosophy are not separable in any clearly defined way. The existence or co-existence of 
apparently distinct kinds of discourse, for example the mixture of the proto- or pseudo-scientific, 
with the metaphysical, poses something of a hermeneutical problem if whole sections of discourse 
are not to be ignored in favour of others. 'Myth', 'philosophy', and 'science' can co-exist at source. 
Generally speaking, there is understood to be a transition from Myth to 'philosophy' (from 
mythos 'to logos) that took place between the 9th and 6th centuries BC. 134 In the sixth-century BC 
we find Orphic mythology co-existing with Pythagoreanism, the earliest reference to Orpheus 
being by the poet Ibykos. 135 The apparent duality between myth, and mathematics as represented 
by the Pythagoreans, is enhanced by the fact that the Pythagoreans and Orphics do not seem to 
have been closely associated with each other in the 5th and 4th century evidence. 136 Nevertheless, 
Pythagoras is thought to have regarded Orpheus as a chief patron, 1l7 and there is evidence that the 
Pythagoreans even used Orpheus as a pseudonym. 138 Guthrie has argued that Pythagoras was 
134 Kirk, GS; Raven, JE; Schofield, M, the pre-Socratic philosophers, Cambridge, 1983, pp. 73-74. 
135 Guthrie, WKC, 01pheus and Greek religion, London, 1935, p. I. 
136 Kirk, Raven and Schofield, op. cit., p. 221. 
137 Guthrie, WKC, Orpheus and Greek religion, London, 1935, p. 220. 
138 Ibid., p. 217. 
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'working on a mythical background' ,n9 and that the Orphics and Pythagoreans shared the same 
concern - the generation of the many out of the One. 140 The difference is that whilst Orphic 
cosmogony is mythical and expressed in terms of personal agents, marriage, and procreation, 
Pythagorean cosmogony was expressed in terms of numerical ratios. 141 In many respects, Guthrie 
argues, one is the counterpart of the other. 142 
This does not mean Pythagoras was attempting to express myth, mathematically. It means 
that something significant in human knowledge that finds expression through myth, later found 
expression in a quantitative 'language' used by Pythagoreans who had particularly noted 
quantitative order in the universe. If this is so, then the original q11antitative expression of the 
harmony of the spheres, even if it existed, may not be important other than as a philosophical 
symbol, either to us, or in the original context of Pythagoras' own philosophy. It may have been 
introduced as a piece of inductive reasoning based upon the observation that there is mathematical 
order, and hence mathematical 'harmony', between the many parts of the manifest universe. The 
need to further the doctrine by describing actual sound coming from the celestial bodies, is then 
completely redundant except as a j11rtlrer symbol in the communication of the metaphysical 
philosophy behind the doctrine. So even if the original Pythagoreans did use this kind of 
description, Aristotle's objection would then amount to a case of inappropriately taking a 
metaphorical or allegorical description literally, and predictably declaring the pseudo-scientific 
thesis that it may later have been taken to be, as scientifically untenable. 
Let us also propose for a moment that the 'missing links' in Archytas had existed, but are 
now lost, and that Archytas had confirmed exactly what Aristotle asserted the Pythagoreans 
believed about the celestial bodies, in respect of them producing actual sound. Would that alter the 
position? I suggest not. On what basis would we be ascribing greater authority to Archytas' account 
than to Aristotle's? Presumably it would be on the basis that he was himself a Pythagorean. But 
here we are beset with even greater uncertainties. Were all Pythagoreans perpetually in agreement 
with one another? Did the Pythagorean school continue to propagate the teaching of Pythagoras 
exactly as he had communicated it? Do we know that even Pythagoras' closest disciple had 
139 /bid., p. 219. 
140 Ibid., p. 220. 
141 Ibid., p. 218. 
142 /bid., p. 219. 
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absorbed Pythagoras' teaching without distortion? How can we be confident that the 
understanding of Archytas, a century and a half later, represents with any fidelity that which 
Pythagoras himself taught? The only part of Pythagorean ism that would be immune or resistant to 
change, corruption, or misunderstanding, would be the mathematical verities or numerological 
assertions. The square on the hypotenuse still equals the sum of the squares on the other two sides, 
and the ratio associated with the perfect fifth is still 3:2. But what of the original metaphysical or 
mystical part ofPythagoreanism, as taught by Pythagoras? Would it even have necessarily survived 
intact as part of Archytas' own understanding? Pupils do not generally follow their teachers 
blindly, indefinitely. Few are perfect disciples and most stand to develop a different outlook from 
their teachers, and propagate a different teaching. Plato and Aristotle are a prime example. Over a 
number of centuries in a changing civilisation the role of hermeneutics cannot be ignored, 
especially within an oral tradition. 
Number as a symbol of llarmo11ia 
We thus have plentiful hearsay evidence, but no primary evidence for an original, 
quantitative, Pythagorean doctrine of the harmony of the spheres. If we do not interpret the 
Pythagorean emphasis on Number as an assertion that Number is the originating cause of 
everything, the Divine, or the Real, then the search for the details of an original quantitative 
harmonia mundi becomes questionable. For then Number is the manifestation of harmonia, which 
is itself not only an earlier, but a higher and more fundamental principle. Furthermore, harmonia 
can be symbolically represented by Number, without necessarily inferring that the thing Number 
relates to, is actually and measurably quantifiable. As it turns out, this is entirely necessary, since 
'the soul' is primarily a metaphysical concept. Thus the soul can be 'joined to the body through 
number' 143 or the 'soul of the world' or a man's soul can be proportioned numerically, as they are 
in Plato, without inferring that 'the soul' is physically measurable. Alternatively, where Number is 
used as a metaphysical symbol, a physical thing predicated in numerical terms, is merely a physical 
symbol of harmonia. 
143 Claudianus Mamertus purporting to be quoting from the third volume of Philolaus' On rhythm and metre. 
See Freeman, Ancil/a, op. cit., p. 77. 
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Just as unmeasurable, metaphysical things like the soul can be predicated numerically, so 
numerical predication in a Greek source is not necessarily an indication of a proto-scientific 
viewpoint, a numerological viewpoint, or a viewpoint that upholds Number as an originating cause 
of all things. In the Greek sources mentioned, Number may not appear to be used in the way it is in 
the Vedas, but that does not mean its use cannot be metaphysical and allegorical. 
Since the use of Number can be as a metaphorical symbol rather than an assertion that 
metaphysical things are literally predicable in numerical terms, Plato's quantitative description of 
the creation of the 'world soul' in Timaeus, is not necessarily most important as evidence of a 
physical cosmology. When it is interpreted as such, the details that appear to be quantifying the 
celestial system, may assume a proto-scientific importance that is irrelevant to the more important 
metaphysical message they are being used to convey. And yet it has been repeatedly plundered and 
analysed for evidence of 'Plato's mathematical system', even in the face of the fact that Plato is 
recognised as what philosophers call an idealist, and hence, fundamentally, a metaphysician! 
Plato's metaphysics is not a philosophy in which harmonia is an effect of Number. 
Number may have been held by the Pythagorean Philolaus to be essential or even a 
prerequisite to physical existence, but even this does not mean that harmonia has to be originated 
by Number. We must also not forget that, as I have said, in a metaphysical cosmogony or 
cosmology, physical existence is often held to be secondary to the metaphysical reality behind it. 
Harmonia itself would be a metaphysical thing, behind the scenes of existence, as it were. Only 
through Number can physical multiplicity actually exist, so it would not be surprising to find 
Number as the essential ordering power of a physical existence whose nature is multiplicity. In this 
way, Number is always present as the servant, symbol, and reflector of harmonia. Just as the 
physical arrangement of the universe can symbolise the metaphysical reality behind it, so too, can 
the apparently autonomous laws of Number. 
The laws of Number are none other than a Wittgensteinian logical form in action. The 
logical form of Number is the logical form of the physical universe, or vice versa. The logical form 
is something that shows itself in the operations of Number itself, in the physical universe, and in the 
relationship between Number and the physical universe. In Philolaus' philosophy this logical form 
is a symbol of something else, which shows itself subjectively at another level of intelligence -
harmonia. 
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Number, Nature and Intelligence 
Physical science grounds itself on Number, or mathematical laws, - the 'laws of nature'. 
Mathematics is now the adopted 'language' of physical science. The work of the physical scientist 
makes it look as though there is an abstract mathematical matrix behind physical existence, and that 
it is this matrix that the scientist is discovering. This can too easily be taken to be the divine or 
semi-divine thing that Pythagoras intuited, - Number. Some might even argue that this abstract 
mathematical matrix is what we should call Reality, parts of which are represented by the physical 
world. I say parts, because there are always exotic areas of pure mathematics that have not yet 
found an application in physical science, although there seems to be a constant and quite rapid 
'movement' from new techniques in pure mathematics to their practical application. 
But it is always the intelligence of the scientist or mathematician who beholds or finds this 
matrix, just as it is intelligence, coupled with the senses, that beholds and scientifically questions 
the physical world. Philolaus spoke of 'Nature itself as being behind the appearance of physical 
existence. Existence itself, that is, the manifest universe of all existing things, is what Philolaus 
calls 'Nature in the universe' .144 'Nature itself, he said, requires 'Divine intelligence and not 
human intelligence' .145 The abstract mathematical matrix, which seems to determine what we call 
the laws of Nature is not Philolaus' 'Nature itself, because it is grasped by human intelligence. 
Number is merely the law that holds together the manifest structure of existence, determined by 
harmonia. Number is not Nature. Although Number is necessary for existence and for existence to 
be intelligible, existence comes from the Being which is etemal. 146 
Philolaus actually purported to know about Nature itself So he implies that if Nature itself 
is to be apprehended, then the intelligence of the beholder, in this case Philolaus himself, must 
itself have changed, to touch upon the divine. Here, we are beyond information, we are back to an 
untheoretical metaphysics, to gnosis, and the mystical context of harmonia. 
The transformation of the intelligence of the beholder through subjective knowledge, or 
through gnosis, was once a deliberate part of the 'alchemical' and Paracelsian study of matter. The 
scientific study of matter does not have this immediate, conscious aim. In this, finally, is the 
144 Ancilla, ibid., p. 73. 
145 Ibid., p.74. 
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difference between science and what can properly be called metaphysics. Both are concerned 
with knowledge. Science may even be concerned with improving subjective knowledge. But only 
metaphysics attempts attainment through subjective knowledge, rather than through the study, and 
gathering of 'objective' information about the world occupied. 
We are talking about the belief that what Man discovers about the world he occupies is 
already within him, so that understanding the world occupied requires subjective knowledge as 
well as external observation. Alchemy and Paracelsianism were attempted methods of initiating 
this kind of knowledge of the world occupied, together with subjective change, even by 'studying' 
the world occupied. 147 The study of the nature of the world occupied through Number alone, the 
purely rational approach, is quite a different thing. According to lamblichus and others, Pythagoras 
helped to bring about subjective change in his disciples through music, and the essence of this idea 
is also central to the Orphic tradition. This was not through the study of music as a science, 
something that we are told the Pythagoreans also did, but simply through the experience of music. 
Similarly, Pythagoras himself is supposed to have received some kind of higher knowledge by 
'hearing' the music of the spheres. Again, this was not through scientific, astronomical study. Why 
could his disciples not hear it? The explanations offered are pseudo-scientific, and assume that this 
'hearing' was physical, acoustical. The singing of the universe need not be acoustical, in the sense 
that it need not be a phenomena that was part of the world occupied. If it was, then the world 
Pythagoras occupied was a different world to the one we occupy, and different to the world 
occupied by his disciples. 
The 'objective' aspect of harmony is the acoustical phenomena and form, that which we 
can measure and understand theoretically as harmony, whereas the subjective side is what we 
perceive as harmony. In Platonism and neo-Platonism harmony has a physical side, and a 
metaphysical side. The metaphysical side occurs where 'the soul' is said to be arithmetically 
'proportioned', and is therefore in 'correspondence' with arithmetical proportion in the physical 
world. The implication is that 'the soul' is divided, that is, it is in a condition of conflict that is only 
stabilised by harmonia. Actual, audible, acoustical music can be an aid to this stabilisation. In a 
sense, music 'tunes the soul'. 
146 Ibid., p. 74. 
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But how does it happen? There must be a way in which 'the soul' is ordered or 
harmonised by the experience of music. Plato portrayed the soul's dividedness quite simply, saying 
it was in three parts, and that the parts needed to be harmonised rather like the three fundamental 
musical intervals. Ptolemy added further subdivisions, giving fourteen species of virtue 
corresponding to species of musical interval. 148 These 'virtues' are things like moderation, 
fearlessness and prudence, which are clearly to be encouraged in the subject, i.e. in the soul, and 
which contribute to the metaphysical harmony, within. The implication in the metaphysical or 
qualitative harmony of the spheres tradition, as in Orphism, is that music can help to bring about 
this inner harmony, or virtue. 
The crude, quasi-scientific interpretation trotted out in so many accounts, is that the soul, 
being (or needing to be) arithmetically proportioned in literally the same way as physical or 
acoustical harmony, just 'responds', and appropriately orders itself or its parts when it hears the 
right music. But really this is no explanation at all, it is not clearly a metaphor, and it accepts that 
the 'soul', a metaphysical thing, is literally arithmetically proportioned, precisely like a physical 
thing. Literal, arithmetical proportion, must be predicated to something quantitatively measurable, 
which the soul is not. This kind of 'explanation' is naive, and its attribution to a pre-Socratic 
teaching, is merely retrospective. 
The metaphysical soul cannot literally resonate like a physical body, or be brought into 
tune by exposure to acoustical vibration. The idea that it can, arises from conceiving the soul as an 
object, rather than as the reality of the subject. It is the subject who feels the benefits of music, and 
who seems to be affected by music. It is the subject who is affected by the object of music, or by 
his or her subjective experience of the objective, acoustical phenomena. What is missing from this 
quasi-scientific explanation is an account of how the subjective effect or experience is connected to 
the objective, acoustical phenomena. Only the more qualitative accounts like those of Iamblichus, 
are less naive, and treat the whole question more metaphysically, perhaps in terms of the soul's 
allegiance to divine harmony, from whence it came, and of which earthly music is a reminder. 149 
147 See, for example, Rattansi, PM, 'Art and Science: The Paracelsian Vision', Science and the Arts in the 
Renaissance, Ed. John W Shirley & F David Hoeniger, 3, pp. 50- 57. 
148 Harmonics, Book HI, Ch. 4; Barker, A, Greek musical writings, (2 Vols), Cambridge, !989, Vol. 2, pp. 
375-376. 
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Chapter 2 - Hermeneutics, the ever-present question of interpretation 
Numerical principles and ideas that are either foundation stones of science, like 
Pythagoras' theorem, or stepping stones in the procession of science, like Anaximander's or 
Eudoxus' spheres, are an integral part of early Greek discourse. It is perfectly valid to approach the 
sources as examples of 'early science'. But how does interpretation affect our reading of the 
sources? 
Modem interpretation in this field has generally used two common methods of attack in 
dealing with the sources, each of which involves effectively putting the evidence through a 
'herrneneutic filter' that selects only those parts of the available discourse that are pertinent to the 
interpretation. There is nothing intrinsically reprehensible about doing this, providing the criteria or 
reasons for filtering in this way are broadly understood and declared. But, as it turns out, the 
adopted preferences for filtering can be based upon unchallenged, widely accepted conventions, 
rather than upon any consciously selected philosophical approach. 
Kingsley has stated in his argument for a reassessment of the philosophy of Empidocles: 
'Scholars have long been inclined to distinguish between the historical or 'important' and the 
legendary or 'appealing". 150 In the case ofEmpidocles the distinction made has been between what 
we consider to be 'philosophy' and what we regard as 'myth' or 'magic'. In short, Kingsley argues, 
Empidocles has been studied as a 'philosopher' according to our preconceived standard of what a 
'philosopher' is, or what 'philosophy' is about, and only those parts of his discourse that fit this 
existing structure of understanding and interpretation have been included in the study. Kingsley 
argues that a fragment known as 'fragment Ill' which effectively defines the 'magical' context of 
Empidocles' discourse, has been hitherto disregarded for purely hermeneutical reasons. Kingsley 
states: 'Once the magical side to his [Empidocles '] activities has been granted, as it must, the 
possibility of being able to draw a neat dividing line between Empidocles the magician and 
Empidocles the philosopher immediately disappears' .151 
149 Taylor, T, Jambliclms 011 the mysteries of the Egyptia11s, C/wldeans, a11d Assyria11s, London, 1821, 1968, 
pp. 133, 143. 
15° Kingsley, P, A11cie111 philosophy, mystery a11d magic, Oxford, 1995, p. 228. 
151 Ibid. 
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The most widely adopted guiding light that has been used in the interpretation of the 
mythical or mystical parts of the discourses, is historicity. We do not give magic or myth actual 
credibility, and therefore the magical and mythical claims of the Greek discourses are not given 
credibility. There is only one way that they can be brought under the guiding light of historicity, 
and that is by trying to establish a historically and geographically traceable lineage of mythical 
tradition or magical ideas. But merely doing this avoids tackling the significance of the magical and 
mythical except in the context of the historical and geographical lineage of ideas. Any other 
dimension of the meaning of myth or mystical expression is evaded by this filter. 
The second common hermeneutical method is to understand what appears in the discourses 
according to a history of science. This interpretation is bound to find a certain quantity of material 
that qualifies (especially with hindsight) as proto-science, together with much that must be 
dismissed as poetic or 'philosophical' discourse, or even just imaginative dross. Using this filter, 
for example, the Pythagoreans can be 'usefully' interpreted as having made a 'stab in the right 
direction' at least in as much as they asserted that the earth moved in orbit around a celestial centre. 
The preference and use of this filter may well indicate a tacit faith in science and scienti fie 
description, as an ultimate way of seeing the truth about the world, and as something towards 
which we have been progressing, in time. 
It is true that these filters are not always used exclusively and under all circumstances, but 
they are ubiquitously present in the minds of interpreters, and are, sometimes, used exclusively. 
Great attention is usually paid to the construction of a historical, contextual picture that primarily 
respects the evolution or propagation of 'ideas' in a temporal and geographical order. This is the 
historicity filter in action, and in a sense this is the primary filter without which even the concept of 
'temporal emergence' in the 'emergence of science' filter would make no sense. 
The historicity filter 
Historicity (in which we usually include the concept of the geographical propagation of 
information and ideas) and the 'emergence of science' filter generally enjoy an unchallenged status 
as valid hermeneutic filters no matter what other specific approach to interpretation is being 
adopted. Philosophically this rests upon two conventions, or convictions. Firstly, in the use of the 
historicity filter is the assumption that we can always understand Man's ideas about things as being 
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at least partially generated or modified through a cause-and-effect propagation in time. This rests 
upon the convention of accepting temporal order as fundamental to our modus operandi of 
understanding the world. Sometimes the sole attempt of an interpretational exercise in history, is 
simply to demonstrate or establish a temporal and geographical order of propagation. Yet too much 
emphasis on the context of the temporal order in which Man's ideas seem to occur can lead to 
superficial interpretation, that often actually obscures the philosophical import of what is being said 
in any given source. That import may, for example, be the expression of a 'timeless' philosophical 
question that recurs at different times, in different ways. The historicity filter purely in itself treats 
the philosophical content as not relevant to its interpretation. From where then, does a 
philosophical interpretation come, when one finds it accompanying a historical account? It comes 
via the assessment of the interpreter, which in the case of a Greek scholar means it comes through 
the hermeneutic filter of a scholar whose primary special ism may well be advanced philology and 
historicity, but not philosophy. 
A method of historical categorisation and assessment of ideas contained in an ancient 
discourse is often considered essential to a proper understanding of the philosophical content, yet 
this method can be inherently unempathetic to some of the philosophies it purports to understand, 
precisely because it places them in an historical sequence. For example, we can say that Plato must 
have 'derived' some of his ideas indirectly, from earlier sources that speak of the same things as 
Plato. Empidocles, for instance, mentions the like and the different and the mixing of them in a 
harmony, long before Plato. 152 (In my opinion the entire essence of 'Plato's' philosophy exists in 
the pre-Socratic sources). We could also say that indirectly Schopenhauer derived his ideas from 
the idealism of Plato. Schopenhauer pays full tribute to Plato in this respect, and it is Plato who 
escapes the penetrating criticisms Schopenhauer launches against the other philosophers he 
mentions. Yet at the centre of Plato's philosophy is the denial of time itself as part of the ultimate 
Good or Reality. Schopenhauer in The World as Will has a whole chapter devoted to the refutation 
of the view that historical understanding can contribute anything to real philosophical 
understanding. 153 In it he reiterates Plato, and effectively denounces history as being based upon an 
understanding that Plato would have called mere illusion, belief, or opinion. Plato and 
152 Freeman, Ancilla, p. 55. 
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Schopenhauer would argue that believing temporal order is real or is the truth behind everything 
that happens, and believing that the truth of the world can be understood in tenns of temporal 
order, is to be using a modus operandi of understanding that does not understand the truth of the 
world. 
The notion of historicity is readily understood by everyone and is therefore an important 
structuring tool for the purposes of communication. However, the notion that a valid historical 
argument is more 'objective' than a philosophical interpretation, and therefore should automatically 
carry weight, is, henneneutically, nothing more than the favouring of a philosophical position that 
rejects out-of-hand the assertions of philosophers like Plato and Schopenhauer, in respect of time 
and history. There is therefore, in this respect, a possible impasse between history and philosophy. 
History will judge philosophy according to a set of rules that justifies historical interpretation, but 
certain philosophies like those of Plato or Schopenhauer will deal with history according to quite 
another set of rules. 
Ultimately, the question of how to interpret historical discourses that themselves throw 
doubt upon the meaning of the idea of 'the passage of time' or the meaning of historicity, is always 
a question of philosophical henneneutics. Historicity is not a hermeneutical absolute except 
according to a set of assumptions that certain philosophies, like those of Plato or Schopenhauer, 
directly challenge. The mere existence of these sincere challenges to the assumption of historicity, 
removes any claim historicity can make to being a philosophically absolute method of 
interpretation, that everyone is obliged to respect, other than as a matter of chosen convention. In 
short, from the point of view of philosophy, all historians do have a philosophical agenda, even i r 
they do not know it. Philosophy may, in certain circumstances, justifiably deny the validity of 
historicity, even if the historicity is demonstrably 'correct' in its own terms. 
The merely relative status of historicity in interpretation has already been sensed in Greek 
scholarship itself. In The unwritten philosophy and other essays, Comford argued that if, for 
example, the Jungian theory of the collective unconscious should prove to be valid, then the 
demand for a historicity of the appearance of certain mythical symbols in the ancient sources, 
153 Schopenhauer, A, Tr. EFJ Payne, The world as will a11d represe11latio11, New York, 1958, 1969, Vol. 2, 
pp. 439-446. 
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ceases to have any point at all. 154 Comford states 'If the symbolism, for instance, of marriage 
with the Earth-Mother is actually present now in all our minds, .... we may assume that it was 
present in the mind of Sophocles, and probably much nearer the surface' .155 The real question 
would then be one concerning the cause of such archetypal images, and their deeper meaning. This 
might involve a fully-fledged philosophical or even scientific questioning of human nature, or the 
question of the development of the human mind over the evolutionary time-scale, rather than the 
time-scale associated with the historical 'evolution of ideas'. It may even be argued, in Jungian 
terms, that the apparent 'propagation' or 'evolution' of ideas, is an illusion, and that what is really 
going on is a gradual manifestation or externalisation in time, of things that permanently reside in 
the psyche of the species. 
The 'emergence of science' filter and the corruption of the metaphysical world-view 
Scholarship which values the Greek sources only as examples of 'early science', 1s 
abundant. But the 'emergence of science' filter poses its own problems. This filter treats 'science' 
as a method or body of knowledge which continues, refines or increases in time. The ancient 
sources have probably been more plundered with a view to understanding the 'emergence of 
science', than for any other reason. For the purposes of tracing the 'scientific thinking' or 
development of'scientific' ideas by the ancients, it is presumed that 'the world' is: 
I. An object that we now know better than the ancients, thanks to science. 
2. The same object that concerned the ancients. 
In using the 'emergence of science' filter our position is, purposely, hermeneutically 
biased. But to the degree to which 'the world' (i.e. the object we know scientifically as the world) 
is not the object that concerned the ancients, we cannot claim that we know a common 'world-
object' better than the ancients, by virtue of our science. 
The interpretation of the ancients' 'world' as having been our scientifically recognised 
world all along, does not have any 'absolute' status as an interpretation. It rests upon the 
presumption that our current scientific world-view is both absolute and clearly understood, and also 
154 Comford, FM, 'The unconscious element in literature and philosophy', Cornford, FM; Guthrie, WKC, 
The llnwritten philosophy and other essays, Oxford, 1950, pp. l-13; seep. 9. 
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upon the presumption that we fully understand how scientific world-views change in time. 
Unlike the state of affairs that existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the universe 
was effectively seen as a 'clockwork machine' whose laws of operation simply 'remained to be 
found', it is now not at all clear or agreed what our received contemporary scientific 'world-view' 
is supposed to be, and what we do know of it in some areas such as the leading edge of modem 
physics, is radically puzzling or paradoxical. 
We often hear about something called our scientific understanding of the world. We might 
assume that through this, we are progressively gaining more and more knowledge of something 
that in itself, is quite independent of our methods of understanding it. In 1962 Thomas Kuhn 
challenged this assumption. In his influential book T11e stntcture of scientific revolutions he 
presented the argument that scientists actually work in a different world before and after a scientific 
revolution, and that 'what occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a 
reinterpretation of individual and stable data' .156 A 'scientific revolution', according to Kuhn, 
involves the now much-quoted 'paradigm shift', a term that has become a 'catch-phrase' in many 
areas beyond the philosophy of science. Followed through to its limits the argument does not just 
assert that observations and interpretations are affected by, and relative to, adopted scientific 
paradigms. It threatens to undermine the very assumption that what science understands as the 
object appearing as the world, is anything truly objective at all. The scientific understanding is 
always an approximation, but an approximation to what? Science, the argument asserts, operates in 
the proximity of its own conceptual paradigms, and not in the proximity of any truly 'objective' 
conceptual structure. The principle of 'objective observation' in scientific method was once 
thought to be the guarantor that the absolute 'objective structure' of the world could be 
apprehended. But in modem physics even the very notion of an 'objective observation', or of 
phenomena that is intrinsically separable from the observation, or from the observer, falls down. 
What we know scientifically as 'the world', we do know better than the ancients, but what 
we know scientifically as our world, is not necessarily their world at all. The assumption that it is, 
is the assumption that there exists something objective called 'the world' that is common to both 
the ancients and us. But the world we assume we must have in common, the physical part of which, 
155 Ibid., p. 9. 
156 Kuhn, TS, The structure of scientific revolutions, Chicago & London, 1962, 1996, p. 121. 
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in the first instance is the world we perceive with the senses, is not to be entirely identified with 
the changing conceptual model of 'the world', 'the universe', or 'the cosmos', that science 
describes and understands according to its current paradigms. 
In saying that as far as scientific understanding is concerned we occupy a different world to 
that of the ancients, we are saying two things. Firstly, we are saying that whatever we know 
scientifically, is necessarily couched in terms determined by the modus operandi of our current 
state of scientific understanding. The modus operandi is affected by what Kuhn called the 
'scientific paradigm'. Secondly, because our scientific vision of the world is determined by the 
'scientific paradigm', our scientific understanding is not so much knowledge of some objective 
absolute, as knowledge of our current paradigm, or paradigms. We are thus saying that there is no 
objective, scientifically understood and described absolute, called 'the world' or 'the cosmos', that 
is common to both us and the ancients. 
We would, however, feel that there definitely is one thing in common called 'the world', 
occupied by both the ancients and ourselves. There is, but the physical universe is only a part of it. 
The totality of the world in which we find ourselves from birth also includes all our subjective 
observations, living, feeling, relating, knowing, experiencing, loving, and suffering, and their 
subjective significance - all the things that certain Greek Godmen-scientists could address 
simultaneously along with the physical nature of the universe. 
Any understanding of the subjective, experiential side of the world would include an 
understanding of human experience and human nature. A single, combined understanding of both 
human nature and the physical nature of the universe requires an interpretation of the world that 
space-age scientists do not yet have, but that the ancient Greek Godmen-scientists did purport to 
have, since they addressed both aspects often in the same discourse. Whatever physical 
understanding of the world is purported, this combined understanding is in the first instance likely 
to be a metaphysical understanding, - it is likely to be built upon metaphysical foundations. 
It should not surprise us to find that such an ancient subject-orientated understanding of the 
world, was communicated using allegorical models - metaphysical paradigms. The ancient concept 
of 'the soul' is itself one of these metaphysical paradigms, sometimes appearing symbolised 
physically as perhaps a bird or a winged personage, and other times being referred to with no overt 
symbol attached to it. We cannot assume that every time 'the soul' is referred to that we are dealing 
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with a quasi-physical or measurable object, even if sometimes this is how it is portrayed. The 
concept is fundamentally a metaphysical one, concerned with birth and death. We are in deep water 
indeed when the symbol for a metaphysical paradigm is also the kind of physical object, or 
physical system that is a prime target for mathematical, scientific assessment, like a celestial body 
or system. The reference to it is easily seen solely as quasi-scientific rather than metaphysical, 
especially if it is couched in terms lacking obvious metaphysical attributes. We can accept as a 
myth an idea that Mars is a god, because the notion of a 'god' is overtly metaphysical, but if we are 
told that the sun is an image of another, higher fire, we may tend to understand this as meaning 
only that the light of the sun is some kind of physical reflection, like that of the moon. We might be 
led confidently astray even further, if we are told that the sun is like glass, even though the truth 
may be that the whole paradigm, though deliberately physical in presentation, is but an allegory, or 
in other words an allegorical metaphysical paradigm. We may think through our 'scientific' 
hermeneutic filters that we can see scientific paradigms in an ancient discourse, but to the writer of 
that discourse what we are looking at may have been primarily a metaphysical paradigm -
something that did not exist solely as some attempt to explain part of the physical nature of the 
universe for the sake of such an explanation, but rather, existed as a physical or conceptual model 
to communicate some essentially metaphysical combined understanding of the universe, human 
nature and human experience. We would be misled by the apparent 'physical' description in the 
discourse, in just the same way as we can be misled by a quantitative or numerical expression of 
ideas that are essentially qualitative. The sun, and fire, are mystical symbols as well as physical 
phenomena, and the use of physical presentation should be all the more expected where a single, 
combined understanding of both the metaphysical and physical aspects of the world is at hand. 
We live in a world where there is a solar system with nine (or now possibly more) planets. 
The five-planet solar system of the ancients' world, is to us, our solar system when less well 
understood. By extension we say that this world we occupy was the world occupied by the 
ancients, except that they did not know it as well as we do. We say this as if we are confident that 
the nature of the world as we see it scientifically, is fixed once and for all, independently of 
anyone's knowledge of it. The philosophical difficulties with that assumption are part of an 
established minefield of philosophical problems that I have merely touched upon, but they cannot 
be simply ignored, and I trust I have illustrated that they are wholly pertinent to the question of 
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interpreting the ancient sources, and therefore the question of interpreting the notion of music of 
the spheres. 
What we are emphasising now is that the paradigm-bound 'object' described by physical 
science, is not the world in its entirety. The world in its entirety as far as we can lmow it- the whole 
of the 'world' that we discover from birth- includes human intelligence, experience, and subjective 
understanding. It also includes human nature. Human nature is perhaps a surer part of the world in 
its entirety than what science understands as the physical world. In the light of what we Imow about 
the changing face of science, scientific paradigms, and scientific beliefs, we might justifiably say 
that the most static or unchanging thing about our world in its entirety is not the scientifically 
understood paradigm - not what we conceive scientifically as the nature of the universe, - but 
human nature. 
In an age where scientific Imowledge has not even begun, a single, combined 
understanding of both subjective and physical nature in subject-orientated terms, would naturally 
grow first around a subjective, experiential, 'metaphysical' Imowledge of subjective human nature 
and experience, rather than around what is lmown about physical nature alone. It is an unproven 
and naive assumption that early men and women looked out into the night sky and made only 
physical or quasi-scientific hypotheses about what it is or where it came from. However, some 
probably did, and if they did, the drive for scientific lmowledge had in a sense already been born. 
As soon as scientific lmowledge is in its infancy, a single, combined understanding starts to 
be pushed aside by the rise of separate understandings of the physical universe and of human 
nature. There may or may not ever have been a time when the drive for scientific Imowledge was 
unborn. The drive is associated with a long but temporary movement that is mostly away from 
understanding the world in terms of human nature and the human condition, a movement that for a 
long time leaves the latter behind as a separate branch of Imowledge. 
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Chapter 3 -The metaphysical harmonia mundi 
Pythagoras is supposed to have been the first to use the word Cosmos, a word which 
signifies both order and beauty. 157 The double significance of the word reflects the two aspects of 
Pythagoreanism, the quantitative and the qualitative. I have suggested that the quantitative side 
provides useful material for our understanding of the emergence of science. For example, 
Pythagoras is perhaps most famous for his right-angled triangle theorem which is a foundation 
stone of mathematics, science and engineering. I have also suggested that this useful 'emergence of 
science' material had a concomitant, qualitative and metaphysical face at the time of Pythagoras. 
However, from a philosophical point of view, the usefulness of the 'historicity of ideas' filter on 
the qualitative face, is severely limited for the reasons I have outlined. I have described the 
quantitative tradition of harmonia mundi as a large but spurious plume of smoke, that smoke-
screens the truth behind the origins of the metaphysical, harmonia mwuli idea. 
From what fire does this smoke arise? It is a fire started by making quantitative 
interpretations of the qualitative or metaphysical, and it was encouraged to start because one of the 
modes of expression of metaphysical ideas, was Number, or quantification. It was also catalysed by 
the simultaneous knowledge and use of Number as an actual quantitative tool, and by the fact that 
'Number' includes 'proportion' in the wider context of geometry, which can express relationships 
indescribable by whole number ratios (irrational numbers). The creation of this quantitative smoke 
is not something for which only modem interpreters are responsible. Pythagoras' closest disciple 
may well have created it too, as far as we know. The qualitative or metaphysical, and the 
quantitative or 'scientific' are both present in the world, then and now. Both were expressed by the 
ancient sources collectively, often side by side in the same source, and both would probably have 
been expressed by Pythagoras. 
We now turn to the qualitative side of harmonia mundi. The metaphysical side of the 
harmonia mundi tradition reports on how Pythagoras, who was himself 'fashioned by the divine 
spirit', 'heard' the harmony of the spheres and endeavoured to communicate to those he taught, 
157 Comford, FM, 'The unconscious element in literature and philosophy', The Unwritten Philosophy and 
other essays, Cambridge, 1967, p. 19. 
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something of what the divine music communicated to him.158 He also is supposed to have carried 
out somatic and spiritual healing with the use of music, and to have educated his pupils, and 
ordered their emotions by playing the lyre. 159 The closeness of these reports to the mythical Orphic 
tradition is notable. These reports are from much later sources, in particular, lamblichus. The 
fragments of Archytas, as we have seen, throw no significant light upon the metaphysical, mystical, 
or qualitative side of Pythagoreanism. The cosmology of Philolaus, on the other hand, raises some 
rather interesting questions in this respect. 
Before turning to Philolaus, it must first be noted that the authenticity of the fragments 
attributed to him have long been disputed. 160 However, Freeman indicates this is without 
justification, 161 and Huffman states that the core of the fragments are now accepted as authentic. 162 
We will here treat the contents of the fragments themselves on an equal footing with the 
attestations by Aetius and Achilles. 
Thanks to Aristotle, Philolaus is much quoted for allegedly having said that everything is 
Number. But what he said was: 'Actually, everything that can be known has a Number; for it is 
impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognise it without this'. 163 Some have deduced 
from this that Number was for Philolaus and the Pythagoreans the fundamental 'stuff of the 
universe', or in some way the 'essence' of the universe. 
This is an over-simplification. Number may be a pre-requisite of an existence that is 
intelligible to the human mind, for this existence consists of a multiplicity of things, and is hence, 
governed by Number. Number is thus an ordering principle governing the physical 'stuff of the 
universe, which according to Philolaus is Earth, Water, Air, and Fire,164 but Number is obviously 
not itself the physical 'stuff of the universe. Is it the ultimate metaphysical or abstract 'essence' 
behind the physical stuff? Not at all. 
158 See Dillon, J and Hershbell, J, Iamblichus On the Pythagorean Way of Life, Atlanta, Georgia, 1991, pp. 
89-91. The idea is perhaps traceable to Nicomachus - Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 30, claims 
Nicornachus to have stated that Pythagoras had the gift of hearing the music of the spheres, see 
Chadwick, H, Boethius- The consolations of music, logic, theology, and philosophy, Oxford, 1981, 
1990. 
159 Ibid. 
160 See, as probably one of the earliest examples, Bywater, I, 'On the fragments attributed to Philo1aus', 
Journal of Philology, Vol.l, 1868, pp. 20-53. 
161 Freeman, Ancil/a, op. cit., p. 73. 
162 Huffman, CA, Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, 1993, p. 59. 
163 Freeman, Ancilla, Ibid., p. 74. 
164 Ibid., p. 75. A fifth element is also mentioned, the 8A.Kti~ofthe 'Sphere'. 
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Philolaus talks at length about Number, ascribing to it all kinds of metaphysical 
significance. He even states that the Decad (ten-ness) is the 'origin of divine and human life ... ' .165 
Nevertheless, Number or the Decad is not the highest point of Philolaus' cosmogony. He also 
speaks of The One, the eternal Being of things, Nature, the Non-limited, the Limiting, and 
Harmonia, - none of which are actually subordinated to Number. He makes it clear that there are 
'supernatural and divine existences' 166 in which the power of Number operates, without suggesting 
that these 'supernatural and divine existences' are synonymous with The One, Being, or even 
Nature. 
Most important is Philolaus' statements that Number is 'the cause ofrecognition',167 and 
that it is 'impossible to grasp anything with the mind or to recognise it', 168 without Number. 
However, he also states it would be 'impossible for any existing thing to even be recognised by us', 
without the eternal 'Being ofthings'. 169 Does this perhaps mean that Number is the eternal 'Being 
of things', the highest principle behind everything? I think not, for the following reason. 
Divine intelligence is not human intelligence, for Philolaus says 'Nature itself requires 
divine and not human intelligence'.170 Yet when Philolaus says 'it is impossible to grasp anything 
with the mind or to recognise it' 171 without Number, the mind he refers to is surely the human 
mind. He is asserting that Number is pre-requisite to existence as it is perceived and understood by 
the human mind. He says that no things in existence 'would be clear to anyone either in themselves 
or in their relationship to one another unless there existed Number and it essence' .172 
If there is such a difference between divine and human intelligence as Philolaus suggests, 
then we might suspect Number is necessary for human intelligence, but not for the divine. It is 
impossible for human intelligence to grasp anything without Number, but it is also impossible for 
human intelligence to grasp Nature itself. That requires divine intelligence. Number seems to be no 
help to the human mind in knowing Nature itself. Might it not be that Nature itself does not require 
Number, and only requires Number when it is 'fitted into' physical existence, and becomes 'Nature 
in the universe'? Philolaus is quite clear that there is a difference between 'Nature in the universe' 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., p. 75. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid., p. 74. 
169 Ibid., p. 74. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., p. 74. 
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and 'Nature itself. What we have here, again, is the notion of the physical representation or 
symbolism of something metaphysical. 'Nature in the universe' is the physical symbol of a 
transcendental, metaphysical 'Nature itself. If this is the case, then Number also, as lrnown by 
human intelligence, can be no more than a symbol of' Nature itself. 
The inference is that the intelligence of the human species, the existence of the human 
species as sentient beings in a physical existence, and Number or plurality, are all interconnected. 
Physical existence literally 'makes sense' to human intelligence, through Number. The corollary to 
this interpretation is found where Philolaus says 'Number, fitting all things into the soul through 
sense-perception, makes them recognisable and comparable with one another ... .', 173 and perhaps 
even more so where he says of existing things that 'Number gives them body .. .'. 174 As Iamblichus 
later said, 'Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of 
the contents of the universe' .175 True enough. But we cannot assume that Number is The One, or 
Nature itself, or 'higher' or more important than either of them. 
As I have already indicated, although Nature itself requires divine intelligence, it is 
nonetheless 'fitted together' in the universe from the Non-limited and the Limiting, which make up 
existing things. 176 This, I am suggesting, is a transition from the metaphysical One, to the physical 
and the many, through Number, and through Harmonia. It is not clear from Philolaus whether 
Harmonia is a part of Nature or if it is Nature, or another principle. 
What is the basic Being of things, if it is not Number, and where does it come from? 
Philolaus states that 'The One is the beginning of everything' and that 'The fust composite ... the 
One, which is in the centre of the sphere, is called Hearth'.177 We are also told that 'The universe is 
one, and it began to come into being from the centre ... .' 178 These statements collectively conjoin 
the physical universe with the metaphysical One. Continuing our line of interpretation, the physical 
universe as it appears through Number, is really the metaphysical One, or the original Being, 
appearing in physical form, in plurality, intelligible to sense-perception, or sense-perception based 
172 !bid., p. 75. 
173 !bid., p. 75. 
174 !bid., p. 75 
175 Freeman, Anci/la, op. cit., p. 77. 
176 !bid., p. 73. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid., p. 76. 
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intelligence. 179 Is this not basically the same kind of scenario found in the ancient Indian Vedas, 
dating from approximately the same era? Should we not also mention once again the three cosmic 
steps ofVishnu, for we have here firstly The One, with which we may associate divine intelligence 
and Nature, secondly 'supernatural and divine existences' with which Philolaus still associates 
Number, and thirdly earthly existence and 'human activities' 180 in the physical universe, also 
governed by Number? 
Philolaus may have sung the praises of Number as a quantitative tool, he may even have 
indulged in numerology, and made what appear to be 'scientific' speculations, but Number in his 
philosophy was undoubtedly metaphysically significant. Philolaus' passage on Harmony181 is 
quantitative, but Harmony is something that also plays a fully mystical and metaphysical role in the 
discourse, at the same time as being expressed quantitatively through Number. In Philolaus' 
cosmogony, it is said, the whole universe came into existence through measures, weights, numbers, 
geometry, arithmetic and music, 182 and in his cosmology he asserts that the Earth is not at the 
centre of the cosmos, but moves in a circular orbit like the other planets, around the mysterious 
fiery centre called the 'House of Zeus', 'Hearth of the World', 'Altar', 'Meeting-place', or 'Goal of 
nature' .183 This 'Hearth' was the 'first thing harmonised'. 184 The Hearth is synonymous with The 
One, the beginning of everything. 185 In De Caelo, Simplicus tells us Philolaus maintained that the 
periphery of the universe was another fire 'at the highest point'. The centre was said to be 'first in 
rank', and around it move in a choral dance ten divine bodies: the sphere of fixed stars, the five 
planets, sun, moon, earth, and counter-earth.186 A fragment by Claudianus Mamertus indicates that 
Philolaus is supposed to have written in a volume entitled 'On rhythms and measures' that the soul 
is joined to the body through number and harmony, and that Harmony is incorporeal. 187 
Here we have a constant admixture of the metaphysical and the physical, of the qualitative 
and quantitative. The 'emergence of science' interpretation typically yields a cosmology with a 
179 In the broadest modem sense, this means the intelligence arising in the brain and body of the human 
animal. 
18° Freeman, Ancilla, op. cif., p. 77. 
181 Ibid., p. 74. 
182 Huffman, CA, Philolaus of Croton, Cambridge, 1993, p. 410. 
183 Phi1ip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, Toronto, 1966, pp. 113-114. 
184 Huffrnan, CA, Philolaus of Croton, op. cit., p. 243. 
185 Freeman, Ancilla, op. cif., p. 74. 
186 Phi1ip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, op. cit., pp. 113-114; Huffman, Philolaus, op. cit., pp. 
237-238; Diels (revised by Kranz) A16 (=Aetius 2.7.7). 
187 Huffinan, CA, Philolaus of Croton, op.cit., p. 411; Freeman, Ancilla, op. cit., p. 77. 
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'fire' at the centre of the celestial system, around which orbits the planets, sun, moon, earth and 
stars. Around the entire periphery would be the 'fire at the highest point of the universe'. This in 
the past was the usual interpretation of Philolaus' cosmology. But why is the Hearth at the centre 
called by its other names? What is the significance of these? Are these not metaphysical or mystical 
implications? Even if they are derived from previous 'mythology', what is their significance if not 
metaphysical? It is true that the oldest Greek mythology equates the celestial bodies with Gods, or 
'living Beings', but what are such assertions if not metaphysical? 
As it is reported, there were three 'fires' or suns in the Pythagorean universe as taught by 
Philolaus. This seems to be the earliest extant source for the many concepts and representations of 
a 'threefold sun' that subsequently appear in esoteric and 'mystical' literature. We have already 
seen the weakness of the argument that celestial entities were invented purely for numerological 
reasons. The three-fold nature of the 'fire' in the universe is commented upon by Aetius and 
Achilles. 188 Huffman translates Aetius as follows: 
Philolaus the Pythagorean says that the sun is like glass, 
receiving the reflection of the fire in the cosmos, straining 
the light and heat through to us, so that in a way there turn 
out to be two suns, both the fiery one in the heaven and that 
which is from it and fiery in reflection; unless someone will 
also say that there is a third, the light that is spread from the 
mirror to us by reflection. For we call this latter the sun 
which is, as it were, the image of an image. 189 
Heath's translation is: 
Philolaus the Pythagorean holds that the sun is transparent 
like glass, and that it receives the reflection of the fire in the 
188 Aetius in: 2.20.12; Diels, 348. Achilles in: Jsagoga exce1pta 19; Maas 46.13 (cited in Huffinan, Philo/aus, 
op. cit., pp. 266,267, respectively). Achilles appears in Diels, H, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin, 1874, pp. 
349,350. 
189 Huffman, Philolmts, op. cit., p. 266. 
universe and transmits to us both light and warmth, so that there are in some 
sort two suns, the fiery in the heaven and the fiery from 
which it is mirrored, as it were, not to speak of a third also, 
namely the beams which are scattered in our direction from 
the mirror by way of reflection [or refraction]; for we give 
this third also the name of sun, which is thus, as it were, an 
image of an image. 190 
Achilles' report is translated by Huffman as: 
Philolaus [says] that [the sun], receiving what is fiery and 
translucent from the aetherial fire above, sends it to us 
through certain pores. The result is that according to him the 
sun is threefold, one [sun] is from the aetherial fire, another 
is sent from that to what is called by him the glassy sun, and 
another sent from that sort of sun to us. 191 
Heath's translation of this is: 
Philolaus says that the sun receives its fiery and radiant 
nature from above, from the aetherial fire, and transmits the 
beams to us through certain pores, so that according to him 
the sun is triple, one sun being the aetherial fire, the second 
that which is transmitted from it to the glassy thing under it 
which is called the sun, and the third that which is 
transmitted from the sun in this sense to us. 192 
190 Heath, Aristarclws, op. cit., pp. 115-116. 
191 /sagoga excerpta 19; Maas 46.13. Huffman, Philolaus, op. cit., p. 267. 
192 Heath, Aristarclws, op. cit., p. 116. 
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Do these not sound like second-hand reports of something that had been heard or read by 
the attestors, but not really understood? There are certainly a number of things about these 
attestations that suggest an inadequacy in the frequently encountered, standard 'scientific' 
interpretation, which portrays a peripheral 'fire', an orbiting sun, and a central fiery 'Hearth', all as 
parts of a physical, celestial system. 
The attestations state that there are 'three suns' or that 'the sun' is 'threefold'. The first 
kind of 'sun' is an 'aetherial fire' in the 'cosmos' or 'universe'. This is the 'fiery in the heaven'. 
There is no intrinsic reason why this need be interpreted primarily as a physical, rather than a 
metaphysical 'fire', but any quasi- or proto-scientific interpretation may of course treat it as 
physical, as the 'emergence of science' interpretation inevitably will. 
The second kind of sun is 'transparent like glass', and it 'reflects' or mirrors the original 
sun, yet we are also told that it mysteriously 'strains' the heat and light through to us, 'through 
certain pores'. What does this mean? 
And what of third kind of sun? 
The third sun, if we are to read the attestations as an early 'scientific theory', can only be a 
virtual optical image. In other words, ignoring the mysterious 'straining' and the equally 
mysterious 'through certain pores', we can say the true aetherial, surrounding sun, is 'reflected' by 
the glassy object, and what we see, is the reflection. But this would not be an 'image of an image', 
would it? We would not call this reflection an 'image of an image' unless we are specifically 
talking about the optical 'real image' on the retina of the eye, and we considered the reflection at 
the 'glassy object' as an optical 'real image' (which no such reflection is). Are we really, in any 
case, dealing with this degree of sophistication of optical science? Aetius thought that this third sun 
was 'the beams' which are reflected off the 'glassy' sun and 'scattered in our direction'. This seems 
to indicate he accepted the virtual image in the glassy object as the third sun, and the aetherial fire 
and glassy object itself as the first 'two suns'. But he is confusing about this because he says the 
second sun is 'from' or 'mirrored from' the first. This would not be true of the 'glassy object' itself. 
How does the glassy reflector itself 'come from', or how can it be 'mirrored from' the true aetherial 
fire? 
We are saying that the aetherial fire is the first sun, the 'glassy thing' itself is the second, 
and the reflection of the aetherial fire, in the 'glassy thing', is the third sun. The first two of these 
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are real objects, and the last is a virtual image or reflection. In this scenario, how is it that this 
last sun can possibly be an 'image of an image'? Of course, it is not an 'image of an image' at all. It 
is just an image. 
Achilles is perhaps more consistent with the 'scientific theory' interpretation because he at 
least seems to call the second and third 'suns' the actual beams which are transmitted or sent in two 
stages from the aetherial fire. The trouble here is that we would have four 'suns' including the 
glassy object itself. 
The fact of the matter is that the translations do not make sense. I am not suggesting that 
that there is anything philologically wrong or inaccurate about the translations. I am suggesting that 
perhaps Achilles and Aetius did not themselves understand what Philolaus had taught, or that the 
translations have fallen foul of a 'scientific theory' hermeneutical approach that is misplaced, -or 
possibly both. If Achilles and Aetius did not understand Philolaus, that could be either because they 
failed to grasp Philolaus' scientific theory, if indeed that is what it was, or much more likely 
because they were trying to understand as a quasi-scientific or physical system, something that had 
once been a wholly metaphysical, mystical, or mythical account. The tendency to interpret a 
discourse only as a physical theory is not exclusively ours. 
Aetius also concluded in the most pragmatic and quasi-scientific way that Empidocles 
thought of the sun as a 'reflection of the fire about the earth' .193 Empidocles' poem On Nature does 
include apparently physical astronomical descriptions but the context of the poem is deeply 
metaphysical, its details often mythical or mystical, and its use of poetic allegory unmistakable. In 
Katharmoi (Purifications) Empidocles even declares that he himself is a 'god' who has overcome 
mortality. 194 
The fact is that a 'scientific theory' interpretation of Philolaus' threefold sun, whether 
ancient or modem, is incomplete and unsatisfactory, quite apart from the unresolved problem of the 
'pores' and the 'straining through'. The notion of a 'reflection of a reflection' or an 'image of an 
image' has about it a fascinating ring, and it is something that could easily endure many 
generations of repetition, without being understood in its original context. A metaphysical vision 
may be uttered, but when it falls upon quantitative ears, the result is always conflict and 
193 Aetius, II, 20, 13. Heath, Greek Astronomy, op. cit., p. 22. 
194 Freeman, Ancilla, op. cit., p. 64. 
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senselessness, like the idea of the visible sun as a physical 'image of an image'. How many times 
does this kind of misunderstanding occur in the Greek sources themselves? 
Is it not this problem of interpreting metaphysical allegory literally, that undermined 
Empidocles' sincere statement that the sun 'flashes back to Olympus with serene countenance' ,195 a 
statement that Plutarch reported was a laughing matter?196 
Whatever physical celestial system Philolaus may have been describing, the notion that the 
visible sun is an 'image of an image', if taken metaphysically in the context I have indicated, 
simply means that the visible sun is two stages removed from its metaphysical Sire. In the 
metaphysical context I have outlined, each 'reality' or 'world' is merely an 'image' - pertinent to 
the intelligence associated with that 'reality' or 'world' -of a higher 'reality' or 'world' that itself 
requires some 'higher intelligence'. This is precisely the kind of interpretation that neo-Platonism 
would, and does make. In this way, the real sun is filtered through to human perception through the 
'levels of mind' or intelligence, and each sun can be said to have 'come from' or to have 'sprung 
from' (ano) its higher source. There is indeed now a sense in which 'sun' is 'sent from' the higher 
representation or source, and 'towards' the lower representation (nqm61.1Evov & npo<;). 197 
The situation could be described as follows: The 'aetherial fire' or 'fire in the universe' is a 
metaphysical 'fire'. This may well have been allegorically described like a physical fire, whose 
symbolic position is surrounding creation. It may even have been thought to be physically present 
in some way, but if so, its physical presence would nonetheless have been seen as only 
symbolically significant or important. Beneath the aetherial fire ('beneath' in the metaphysical, 
rather than spatial sense) is its symbol or image, the Hearth at the centre. However, the Hearth, like 
an earthly fire-hearth, is not in itself fiery. It is metaphysically present as the origin of the celestial 
system, and an intermediary between the metaphysical 'aetherial fire', and what we perceive 
sentiently as light and warmth. Its status, by very crude analogy, is not unlike the black-body that 
the sun is considered to be in physics, when regarded as a perfect black-body radiator, except that 
in this case it is a kind of metaphysical window or filter, rather than a black body. The light and 
warmth that we see is not the real sun at all, but its appearance in sense, or in the intelligence of 
sentient beings - in human intelligence, rather than divine intelligence. 
195 Freeman, A11cilla, op. cit., p. 58. 
196 Plutarch, De Pyth. Or., 12, p. 400 B. Heath, Greek Astro11omy, op. cit., p. 22. 
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However, there is a further complication. The visible 'sun' is identified with the Hearth, 
which itself is metaphysically 'the centre' of the system,- and yet at the same time the visible 'sun' 
is observed in its appearance to move around the Earth. Both the visible 'sun' and the Earth are in 
later sources said to 'dance around the centre'. In this sense the visible sun cannot be at the 
physical centre of the system, where the Hearth is supposed to be. However, if the spatial 
positioning of the bodies is mystically symbolic, then the actual or speculated physical bodies in 
space and time are of secondary importance to what they signify. Thus, in terms of the mystical 
symbolism, the visible sun is not only describable as a reflection or image of the Hearth, but it 
could also be validly said that it is the Hearth (as it is perceived in human intelligence). In other 
words the Hearth itself is not directly perceivable in human intelligence, but it is perceived as the 
moving visible sun. In much the same way, it can be said that the entire universe, though appearing 
as a multiplicity, is The One, and yet at the same time it is not, for it is multiplicity. Apparent 
contradiction or paradox is not unusual in mysticism. On the contrary, this is one of its most 
obvious characteristics. 
Similarly, there is a logical conflict between heliocentricity and geocentricity when each is 
considered in physical terms, but when the meaning of each is metaphysical, both states of affairs 
can in a sense co-exist simultaneously. In a metaphysical context this relativity of understanding is 
neither difficult to conceive, nor something only rarely found. McEnvoy has recognised an aspect 
of this, calling it 'valuational heliocentrism', meaning that the sun was understood to occupy a 
central position in every sense except the physical. 198 The inference is that the celestial system of 
Pythagoras, even though described in physical terms, is in effect a metaphysical paradigm and not a 
scientific paradigm. 
Thus, if the final image of the originating One in the physical universe is the visible sun, 
then the 'image of an image' description indicates a three-fold metaphysical 'descent' from The 
One, to the visible sun. What we see as the sun is not the real sun at all, but the symbol or image of 
the real sun in physical existence. The real sun is not a 'thing' as we would know a 'thing',- it is 
being at a metaphysical level, in the eternal act of creation, a stage in the descent of intelligence 
from The One, to earth and sense-bound human intelligence, where it appears as the visible sun. 
197 Diels, H, Doxograpili Graeci, Berlin, 1874, pp. 349, 350. 
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Even the Sire of the visible sun, called the Hearth at the centre, or later called the glassy object, 
requiring a higher intelligence to apperceive, is not the originating One itself, but a representation 
of the One. A similar three-fold descent, or ascent if you like, is found in Dionysian cosmology, 
where it appears as the three realms, the terrestrial, the celestial, and the supercelestial. The role of 
the sun in this context was, for example, recognised by Fludd's brilliant student Pico della 
Mirandola, 199 who says in Heptaplus: 
.... among us, fire is a physical element; the sun is fire in the 
sky, the celestial world; in the region [metaphysically] above 
man, fire is the seraphic intellect. But see how they differ: 
the elemental fire bums, the celestial enlivens, the super-
celestial fire loves.200 
Here are Philolaus' three suns, described in the neo-Platonic, metaphysical context. The 
lowest sun is the physical, visible sun, and above it are two higher, metaphysical fires, the highest 
of which is love. We should not be at all surprised to find ourselves confronted primarily with the 
metaphysical significance of the sun in Pythagorean cosmology. The correlation between the 
visible sun and the Divine is something that is frequently encountered across the whole gamut of 
times and cultures. It is only quasi-scientific opinion or the hermeneutic filters I have mentioned, 
that choose to explain the correlation on materialistic grounds alone. The common idea that the 
association of the sun with the Divine, originates as a cultural belief arising from our obvious 
physical dependence upon the sun, is shallow and naive. In Plato's Republic the sun is treated as 
the image of the good,201 in a metaphysical context that cannot simply be dismissed or explained in 
this way. The presence of the ideas of light, heat, and fire, as metaphysical images related to both 
the good, and to purgatory, are ubiquitously encountered in theological thought. Zeno the Stoic is 
reported by Augustine to have thought that God Himself was fire, and reported by Stobaeus to have 
198 Dobbs, BJT, The )anus faces of genius. The role of alchemy in Newton's thought, Cambridge, 1991, p. 
158. 
199 Huffman, WH, Robert Fludd and the end of the renaissance, London, 1988, p. 94 ff. 
200 Dobbs, BJT, The jamts faces of genius. The role of alchemy in Newton's thought, Cambridge, 1991, p. 
159; citing Gombrich, EH, Symbolic Images. Studies in the Art of the Renaissance, with 170 
Illustrations. 11., Chicago, 1972, 1985, pp. 152-153. 
101 Plato, The Republic 507e- 509c; See Plato, The Republic, Tr. D Lee, London, 1955, 1987, pp. 245-255. 
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said that the celestial bodies, endowed with mind and wisdom, were made of creative fire. 202 The 
role of fire and light both within Christianity and also in vigorous contention with it, is very much 
in evidence in the middle ages.203 In Christian Hermeticism there could even be an identification of 
Christ with the sun.204 The attributes of the sun can equally be metaphors of the good and of 
purgatory, representing as it does, benevolent light and warmth, and at the same time, burning heat 
and blinding light that cannot be directly faced. These metaphors occur frequently in patristic 
discourses that are deeply metaphysical or mystical, and are widely respected as having a content 
that cannot be dismissed as mere reiterations of mythic or cultural tradition, even though they may 
employ traditional images.205 
The metaphor of light, and the idea of a descent from the metaphysical into the physical, 
i.e. from the One into matter, was highly developed by the neo-Platonists, by whom the number of 
stages seen in the descent was increased.206 Soul, sun, and elemental fire were all active causes for 
Marsilio Ficino,207 who wrote a treatise on both corporeal and incorporeal light, in which he 
discussed their relationship. He declared that ' ... The sun can signify to you God Himself in the 
greatest degree .... and God's eternal power and divinity [are understood] through the sun' .208 In 
England the light metaphor was propounded by the Elizabethan magus John Dee, who in his 
Propaedeumata Aphoristica treated light as the first and most sublime creation, and circular motion 
as perfect. Although Dee assumed the geocentric celestial system of Ptolemy, it was the sun that 
was given the central symbolic status in both his Propaedeumata Aphoristica and the Monas 
Hieroglyphica.209 
Johannes Kepler is today is a maJor figure in the 'emergence of science' way of 
understanding the past, as he was the discoverer of the three laws of elliptical planetary motion that 
put an end to the ancient ideal of circular orbits. But despite Kepler's 'scientific successes', he was 
202 Dobbs, BIT, The jamts faces of genius, op. cit., p. 157. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid., p. 161; 
Yates, FA, Giordano Brww and the Hermetic Tradition, Chicago, London & Toronto, 1964, pp. 7-9, 
23, 36. 
205 An example is the work of the Spanish mystic St John of the Cross, perhaps best known for his treatise 
Dark Night of the Soul. For a short example, see, in particular, St. John of the Cross, Living Flame of 
Love, Tr. EA Peers, Tunbridge Wells, 1935, 1987, pp. 127-130. 
206 See Kristeller, PO, Eight philosophers of the Italian renaissance, Stanford, 1966, pp. 120-121. 
207 Kristeller, PO, The philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, Tr. V Conant, Columbia, 1943, p. 127. 
208 !bid., p. 98; Also partially cited in Dobbs, BJT, The janus faces of genius. The role of alchemy in Newton's 
thought, op. cit., p. 159 (n.l13). 
209 French, P,Jo/111 Dee, London, 1987, pp. 94-96. 
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immersed, like Newton and many other figures who are important in the 'emergence of science', 
in metaphysical thought, and he saw the celestial system in terms of its metaphysical and symbolic 
significance. Like the ancient Greeks, he dealt both in metaphysics and in the quantitative science 
that later divorced itself from its metaphysical companion. His metaphysical view of the celestial 
system, again, recognises the symbolic status of the sun, being at the centre, at rest, and the cause 
of motion. Motion of course occurs in Plato and in the Hermetica as associated with time itself, the 
unreal 'world of becoming' .210 In the Hermetica (now thought to be largely derived from Plato) 
motion is associated with suffering. In Platonic terms, the world of motion, coming to be, and 
ceasing to be, is an unreal copy of the Real, The One, or God, which is eternally Being, but never 
becoming or ceasing to be. Kepler sees all this symbolised by the celestial system: 
The sun in the middle of the moving stars, himself at rest 
and yet the source of motion, carries the image of God the 
Father and Creator.211 
The full metaphysical significance of not only the sun, but the whole celestial system, 
cannot be touched upon by the 'emergence of science' interpretations, or even by the of 'history of 
myths and ideas' interpretations that pervade scholarship of the Greek sources, especially where 
they are coloured by a preference for quantitative or physical explanations. The preference for 
quantitative and physical understanding, whether that preference is shown by an ancient Greek, or 
by a space-age scholar, cannot acknowledge the metaphysical significance of 'aetherial fire' (with 
which the sun is of course associated), and will inevitably take an idea like 'fire above' to mean 
physically above, rather than above in the metaphysical sense. Similarly, 'fire in the earth' will be 
taken to be derived from a physical source like volcanic activity, rather than seeing volcanic 
activity as a living metaphor for something metaphysical, in relation to Man's mystical experience. 
In the mystical view, the entire physical universe is a metaphor.212 
210 On Kepler and the Hem1etic philosophy see Field, DIY, Kepler 's geometrical cosmology, London, 1943, 
1988, pp. 187-190. 
211 Opera Onmi, Vol. IX, pp. 33 ff. 5; see Kestrel, A, The act of creation, London, 1964, p. 125. 
212 Kingsley, op. cit., p. 53, states that there is a nexus of Greek passages alluding to the idea that the fires of 
heaven, including the sun, had their origin in the depths of the Earth. 
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The traditional associations between fire, purgatory or hell, the 'black' or 'invisible' sun, 
and even the 'fire in the Earth' of the alchemical tradition/ 13 are as much a metaphysical 
interpretation of the human condition, and the spiritual endeavour to overcome it, as they are about 
the physical structure of the Earth and solar system. Alchemical transmutation in this context is not 
merely about gold-production, but about the metaphysical transformation of the alchemist, the 
transmutation of the human spirit through gnosis. 214 Even if it is true that an imaginative 
metaphysical belief-system can be built upon observations of natural phenomena, any truly 
mystical understanding of human purgatory and transformation was arguably far more likely to 
have originated with the subjective experience of purgatory and transformation, or at least the 
search for it. In this context, a physical phenomenon like volcanic activity exists, like the universe 
as a whole, as merely a physical symbol of the inner search. It is the actual inner journey of the 
seeker-after-truth, that would, so to speak, determine the interpretation of natural phenomena. 
Whilst the details of Philolaus' celestial system considered as a metaphysical symbol may 
remain obscure, the metaphysical interpretation of the Pythagorean Hearth is easy to see when it is 
acknowledged how much of what is said in the earliest sources is primarily allegorical in nature. It 
is very difficult to see through allegory without some foreknowledge of the possible meaning, but 
when we know what the story is really about, the allegory by which it is being told becomes 
relatively transparent. The problem with the 'emergence of science' and the 'history of myths' 
filters is that they can contain no such foreknowledge. The finer and even the more general points 
of the metaphysical philosophy are not exactly visible or tangible to science. Also, if it is an 
intrinsic part of that philosophy, that historicity is mere illusion, then what does the historicity filter 
have to offer towards seeing through the allegory, and understanding that philosophy? 
Heraclitus said 'Harmony consists of opposing tension, like that of the bow or lyre .. .', but 
he also said 'The bow is called Life, but its work is Death'. This, again, is poetic allegory. The 
Greek word for 'Life' is actually punned with the Greek word for 'bow' .215 The work of the bow 
and arrow, as we all know, is death. It is sheer negligence to appreciate the pun, but not to ask what 
Heraclitus meant by indicating that the work of Life is death, and that both are related to harmony. 
213 Kingsley, op. cit., pp. 55-57. 
214 French, P, John Dee, London, 1987, p. 127; See also, for example, ibid. pp. 77-78 & footnotes, and 
Reedy, J, Thomas Nor/on's Ordinal of Alchemy, Oxford, 1975. 
215 Freeman, Anci/la, op. cit., p. 28, footnote I. 
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We could explain this in any number of rational ways if we really wanted to, but we should find 
ourselves running fast into confusion if we are too quick to avoid the metaphysical and offer only 
'rational' explanations for everything that is said by an ancient Greek Godman-scientist. What are 
we to make of his assertion that 'When you have listened, not to me but to the Logos,216 it is wise 
to agree that all things are one'?217 Or what of the statement that 'Time is a child playing a game of 
draughts; the kingship is in the hands of a child'?218 What we have in the source is the poetic 
allegorical expression of a connection between Time, Life, death, and Harmony, all of which are 
ingredients of Plato's metaphysics, all are ingredients of the Myth of Er. All are proper and correct 
ingredients in the metaphysical idea of the harmony of the spheres. 
It is these elements that we should consider now, today, as relevant to our understanding of 
the meaning of music in the most profound sense, for they have nothing legitimate to do with 
mistaken ideas about the structure of the celestial system, but everything to do with music and the 
human emotional condition when it is understood in its full context. 
It is assumed that Plato must have had an earlier source from which the Myth of Er was 
derived.219 The true source of the Myth of Er is the metaphysical world-view out of which it 
springs. Can we understand the Myth of Er without understanding the philosophy from which it 
springs, a philosophy that challenges the common notion of time and historicity? We have to see 
that from the point of view of that metaphysical philosophy itself (a branch of which is explicitly 
represented by Plato), the meaning of the myth is incompatible with the opinion that the myth has 
its source somewhere in time. Anyone who sticks only to the historical facts and thinks, like so 
many scholars, that the myth must have its source in time, clearly has no empathy for, or 
understanding of its philosophical content and meaning. 
In Plato's philosophy, the manifest, objective aspect of the world is seen as unreal, and 
veiling an underlying unity or Reality, identified as The One.220 This central idea of unity would be 
very much expected of any philosophy or tradition that was fundamentally mystical. As Combs has 
put it, in his tackling the problem of the meeting ground between science and spirit: 'most mystical 
traditions share the idea that while multiplicity and separateness are characteristics of manifest 
216 Tr. Freeman as 'Law'. Literally, 'word'. 
217 Freeman, Ancil/a, op. cit., p. 28. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Philip, JA, Pythagoras and early Pytilagoreanism, op. cit., p. 127. 
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reality, the deep order is one of mutual enfoldment and oneness' .221 Only this unified world-view 
can support the assertion that the 'universe sings' .222 
220 e.g. Plato, Timaeus and Critias, 30-32, Tr. D Lee, 1965, 1977, p. 43. 
221 Combs, A, 'The meeting ground of science and spirit: New themes for a new science', in Burner. et. al. 
(Eds.), Holistic Science and Human Values, Adder (Theosophical Science Centre), Madras, 1992, pp. 
53-59; cited in Bags, S & J, The Healthy House, London, 1996, p. 89. 
222 Attributed to Pythagoras, for example by Hippolytus in Refutations, !, 2, 2, see Heath, Greek Astronomy, 
op. cit., p. 34. 
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Chapter 4 - The strength and continuity of the harmonia mundi 
tradition 
The mathematical study of musical intervals, and their combination to form modes and scales, is 
the basis of musical science as it was widely studied throughout most of the history of Western 
music. Before the 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth-century, the science of music was not a 
mere adjunct to other intellectual pursuits, but rather, its place in the quadrivium indicates its status 
as an essential part of the learned man's studies. Musical science was important to the 
understanding of the world, and of Man and his place in the macrocosm. The importance of 
musical science, or the science of 'harmonics' as it was known, was supported by, and arguably 
derived from, the impressive strength of the quantitative harmony of the spheres tradition. 
The idea of the harmony of the spheres has always had its opponents in one way or 
another, the first obvious example being Aristotle. Nevertheless, the celestial system that was 
accepted in Europe for fifteen centuries until the scientific revolution, was the system originated by 
Ptolemy, who was an important proponent of cosmic harmony. Ptolemy developed many ideas 
inherited from Plato, concerning both the quantitative and metaphysical faces of harmonia mzmdi. 
He could indeed be recognised by modem acousticians as a representative of the quantitative 
tradition, and even as what one scholar has described as a 'number cruncher' ,223 but at the same 
time he clearly accepted Plato's conception of the arithmetically proportioned soul, and that the 
effects of music were due to the kinship between the 'harmonics' of the soul, and the harmonic 
structure of musical phenomena.224 Ptolemy developed an extensive astrological correlation 
between the heavens, music, and the human soul.225 'Harmonics' was for Ptolemy, not merely a 
quantitative science, but a manifestation of a predictable, divinely ordained order.226 Knowledge of 
this 'divine' order is both subjective and theoretical and it is a function of nature that allows 
223 Solomon, J, Harmony in Ptolemy's Harmonics, Armadillo, NSW, 1990, p. 13. 
224 Taub, LC, Ptolemy's universe, Chicago & LaSalle, Illinois, 1993, p. 127; Barker, A, Greek musical 
writings, (2 Vols), Cambridge, 1989, Vol. 2, pp. 375-376. 
m Harmonics, Book Ill, Chapters 4, 8-16; Barker, A, Greek musical writings, (2 Vols), Cambridge, 1989, 
Vol. 2, pp. 375-376; 380-391. 
226 Solomon, J, Harmony in Ptolemy's Harmonics, Armidale, NSW, 1990, p. 16. 
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subjective perception of the divine order.227 'The power of attunement is present in all things', 
states Ptolemy, 'but is revealed most fully through human souls and through the movements in the 
heavens', and thus 'The power of harmonia is a form of the cause corresponding to reason' .228 
St Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius and Boethius were important in transmitting Platonism 
and neo-Platonism to the middle ages.229 Boethius was instrumental in propagating the musico-
mathematical concepts from Plato's Timaeus and ensuring that musical science occupied an 
important position in scholarship.230 He also made references to Philolaus' music theory and quoted 
definitions of musical intervals that he attributed to Philolaus.231 His treatises De institutione 
musica, De institutione arithmetica, and the influential Consolations of Philosophy all present 
music and mathematics as necessary to the attainment of knowledge and virtue,232 and in De 
inslitutione musica he emphasises hearing for its ability to influence the soul.233 Boethius helped 
establish music as one of the disciplines of the quadriviwn together with arithmetic, geometry, and 
astronomy,234 and so to make it essential to what was considered a complete understanding of the 
world. Boethius' interpretation of Plato, and the theses he developed from him, emphasise 'reason' 
as an authority. Boethius seems to understand 'reason' as an intellectual, or even deductive faculty, 
that can be enhanced through intellectual study. In this he sides mostly with the spirit of the 
quantitative tradition, and the common belief that the teaching of Pythagoras was a celebration of 
Man's true authority, an authority that is a kind of abstract or God-given 'reasoning' power, over 
sense,235 a 'reasoning' power that is in general not distinguished from the intellectual faculty that is 
employed in the study of arithmetic or geometry. Boethius endorsed a metaphysical 
correspondence, at least theologically, between the various manifestations of musica with which his 
name is associated, but musical scholarship in the Boethian sense was primarily a scientific or 
quasi-scientific study. 
221 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
228 Harmonics, Book Ill, Ch. 4; Barker, A, Greek musical writings, (2 Vols), Cambridge, 1989, Vol. 2, p. 
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232 Moyer, AE, Mrrsica Scientia, lthaca & London, 1992, p. 29. 
233 Ibid., p. 30. 
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Later scholars continued to expand of the study of music as a science,236 and two 
thousand years after Plato, in renaissance cosmology, the notion that musical principles permeate 
the cosmos at every level, once again reached grand proportions. There now existed a strong 
movement of philosophers who used harmonic models of the cosmos and also pursued the study of 
practical music, but whose motives were distinct from orthodox musical scholarship.237 They not 
only studied the quantitative complexities of harmonic science, but also sought a qualitative, deeper 
metaphysical understanding of music as an affective power. In this pursuit there seems to have 
been a good deal of cross-fertilisation of the 'music cosmology' indirectly inherited from the 
Pythagorean tradition, with the occult, neo-Platonic and Hermetic philosophies. The latter had 
spread following the rediscovery of the Corpus Hermeticum, which was initially embraced as a 
source of ancient Egyptian wisdom, perhaps more authoritative than Plato, since it was held to 
contain esoteric teachings transmitted from the Egyptian god Thoth.238 
By the height of renaissance, the Elizabethan magus and Hermeticist John Dee was treating 
music as a mystical art capable of putting Man in tune with the universal order,239 and in Jacobean 
England the metaphysical structure of the cosmos was documented in vivid detail by Robert Fludd, 
who disclosed the secrets of his music-cosmology in his monumental but unfinished History of the 
Macrocosm and Microcosm. 24° Fludd's cosmology was built on an already thriving and complex 
foundation of ideas linking Man with the cosmos as a whole, in a metaphysical and symbolic way. 
Those ideas included the neo-Piatonic concept of the 'Great Chain ofBeing' 241 in which everything 
that existed either physically or incorporeally, was linked in a hierarchy descending from God 
down through metaphysical levels into the material world. The universe was understood in the 
context of a macrocosm-microcosm 'correspondence', in which Man (the microcosm), and the 
universe (the macrocosm), were complementary symbols of each other.242 The renaissance notions 
of macrocosm, microcosm, and harmonic relationship, were variants and elaborations on the 
236 Moyer, AE, Musica Scientia, op. cit., pp. 100-103. 
237 Ibid., p. 7. 
238 The Hermetica is now generally thought to be neo-Platonic in origin, even if ultimately derived from 
Egyptian teaching. Scott, W (Tr), Hermetica, (1924), Bath, 1992. 
239 French, op.cit., p. 140. 
240 Utriusque Cosmi .... Historia, 1617- 1626. See Godwin, J, Robert Fludd, London, 1979; Huffman, WH, 
Robert Fludd and the end of the renaissance, London, 1988. 
241 For a concise overview of the Chain of Being, see Tillyard, EMW, The Elizabethan World Picture, 
London, 1943, 1972, p. 33 ff. The classic study is Lovejoy, AO, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1936. 
76 
tradition inherited from the Greeks and transmitted by Boethius, who had reiterated them in his 
own musical theory.243 
For magi like Robert Fludd or John Dee, the musico-cosmological world-view was part of 
a matrix of esoteric, mystical knowledge, but the notions of the Great Chain of Being and the 
macrocosm-microcosm correspondence were themselves expressed more broadly in a variety of 
ways through Elizabethan art and culture.244 This world-view was imbued with Platonism and neo-
Platonism, drawing particularly on the fifth century Christian neo-Platonists Dionysius the 
Areopagite,245 and Plotinus. Music does not feature as prominently in the Corpus Hermelicum as it 
does in the writings of say, Iamblichus, but it was nevertheless given an important role in the 
Hermetic subculture that existed as an undercurrent to the neo-Platonic beliefs. Although no formal 
academy existed in England for the propagation of Hermetic or occult teaching, its influence 
reached high culture through the close association of the magus and the aristocracy .246 
Many of the ideas held by the English magi were derived from earlier continental 
Hermeticists, who, influenced by the legendary Greek accounts of the marvellous effects of music, 
had developed their own ideas sometimes to fantastic proportions.247 Francesco Giorgi had taken 
the ideas of musica mundana, humana and instrumentalis that he had obtained from Boethius, and 
permeated them with cabalism.248 As in England, it had been held on the continent that the power 
of music to affect Man comes from the unity of Man and the cosmos, both of which are subject to, 
and related by, musical proportion. Again, this idea was not new. It is, as we have seen, implicit in 
the earliest Greek tradition, it is epitomised in Plato, and it is explicitly enunciated by later 
philosophers including Ptolemy and Boethius. Music was thus seen by the Hermetic or occult 
philosopher as a key to knowledge of the higher levels of being in the Great Chain, and as having 
the power to affect the inner being to such an extent that it could even induce some kind of higher 
cosmtc awareness. 
The correspondences that existed between all things, and between material and incorporeal 
levels of Being, assisted in the spiritual quest for union with God, and could even be called upon in 
242 Tillyard, op. cif. For an illustrated overview of Fludd's macrocosm-microcosm cosmology see Godwin, J, 
Roberf Fludd, London, 1979. 
243 French, op. cif., pp. 139-140. 
244 Till yard, op. cit. 
245 Ibid., in particular pp. 49-50, 59, 96. 
246 Especially through Sir Philip Sidney and his circle. French, op. cit., p. 126 If. 
247 French, op. cit., pp. 139-140. 
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the ritualised attempt to invoke assistance from the higher levels. Pico della Mirandola's teacher 
Marsilio Ficino, whom Cosimo de Medici had set the task of translating the Corpus Hermeticum, 
introduced a new hierarchy of correspondences which he developed from that of Plotinus.249 Ficino 
was himself an instrumentalist, giving frequent performances before a large circle of friends. 250 
Working with an occult system that invoked power from the correspondences, Ficino aimed to 
influence people and events through musico-magic.251 He believed music to be the medicine of the 
soul,252 and to be at its most potent when conjoined with words, enabling 'heavenly gifts' and 
'celestial things' to be obtained.253 The perfect matching of words with musical sound affected the 
intellect as well as the spirit, thus influencing the entire human being.254 These ideas were later 
absorbed by John Dee, and adopted by Philip Sidney as the basis of his beliefs in the power of 
measured verse and music.255 
Poetry was considered by Ficino to have its origins in the divine mind itself, whereas music 
had its origins in the harmony of the spheres. However the music of the spheres was held by Ficino 
to be something essentially divine or metaphysical. His understanding of the effects of music was 
based upon a metaphysical and astrological view of Man and the macrocosm, in which there is 
correspondence between earthly and divine music, that can raise earthly perception towards the 
divine. On hearing certain 'sweet harmonies and rhythms', the soul is 'exhorted and excited to 
consider the divine music with a more ardent and intimate sense of mind' .256 In Ficino we find 
again the neo-Platonic idea of a hierarchical descent of Being from unity (The One) to physical 
plurality, and the idea that the manifest physical universe is symbolic of a greater, metaphysical 
whole.257 
As far as music is concerned, Ficino is arguably the most important philosopher of the 
renaissance, and more generally speaking, the most important writer of the Florentine 
248 French, op. cif., pp. 139-140. 
249 Kristeller, PO, Eight philosophers of the Italian renaissance, Stanford, 1966, pp. 42-43 .. 
250 Kristeller, PO, The philosophy ofMarsilio Ficino, Tr. V Conant, Columbia, 1943, p. 307. 
251 French, op. cif., p. 138. 
252 Lewinsky, EE, 'Music in the culture of the renaissance', in Kristeller, PO & Wiener, PP, Renaissance 
Essays, New York, 1968, 1992, p. 344. 
253 Ficino, M, The Book of Life, Tr. Charles Boer, Dallas, Texas, 1992, pp. 158-164. 
254 French, op. cif., pp. 138; Godwin, J, M11sic, mysticism and magic, London, 1987, pp. 117-122. 
255 French, ibid., p. 138. 
256 Kristeller, PO, The philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, op.cit., 1943, p. 308. 
257 Ibid., pp. 74-120; p. 88 in particular. 
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awakening. 258 He was for many years the leader of the Florentine Academy, which although 
perhaps hardly an academy in the proper sense,259 seems to have disseminated Platonism widely 
through those who became associated with it.26° Ficino was known and read across Europe, and 
was a major force in the spread of Platonism in sixteenth century thought.261 When his philosophy 
did not meet with the approval of his clerical enemies, his influence seems to have been sufficient 
to avoid the hostile forces that befell his pupil Pico.262 His Book of Life brought immediate 
accusations of demonic magic and necromancy, but by enlisting the help of friends from three of 
the most powerful families in Florence, Ficino succeeded in clearing his name, and averting a Papal 
ban.263 He wrote the first complete translation into any Western language of the works of Plato, and 
published in his Theo/ogia Platonica a commentary on Plato's Symposium.264 
The ancient idea of the macrocosm-microcosm correspondence, and the neo-Platonic 
'Great Chain of Being' are models -particular ways of expressing a relationship between Man and 
the cosmos as a meaningful whole. The approach is one that sees the part only in the context of the 
whole. It is fundamentally a metaphysical interpretation of man's existence and relation to the 
cosmos, but one that often expresses itself in explicitly quasi-scientific terms. Unlike 
Pythagoreanism as a whole, a cosmology like Fludd's, though full of the use of Number and 
'quantification', juxtaposes the mathematical and the metaphysical, and does not even try to grasp 
the full descriptive and predictive power of mathematics. Rather than seeking the objective fact or 
the quantitative laws governing the parts, it uses mathematical relations to express, symbolise and 
corroborate a qualitative, subjective view of the workings of the whole. It contrasts strongly to 
scientific reductionism and materialism which sees quantitative examination of the parts as the key 
to understanding the whole as a complexus. Conversely we can envisage even the earliest 
Pythagoreanism as setting out upon a road exploring the laws of Number and how they relate to the 
physical world, a road which soon becomes detached from the metaphysical path of which it was 
258 Boer, C, Marsilio Ficino 's Book of Life, Dallas, 1992. 
259 Shorey, P, Platonism Ancient and Modern, Berkeley, 1938, p. 120. 
26° Kristeller, PO, Eight philosophers of the Italian renaissance, op. cit, 41-42. 
261 Ibid., 51-52. 
262 Ibid., pp. 54-71. 
263 Ficino, M, The Book of Life, op. cit., pp. xi-xii. 
264 Kristeller, PO, Eight philosophers of the Italian renaissance, op. cit., 37-53. For the commentary on 
Symposium see Jayne, SR, Marsilio Ficino 's comment01y 011 Plato's Symposium, Columbia, 1944. (Vol. 
19 of University of Missouri Studies). 
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once a part. The quantitative road soon becomes the sole occupation of enquiry, and a foundation 
stone of emerging scientific method. 
The 'scientific revolution' of the seventeenth century signifies the dissolution of the 
musico-cosmological world-view, as musico-cosmology gradually becomes cast into the shadow of 
'scientific' cosmology. One great cornerstone of developing scientific cosmology came in the fonn 
of the Copernican theory of heliocentricity. Copemicus' theory appeared in the previous century 
and asserted on empirical and mathematical grounds that the Earth should be considered as 
revolving around the Sun and not vice versa.265 Such a suggestion, which was contrary to the 
teachings of the Church, was first cautiously presented in the guise of a merely 'theoretical model' 
that happened to be useful for assisting astronomers' calculations. But eventually, assisted by the 
observations of Galileo, the idea gained acceptance as fact, and in the eyes of the progressive 
scientists, it cast all geocentric cosmology like Fludd's conclusively into the annals of the past. 
Fludd, the last great representative of renaissance Henneticism, died in 1637. In the very 
same year Descartes published his Discourse on the method of rightly conducting one's reason and 
seeking truth in the sciences .. ?66 The Discourse asserted the independence of mind and body as two 
distinct 'substances' ,267 and in doing so provided a schema for an empirical scientific method based 
upon the principle of 'objective observation'. The mind could know itself through introspection, 
but it could also be the independent, objective observer and investigator of the material world. It 
was capable of being the independent, objective, scientific mind. In effect, Descartes' duality of 
matter and mind, succeeded for three hundred years or so in legitimising a separation between 
subjective knowledge and the pursuit of information about physical nature. Having accepted the 
duality as a basis for scientific understanding of the world, science now faces the task of ridding 
itself of that duality. 
The scientific world-view, as it matured, offered little support for a cosmology that is 
founded on mystical principles or metaphysical symbolism, but in its earlier stages we can find 
examples of the two approaches to understanding the universe, coexisting within the protagonists 
of scientific method. One of the better known instances of this coexistence, relating to musica 
265 The assertion that the Earth moves, and is not at the centre of the cosmos is at least as old as the 
cosmology of Philolaus. 
266 Descartes, R, The philosophical writings of Descartes, Tr. J Cottingham, R Stoothoff, D Murdoch, 
Cambridge, 1985, 1994, Vol. I, p. 109 ff. 
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mundana, can be found in the case of Kepler. Kepler was what we would now call a scientist. 
Kepler's three laws of planetary motion are still used today, and are named after him - they not 
only confirm Copemicus' assertion ofheliocentricity, but also, by showing that the planets move in 
ellipses around the sun, they destroy the ancient sanctification of circular motion. However, this 
destruction came about not as a direct act of scientific disregard for the echoes of Platonism, and 
not as a result of purely mathematical analysis, but actually as result of Kepler's attempts to prove 
that the orbits of the planets were determined by the shapes of the five Platonic solids?68 Kepler 
also continued to study and write on the subject of cosmic harmon/69 and calculated a 
mathematical basis for the music of the spheres based upon the newly discovered law of non-
circular motion.270 
Even in the late seventeenth century the great Newton himself continued to write 
abundantly on alchemical and mystical matters. But it is not those writings that determined the 
course of things to come. In 1687 he published his Philosophiae Natura/is Principia Mathematica, 
which became the revolutionary basis of a new era in cosmology, and laid the foundation of what 
has become known as classical mechanics. The remnants of Greek cosmology were finally and 
firmly overthrown by a handful of relatively simple mathematical formulae that immediately 
explained a host of known, but puzzling observations. Newton's laws simultaneously explained 
Kepler's laws, the precession of the equinoxes, minor perturbations in the motions of the planets, 
and the complex variations in the motion of the moon.271 The unequivocal scope of the Principia 
establishes it as a masterpiece, a tour de force in the process of disentangling fact from 
imagination, and more generally, the objective from of the subjective. It is one of the most 
prominent milestones in the evolution of physics. What it did, was to blow away centuries of 
accumulated, spurious quantitative smoke from the harmony of the spheres tradition. Above all, it 
fired a new intellectual optimism in the combined power of 'objective' empirical observation and 
mathematical description, an optimism that heralded the ages of reason and enlightenment.272 
267 Descartes, Tr. J Cottingham, R Stoothoff, D Murdoch, op. cit., Vol. 1., pp. 210-216. 
268 This is well known in the history of science discipline, but for example, see Huffman, WH, Robert Fludd 
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Notwithstanding the new enthusiasm for scientific method, the echoes of macrocosm-
microcosm style musico-cosmology continued, not least in the field of medicine. Whilst medicine 
has always had its share of mechanical philosophers who have chosen to see the human being as a 
machine, it has also always traditionally posed additional questions with which the physical 
sciences were not primarily concerned, questions concerning mind and the nature of its connection 
with the body. In this context, the use of musical principles in understanding Man's physiological, 
spiritual and psychological nature existed outside the boundaries of music-cosmology, and 
persisted in England into the eighteenth century, as Kassler has shown.273 In particular, the Baconic 
view that health is a harmony and that the body is like a musical instrument or consort of 
instruments/74 remained a guiding principle in parts of medical practice beyond the seventeenth 
century.275 Twentieth century medicine has witnessed a conceptual rift between body and mind,276 
largely because of an unquestioned, tacit acceptance of a Cartesian-like duality of mind and matter, 
or mind and body, but also on the strength of its reductionist understanding of the body. This is 
now slowly changing in some areas. But in the eighteenth century respected medical writers in 
England frequently puzzled over the connection of mind and body,277 and acknowledged the effect 
of the mind upon the health of the body, and vice versa. The mind-body question provided a 
medium for the continued speculation on the effects of music upon the human organism, but 
without the need to endorse the concept of universal or cosmic 'music'. Nevertheless, these 
physicians were well aware of the Greek and later accounts of the marvellous effects of music, and 
were fond of quoting them. In addition to the idea that music could affect the vital or animal spirits 
in the body directly, the mysterious interaction and connection between body and mind, itself 
allowed a number of English medical writers and practitioners to endorse the medical efficacy of 
music.278 In this respect it was music's power to affect the passions that was held to be important, 
since the management of the passions was seen as being one of the physician's most valuable 
273 Kassler, JC, Inner Music: Hobbes, Hooke and North 011 Internal Character, London, 1995. 
274 Bacon, F, The advancement of/earning, 1605, Ed. A Johnston, Oxford, 1986, p. 106; cited in Kassler, op. 
cif., p. 211. 
275 Kassler, op. cit., p. 231. 
216 Damasio, A, Descartes' Error, New York, 1994, London, 1996, p. 257. 
271 These medical writers were not theorists, but invariably practising physicians. Scientific lecturing was 
based mainly on the work of London entrepreneurs, whereas medical lecturing primarily had a 
vocational aim. See Porter, R, 'Medical lecturing in Georgian London', British Journal for the History 
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tools.279 The passions were understood to both exasperate and cause diseases, and the mutual 
influence between mind and body was considered of the greatest importance, especially in cases 
that we would now call psychosomatic, or cases of depression or anxiety.280 The English 
eighteenth-century acceptance of the medicinal efficacy of music, seems to be associated with the 
theory of vitalism281 and on the unanswered question of the connection of mind and body, rather 
than on some deference to the Wisdom of the ancients. Nonetheless the use of music in eighteenth 
century medicine noticeably parallels the use of music by Pythagoras', as reported by 
lamblichus.282 
What appears to be repercussions of Platonism or neo-Piatonism seems to have thrived in 
the environs of nineteenth and twentieth century theosophy, and new musical cosmologies have 
been proposed by Blavatsky, Steiner, Mathers, Jung, Gurdjieff, and Ouspensky.283 Composers of 
the twentieth century have continued to pay tribute the notion of cosmic music,284 and Jules 
278 In particular, Browne, Richard, Medicina Musica or, a Mechanical Essay on the Effects of Singing, 
Musick, and Dancing, 011 Human Bodies .... , London, 1729; Brocklesby, Richard, Reflections 011 Ancient 
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1786, Ch. XIV, p. 259, especially p. 260 IT. 
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Combarieu has even equated music with magic, and the composer with the magician, in a quasi-
Orphic sense.285 The echoes continue unabated to the present day.286 
285 Combarieu, J, Histoire de la musique des origines au debut du Xxme siec/e, Paris, 1913-1930. See Dwight 
Alien, Philosophies of Music Hist01y, New York, 1939, 1962, pp. 187-189. 
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the universe, London, 1995, especially pp. 219-220, & 225-228. 
84 
Section 2 - A Contemporary Exposition 
Chapter 5- Subject-orientated knowledge in Plato 
Plato provides the first extant account of the Myth of Er, and it is presented as part of 
Socrates' teaching. There is the important question of how in principle, Pythagoras' or Socrates' 
knowledge - knowledge that does not purport to be a set of scientific facts - was supposed at the 
time to have come about in the first instance. Plato himself has something to say about this. Plato 
speaks of 'The Eternal Being', or 'That which always is and never becomes', which is, according 
to Plato, 'apprehensible by intelligence with the aid of reasoning, being eternally the same ... ' 287 
Plato may have meant this to imply that knowledge of the Eternal Being can be reached, through 
thought, as a reasoned conclusion. The interpretation of the word 'reason' is seemingly fraught 
with philosophical problems, but we can say that Plato's statement was not out of keeping with the 
Platonic dialogues generally, since they usually proceed as if conclusions were being reached with 
the aid of 'reason' as a deductive or connected sequence of thoughts or arguments. But this 
approach or method of communication is not present at the climax of the Rep11blic where the Myth 
of Er is presented as the ultimate metaphysical explanation for the condition of the world. It cannot 
be 'reasoned' because it represents knowledge beyond death. Elements of the myth are also implied 
in Timaeus, and if Timaeus himself is supposed to have reached his extensive knowledge of the 
cosmos through such reasoning, Plato does not tell us how. It would be far more consistent with the 
spirit and presentation of the Myth of Er and of the discourse in Timae11s, to assume that Socrates' 
and Timaeus' knowledge is supposedly the result of a power of 'reason' which yields precognitive 
knowledge, and not deduced conclusions. Such a power of reason would at its extreme, perhaps be 
defined as: 
287 Timaeus, Ibid., 27-28, p. 40. 
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[Divine] Intellect personified; Faculty transcending the understanding and 
providing a priori principles, intuition.288 
This would be a form of immediate or induced knowledge, as distinct from deduced or 
observation-based information, or rationally reasoned conclusions. 
The spirit of the communication in Timaeus is much more one of the didactic transmission 
of knowledge by induction, than of 'reasoned' argument and verification, as in many of the other 
Platonic dialogues. Even the dialogue in the Republic that occurs prior to the telling of the 'Myth of 
Er', is plainly presented as Socrates utilising the process of question, argument and conclusion, 
merely as a tool for the purpose of authoritative didactic communication. In the 'Myth of Er', as in 
other sections of the Republic, - notably the beginning of the seventh book - the spirit is nakedly 
one of direct revelation, even if not at first-hand. Plato's world-view obviously takes the idea of 
authoritative subjective knowledge seriously, and recognises it as distinct from, and having a status 
above, what Plato calls 'opinion', which is concerned only with the unreal 'world of becoming'. 
Plato's undercurrent of reverence for Socrates as an authoritative source of genuine 
wisdom is unmistakable to anyone who is not primarily concerned with the intellectually 
entertaining distractions of Socratic dialogue. One does not have to rely upon the legend of the 
Delphi oracle to see that Socrates symbolised the embodiment of wisdom. Socrates ultimately 
represents the voice of the original philosopher, the genuine 'seeker of wisdom' who is his own 
authority, yet well able to cite other recognised authority in support of his own teaching. The 
wisdom he seeks is what Pythagoras, according to Iamblichus, called 'knowledge of the truth 
which dwells in being' .289 This philosopher has been a disciple himself and perhaps still is, but his 
authority does not come from his knowledge of anything separate from himself that he has read 
about or heard about or abstractly thought about. He speaks, as Richard Tarnas has so succinctly 
put it, 'with an intellectual and moral confidence based on profound self-knowledge, rooted as it 
were in the depths of his psyche' .290 
Where was this knowledge supposed to have come from? Socrates is supposed to have 
used the dialectic as a means of teaching, and whilst we do not need to dispute that, it is 
288 The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1976 (after Kant). 
289 Clark, G, /amblichus: On the Pythagorean Life, Liverpool, 1989, p. 71. 
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nonetheless misleading. The dialectic without the guidance of the subjective authority behind it, 
and that is not consciously aimed at the deepening of subjective authority, would be an anathema to 
the Socratic endeavour. The Socratic dialogue always had the guidance of Socrates' subjective 
authority behind the shammed ignorance, the 'Socratic irony'. Socratic irony was supposed to be 
necessary in order for the pupil to discover his own knowledge, rather than trying to acquire a 
merely mental or intellectual understanding of Socrates' subjective knowledge. Only the process of 
self-discovery of what is already potentially known, but not previously realised, could contribute to 
subjective authority, and only then, given that there has been some relevant experience. This is the 
modus operandi of the Socratic dialogues. 
The world at large is a constant theatre of conflict and argument, and this is frequently 
upheld as necessary on the belief that truth, stability, solution or compromise can be synthesised 
from the conflict of opposites, without the necessity for one force to annihilate the other. 
Agreements, compromises and a balance of force are indeed often reached where forces conflict, 
and the new may indeed be born or synthesised out of the old. But as dialectical theory indicates, 
the new contains the seed of the old - which must grow again into conflicting force. Socrates is not 
a player in this game, even if he does use the same game-board. 
What was the philosophical 'game' Socrates was playing when he chose hemlock in 
preference to hypocrisy?291 The ultimate game for all of us is the total experience of existing as a 
human being, enmeshed in physical existence, through the reality of experience. Socrates, real or 
Myth, is a symbol of a man who was not just a thinker, a cogitator. He was an experienced man and 
the very paradigm of subjective authority. He is supposed to have experienced seventy years of 
living when the final demonstration of his subjective knowledge was called for. And the final trial 
of Socrates' philosophy was not a cogitative, intellectual one, tested and thought-out in the 
philosopher's arm-chair. It was a test in actual experience- that resulted in a cup of poison hemlock 
that Socrates cheerfully drank- and we who spend our time in great seriousness mentally analysing 
and discussing it over the philosophy table will never know if Socrates was a fool or not. As he is 
portrayed, Socrates knew perfectly well that philosophy as the genuine seeking of wisdom is not 
290 Tamas, R, The Passion of the Western Mind, London, 1991, p. 36. 
291 Socrates was condemned to death (for political reasons) on the invented charge of com1pting the young, 
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about proposition and refutation; it is not about water-tight persuasion or open minded 
discussion. It is not the endeavour to know about anything. The legend has it that in response to the 
Delphinian oracle's proclamation that Socrates was the wisest man in Greece, Socrates declared 
that if he was, it was because he alone knew that he knew nothing. The report of the life of Socrates 
is one version of a more universal symbol that appears in many other stories and myths. Socratic 
philosophy is the seeking of knowledge not as information about the world but as subjective 
knowledge of the subject-orientated 'world system' which itself is surely unattainable without self-
knowledge, and self-knowledge is surely unrealisable without experience. Socrates' wisdom would 
not be wisdom unless it had some value beyond the appointment of recognised authority, or the 
personal success of its holder, and it is precisely that value that Plato portrays in his accounts of the 
death of Socrates. 
The Myth of Er- which provides the context for the idea of the music of the spheres - is a 
myth about life, death and destiny. As Plato portrays through the symbol of Socrates, the 
contemplation of these things is not separable from the experience and se! f-knowledge that Plato 
indicates in Socrates. The music of the spheres tradition already embodies an attempt to provide a 
connection between these things and music on a most profound scale. The scale of the idea is so 
vast we may feel it can only be tackled as myth. The truth is, even outside this context of such a 
vast metaphysical cosmology, the tradition invites us even today to acknowledge the subject-
orientated perception of the world, and to acknowledge that there is a dimension of music that 
relates to what is beyond this 'world'. It demands that we recognise there is a dimension of music 
that relates to the nature of the world and our involvement in it, but is somehow beyond it, and thus 
probably beyond the emotional feelings and psychology that comes from our enmeshment in the 
world. 
The concern with the connection of music and emotion is associated with enmeshment. 
Enmeshment in the world means being conditioned by the world. The relation of music to 
something 'beyond the world' implies a position free of this enmeshment, from which the world 
and enmeshment can be seen, and this occurs in the Myth of Er in which Er is briefly given this 
position. Er had to pass through death to reach this, and from that position was visible the whole of 
and cheerfulness. See Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H Tarrant, London, 1954, 
1993. 
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the existence of the world as a cyclic system of 'harmony'. We may not pass through death as Er 
did, but we certainly pass through experience in life, and we are going to look at the possibility that 
passing through experience in life can produce a perception that can similarly see the world from a 
position beyond it, even if not from a position of having passed through death. 
The message delivered by Plato through the example of Socrates and his teaching is that 
the fear of death is transcended through knowledge of death, and whilst Socrates is able to engage 
in 'reasoned' dialogue about the nature of the soul and its relationship to the body, when it comes 
to knowledge of death itself, the path of 'reason' disappears,292 but the knowledge does not, as 
adequately demonstrated in his last hour. Throughout Socrates' teaching he is clearly working 'top 
down', from knowledge already in place, and using the dialogue of philosophical argument almost 
as a trick with which to bring the other philosophers up towards him. What all the philosophers call 
Reason is as much about self control and the actual breaking of attachment to pleasure, pain, 
desire, and eventually, the body, as it is about the contents of the dialogues. This is all part of the 
agreed training of the philosopher, and what it amounts to is experience, and the breaking of 
attachment to experience or the desire of experience. 293 In the case of Socrates, even though in 
good health, at his death he continues in a state of cheerful, yet unemotional equilibrium. We could 
say this is because in one sense he is already beyond death. Death of the body, which is part of the 
'unreal world of becoming', is for Socrates not a problem- it is in effect irrelevant. Yet the other 
philosophers cannot contain their weeping- for them, his death is an emotional experience - they 
are emotionally attached to him.294 
Socrates the Master, and the implications of music beyond emotion. 
Now we may say that emotional experience in music is all part of the same enmeshment in 
existence from which the true philosopher seeks to escape. The symbolic scenario of death shown 
in the Myth of Er, which through the Fates does involve musical harmony, does not connect the 
'music' or harmony itself with emotion. It connects it with something 'higher'. Plato does not show 
292 This happens where the account of the Myth of Er takes place in Republic 10, and in Socrates' account of 
death in Phaedo, I 07d - I 08d, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H Tarrant, London, 
1954, 1993,pp. 174-175. 
293 For example, Phaedo 82e - 84b, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H Tarrant, 
London, 1954, 1993, pp. 142-143. 
294 Phaedo, 117c- 118a, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H Tarrant, London, 1954, 
1993, pp. 184-185. 
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us in Socrates any indication that the highest sensibility in the world is emotional. When viewed 
in the context oft he life of Socrates and especially the last hours of Socrates, the Myth of Er is not 
likely to be any indication that the real purpose and value of music in existence is in its emotional 
aspects. 
It is remarkable that so much attention has been paid to the isolated relation of music and 
emotional feeling when it is clear that emotional feeling is not an absolute but is mutable with 
experience. This happens where we pay more attention to 'emotional meaning' in our lives and 
thus in music, than to the fact that emotional feeling changes with age and experience. We accept 
that there are lessons to be learned from experience in coping and dealing practically with the 
world, and that this prevents us from circulating through the same mistakes too often. But what 
about the way we relate to the world through the personal and emotional interpretation of it, 
through the identification with it, and through the emotional and psychological attachment to it and 
enmeshment in it? Is it not so that experience is more than the accumulation of what we have learnt 
and remember about how to deal practically with the world? Experience is also experience of our 
own emotional feeling, and there is surely something amiss about simply accepting this at any time 
or stage of life just as it is, and then aspiring to greater knowledge of it, and music's relation to it. 
The grounds on which we ascribe reality and importance to it are self-referencing, they are the 
existing attachment to, and enmeshment in the emotional feeling itself. We surely cannot know 
what is beyond this except to the degree to which we are not enmeshed, identified and attached. All 
these things are elements of self, and the freeing from them is in effect a degree of loss of self, 
which is already recognised as being important in relation to a change of perception associated with 
'aesthetic experience' or 'impersonal perception'. The implication in all this is that to the degree to 
which the person, the self, is removed from the equation, perception is not lost but heightened. This 
perception is of both the world and music, and the meaning of each changes in relation to it. 
The picture we are forming is that as perception is altered through the 'loss of self as the 
attachment to and enmeshment in the phenomena of the world, so what is seen as the nature of the 
world, changes. The implication in Plato is that the external (to the subject) world to which normal 
sentient intelligence relates, is 'unreal', or as Plato puts it, an 'unreal world of becoming'. Reality is 
as it were, outside the phenomena of it. Plato's Republic, the climax of which is the Myth of Er, is 
the discussion of an 'ideal State', but it is a symbolic State whose form or 'structure' corresponds to 
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the metaphysical 'structure' of men, or of the 'soul', or as we can say, of the self. It is in effect a 
State consisting of a multiplicity of the selves (souls), a State designed for the best guidance of self 
with regard for the various kinds of nature of self (soul), and the only candidate suitable for its 
control is the 'philosopher king' who has a profound knowledge of self, and, as we might now say, 
sufficient absence of self. The symbol of this 'philosopher king' in Plato, or the closest thing to it, 
is Socrates. The ultimate form of this self-knowledge, as explicitly depicted in the Myth of Er, and 
as implied in the life, teachings, and death of Socrates, is a knowledge already beyond death of the 
self, that perceives the whole cycle of life and death from a position beyond enmeshment in it. The 
context Plato thus gives to the so-called Pythagorean idea of the music of the spheres is not at all 
inconsistent with the Eastern tradition of non-duality in which the Master (the 'philosopher king') 
has already attained liberation from self and its repetition in the cycle of life and death, in the 
realisation of the One beyond existence. 
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Chapter 6 - The First Repudiation of Emotion in music- Hanslick 
Beyond emotion 
It is from the regarding of emotional feeling as a creditable high point of human 
subjectivity, that music's efficacy in this respect is seen as correspondingly important. Such a 
position is one that really can only be maintained from a position of the need of experience. The 
pursuing of the world and the emotional experience it offers, the willingness to become enmeshed 
in it, the emotional attaching to it, the continual personal and emotional interpretation of it in 
relation to the emotional self, - all these things are undeniably what the individual engages in for 
many years or maybe for a whole lifetime. If most of the population of the world is still attached to, 
and identified with emotional condition, and every member still engages in this as a perceived self 
reality, then we might expect that music's emotional effects should be widely considered 
important. But if we have experienced a connection between music and emotional self, then it is 
also conceivable that there is a connection between music and what is beyond the experiences of 
the emotional self. Also, we might see that there is something pervading the world that relates to 
our own nature beyond the emotional self. Rather than seeing music as an emotionally relevant 
representation or manifestation of emotional nature in the world and our selves, we might see it as 
connecting with some higher nature in the world, or what lies beyond emotional self. 
It may then follow that it is not emotional fom1, or emotional 'expression' that music is 
really about. Hanslick is already well known for the rejection of the alleged importance of the 
connection of music and emotion. However, he argued the aesthetic form of music is something 
that can be understood in an object-orientated way, and investigated by science. Too much 
importance can be placed on this, and it is from his assertion that the beauty in music is in the note 
objects, and that this should be investigated by science, that he is understood primarily as a 
formalist. It should be remembered that this was said in an age when science was still regarded as 
something that would eventually, through empirical observation, reach a complete understanding of 
the 'Clockwork Universe'. His assertions regarding science were really just an expression of his 
time, and tend to obscure his greater and more important perceptiveness about emotion, feeling, 
and the 'spiritual' in music. However, despite this perceptiveness, what Hanslick did not say about 
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his implied distinction between 'emotional feeling' and 'feeling' of another kind, is how this 
distinction relates to the individual's experience in the world as a whole, how it relates to the nature 
of the world, and where it comes from in the first instance. 
The insights of HansUck 
Hanslick's classic work On the Musically BeautifuP95 is perhaps best known as a 
repudiation of the idea that the aesthetic value of music lies in its connection with feeling. Hanslick 
argued that musical beauty is a property of the purely musical art 'object' constructed of tones, and 
that the enquiry of musical aesthetics should be a scientific, or at least a quasi-scientific 
investigation of this beauty. In Hanslick's view, the methodology of musical aesthetics ought to be 
something akin to the investigations of chemistry or physiology. 
Part of the dynamic behind Hanslick's refutation of emotion was a reaction against the 
music of Wagner, whose philosophy Hanslick saw as being diametrically opposed to his own. 
Wagner's own metaphysical beliefs about music were inspired by Schopenhauer's philosophy.296 
Hanslick presented two main theses which are: 297 
The defining purpose of music is not to represent (or express 
or arouse) feelings. 298 
The beauty of a piece of music is specifically musical, i.e., is 
inherent in the tonal relationships without reference to 
extraneous, extramusical context.299 It is self-contained and 
consists simply and solely of tones and their artistic 
combination.300 
These theses are a reaction against the use of music as an opiate, and the mistaken notion 
that its ability to intoxicate the feelings is some measure of its aesthetic quality. For Hanslick, the 
295 (Vom Musikalisch-SchOnen, Leipzig, 1854); Hanslick, E, On the Musically Beautiful, Tr. Geoffrey 
Payzant, Indianapolis, 1986. 
296 Budd, M, Music and the Emotions, London, 1985, p. 76. 
297 See Geoffrey Payzant's essay, Hanslick, op. cit. pp. 95-96. 
298 Payzant, in Hanslick, op. cit., p. 95. 
299 H I" k . . .. ans tc , op. c1t., p. xxm. 
300 Ibid., p. 28. See also pp. 72-73, and Payzant, Ibid., p. 95,96, & p.xxiii. 
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aesthetic quality of music is an objective aesthetic property of the music itself,301 and it does not 
represent emotion or feeling, or anything extraneous to the music itself. Tones are the raw materials 
out of which music is made,302 and Hanslick saw the purely musical content of music, as consisting 
of the 'artistic combination' of tones. It is this musical content, that is not only acoustically 
pleasing, but in some way actually spiritual.303 The content of music embodies in its 'concrete tonal 
structures '304 'the creation of the artistic spirit, with which the contemplating spirit unites in 
complete understanding',305 This 'ideal content' and the 'specifically musical part' 306 of music to 
which Hanslick refers, he says 'is a not inconsiderable spark of the divine flame, like the beauty of 
any other art' .307 It 'derives from its particular tonal structure as the spontaneous creation of mind 
.. ·-·· 
out of material compatible with mind [i.e. the tones].308 We should note here Hanslick's emphasis 
upon mind, and its association with the spirit and metaphysical notions such as the divine flame. 
Conversely, ·the 'feeling produced' by music happens mechanistically. It can be called 
neither its content nor form, but 'actual effect' .309 This effect largely 'conforms to physiological 
laws' ,310 and the most impm1a.nt factor determining the 'intensity and immediacy with which music 
is capable of arousing feelings, is its powerful effect upon the nervous system'. 311 The link between 
effects on the nervous system and feelings is unlrnown, but it has little or nothing to do with the 
'purely aesthetical side of music. '312 
The effects of music upon the feelings was held by Hanslick to be dependent upon the 
merely 'elemental' 313 qualities of music, such as 'sound and motion', and 'sensuous rhythm' 314 
which Hanslick called its 'material moment' .315 The effect of music's 'material moment' can 
nevertheless be a powerful one because nature has endowed it with 'that unfathomable 
301 Ibid. pp. 1-2. 
302 Ibid., pp. 68-72; also 28,31, 35, 45-48, 83, 97,98. 
303 Ibid., p. 83. Hanslick also says, Ibid., p. 42, in connection with a refutation of the mathematical structure 
of composition, that 'What makes a piece of music a work of art and raises it above the level of physical 
experiment is something spontaneous, spiritual, and therefore incalculable'. 
304 Ibid., p. 60 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 1bid.,p. 83. 
308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid., p. 60. 
310 Ibid., see also pp. 50, 53-57, 58. 
311 lbid., p. 51, 57. 
312 Ibid., p. 57. 
313 Ibid., pp. 58-61. 
314 Ibid., p. 61. 
315 Ibid., pp. 58. 
94 
physiological affinity' ,316 by which it is able to affect the nervous system. Note now the 
emphasis upon an essentially 'mechanical' cause and effect pertaining to the basic physical 
phenomenon of music, and the mal/er of the body, as distinct from the mind. It is no accident that 
Hanslick calls the effects of music upon the feelings its 'material moment'. Hanslick calls this 
process of cause and effect pathological rather than aesthetic. Conversely the 'artistic moment' 
associated with the beautiful or spiritual in music, is above this basic material and physiological 
level, for it 'comes from mind and addresses itself to mind' .317 
Hanslick refutes the importance of the traditional emphasis on the moral effects of music, 
and asserts that the effects of music upon the feelings is inversely correspondent to music's true 
aesthetical component.318 Hanslick states; 'As is well known, music exercises the strongest effects 
upon savages', and 'the moral influence of tones increases with coarseness of mind and 
character. ' 319 As for the Greek tradition of the 'marvellous effects of music' ,320 he says: 'There can 
be no doubt at all that, for the ancients, music had a much more immediate effect than it has now, 
since humankind only just in its primitive stage of development is much closer to and more at the 
mercy of the elemental than later, when consciousness and self-determination come into their 
own.321 For Hanslick, susceptibility to the e.lemental in music is a sign that the person is less 
developed,322 lacking in musical training,323 or 'not in control of themselves' .324 In short, it is an 
intellectual and spiritual shortcoming. 
The repeated underlying assertion behind Hanslick's position is that the things of the mind 
are above the emotions and the feelings, and that the former should have dominion over the 
latter.325 The idea that susceptibility to emotional influence is a mark of unevolvement was overtly 
stated by Hanslick, and his concomitant thesis is that aesthetic appreciation requires the command 
of intelligent and educated judgement. The position he adopted is of course nothing new, - it is just 




319 Ibid., pp. 61. 
320 This phrase is a chapter title in Godwin, J, Hamwnies of Heaven and Earth, London, 1987, p. 11. 
321 Ibid., pp. 62. 
322 This is general inference ofHanslick, Ibid., p. 61. 
323 Ibid., p. 65. 
324 Ibid., p. 61. 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, that reason or the intellect must rule over the passions, 
and not vice-versa. This belief was strongly represented in the didactic morality of eighteenth-
century England, despite the fact that David Hume made assertions to the contrary, and despite the 
special status that sentiment came to enjoy. There is a covert preoccupation with the superiority of 
the intellect over the passions in Hanslick's work, a preoccupation that impedes the communication 
of his more original thoughts, and on a number of occasions causes him to subscribe to the very 
common practice of confusing the intellectual with the spiritual. 
The alleged duality of the 'power of reason' and the passions is something that has been 
repeated throughout history with monotonous regularity, and must be responsible in many cases 
other than Hanslick's, for the distracting of attention away from the importance of feeling as a 
factor in human intelligence. 
Following Hanslick's outright rejection of 'feeling', it may seem strange that 'feeling' is 
not in the final event actually banished by Hanslick from the aesthetic perception of the 'artistic 
moment' of music. In fact, in response to criticism, Hanslick specifically denied mounting a 
polemic against all feeling. 326 In the Foreword to the eighth edition of his book he states 'I share 
completely the view that the ultimate worth of the beautiful is always based on the immediate 
manifestness of feeling' .327 But its role in purely aesthetic perception is limited, for aesthetic 
perception requires not just the ability to feel, but imagination through contemplation, that is, 
'contemplating with active understanding, i.e., conceiving and judging' .328 Hanslick ambiguously 
informs us that imagination lies halfway between feeling and understanding,329 but as we shall see, 
this description is an attempt to legitimise what actually amounts to a simultaneous rejection and 
acceptance of what he calls 'feeling' as an important part of the aesthetic perception of music. 
We can now refine this synopsis of Hanslick's ideas further, but before doing so I should 
mention Hanslick's argument that music cannot represent definite feelings or emotions. Hanslick 
constructs an argument to this effect in order to support his initial assertion that the aesthetic 
quality of music has nothing to do with the feelings. I address this only because the question of 
325 As already illustrated Hanslick treats the 'spiritual' as being generally coextensive with what he calls the 
'mind'. Thus, 'things of the mind' [my phrase] not only includes mental skills, but also 'the promptings 
of spirit' and moral will. See in particular, p. 61 ofHanslick Ibid. 
326 Ibid., p. xxii. 
327 Ibid., p. xxii; also see note p. I 05. 
328 Ibid., p. 4; see also pp. 5, 30, 31, 41, 45, 64. 
329 Ibid., p. 4. 
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whether or not music can represent or arouse specific feelings or emotions has usurped a position 
of importance in aesthetics. About it I have only this to say: it is a red herring that at this stage 
distracts from more important issues. Hanslick's attempt, like all attempts to discover whether 
music can represent or arouse definite feelings or emotions, is necessarily dependent first of all 
upon on the attempt to understand emotion, feeling, thought, and the relation between them. It is a 
subjective knowledge, or praecognitum of these, and their relationship, that is prerequisite to 
knowledge of the effects of music on them or in relation to them. One cannot work backwards from 
music to this. Hanslick does not address this area of knowledge, so his argument is inevitably 
superficial. Similarly, we should not be postulating mentally calculated theories about this aspect 
of our experience, when our theories amount to a substitute for a genuinely deep subjective 
knowledge or praecognitum of our own emotion, feeling, and thought. 
Here then, is the refined synopsis ofHanslick's position. 
As the sculptor might use bronze, or the painter oils and canvass, so the composer uses 
tones. The artistic arrangement of the tones is created by the genius of the artist, who in a spiritual 
activity pertaining to mind, creates the beautiful in the music. This beauty is not a representation of 
anything, but is beautiful in its own right, and in particular is not representative of human emotion. 
It is apprehensible by 'pure contemplation' on the part of the auditor. This is not the same as being 
emotionally moved by the music in the pathological way, - that is something that arises largely 
from the effects of the more elementary qualities of music upon the nervous system. However, pure 
contemplation does not necessarily give rise only to an exclusively abstract mental appreciation to 
which feeling in every sense of the word is entirely alien. There is an important difference between 
the feeling of the enjoyment of aesthetic content and the 'undergoing' of emotion. The nature of 
Hanslick's 'aesthetic experience' is highlighted in the following critical passages: 
.... pathological ways of being affected by a piece of music 
are opposed to the deliberate pure contemplation of it. This 
contemplative hearing is the only artistic, true form; the raw 
emotion of savages and the gushing of the music enthusiast 
can be lumped together in a single category contrary to it. To 
the beautiful corresponds an enjoying, not an undergoing, as 
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the term aesthetic enjoyment neatly signifies. Of course the enthusiasts 
consider it a heresy against the omnipotence of music if a 
person denies the association with the revolutions and riots 
of the heart which they encounter in every piece of music 
and in which they sincerely participate. Obviously that 
person is "cold", "unfeeling", "cerebral". Nevertheless. It is a 
splendid and significant thing to follow the creative spirit as 
it magically opens up before us a new world of 
elements .... This is not a feigned emotion lacerating us with 
compassion. Joyfully, in unemotional yet heartfelt pleasure, 
we behold the artwork passing before us and realise better 
what Schelling so felicitously called "the sublime 
indifference of the beautiful." Thus to take pleasure in one's 
own mental alertness is the worthiest, the wholesomest, and 
not the easiest manner of listening to music.330 
.... The person who wallows in feeling is in most instances 
untrained in the aesthetical comprehension of the musically 
beautiful. The layman is most likely to "feel" when he listens 
to music; the trained artist is least likely to do so.33 1 
These passages are a general reiteration ofHanslick's arguments, but included within them 
is a concise encapsulation of his most important yet unsung contribution to musical aesthetics. I 
focus upon this particular instance for brevity's sake, as it conveniently reflects the essence of 
Hanslick's perception, the true distillation of his whole work. Even if here it is nothing but a 
fortuitous quirk of translation, or turn of nineteenth-century Germanic phrase, the words as they 
appear conveniently epitomise Hanslick's repeated, underlying observation, which is not dependent 
upon its expression in this one instance. 
330 Ibid., p. 64. 
331 Ibid., p. 65. 
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Hanslick is describing an aesthetic experience, (which in a brief moment of unbridled 
formalism he is about to associate with the pleasure of one's own 'mental alertness', of all things) 
and he says that this happens 'Joyfully, in unemotional yet heartfelt pleasure'. We shall ignore the 
alleged context for a moment. Note that Hanslick's Joy and pleasure is heartfelt yet unemotional. 
Joy, the true pleasure of beholding aesthetic beauty, is not an emotional condition. But it is 
heartfelt. 
Hanslick, not unusually, uses the terms 'feeling' and 'emotion' more or less 
interchangeably throughout his work. Generally, he does not aspire to any deeper knowledge of the 
nature of emotion than the common ability to merely refer to it in a more or less ambiguous way. 
The possible exception is when he asserts that only in conjunction with 'ideas and judgements' can 
feeling become specific.332 Otherwise, Hanslick's description of the nature of emotion is mediocre 
and unenlightening. 
But Hanslick has recognised, even if indirectly, something very important. His thesis could 
be described as asserting that not everything we feel, is feelings. We might do better to say that all 
that can be felt is not necessarily emotion. Of course, everything here depends on what is meant by 
that word 'emotion', and what is meant by the word 'feeling', - and that is the whole point. In other 
words, Hanslick presents his apparently paradoxical thesis without realising its true significance: 
that the lumping together of the different nouns 'feeling', 'emotion', 'joy', 'anger' etc. as if they 
were all generically the same thing differing only in specification is a primary error in the study of 
aesthetics. 
What we specify with these words, what they mean, depends upon our understanding of our 
own inner experiences. But it also depends upon the efficacy of our language in communicating 
that understanding. What if the statement all that can be felt is not necessarily emotion is not pure 
nonsense? It implies that although the meaning of the nouns 'feeling' and 'emotion' is strictly 
speaking a matter of definition, we are able to contextually use these nouns, undefined, in a way 
that communicates something that we may recognise from experience. If we allow that whatever 
we feel may logically be called afeeling, then we can say Hanslick's central insight is about the 
difference between feeling and emotion, even before we define emotion. We could equally well 
say, as Hanslick effectively did, that in listening to music "there is feeling, but then again, there is 
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also feeling". We have no language structure or vocabulary to fully support what we are saying, 
but we use what language we have, in the attempt to communicate something we may perceive. 
Hanslick's discourse betrays that he perceived a fundamental difference between at least two kinds 
of felt experiences when listening to music. One is a base reaction, the other is 'spiritual'. 
As we have already seen, Hanslick attached great importance to the principle that things of 
the mind are above the activities of the emotions and feelings, and hence that the intellectually 
skilled or 'trained' appreciation of music is above the 'feeling' of it. His underlying preoccupation 
with this principle simply eclipsed the opportunity to fully acknowledge that he had recognised a 
generic difference between what is 'felt' in the aesthetic perception of the beautiful, and what is 
'felt' in 'emotional' experience. 
Thus, Hanslick's motive was not to deny the connection of emotional experience with 
music, but to reject it as the basis of music's aesthetic value. In order to maintain consistency with 
this aim where he had no deeper knowledge or language to describe the nature of emotion, feeling, 
sensation, thought, and their relationship, he had little choice but to segregate anything felt in the 
aesthetic appreciation of music, from the collective whole of all that is felt, by asserting that it is 
not a feeling, but either cerebral activity, or as Hanslick had to compromise, halfway between 
understanding and feeling. We might well expect Hanslick's position to lead him into adopting 
double standards in the use of the word 'feeling', and this is precisely what he does. 
The general association between spiritual creativity, what is felt, and music, features 
strongly in Hanslick's thought. m Consider the following passages: 
332 Ibid., p. 9. 
333 Ibid., pp. 45-50. 
334 Ibid., p. 45. 
335 Ibid., p. 46. 
Take first the composer. During the creative activity, an 
exaltation will fill him such as can scarcely be thought 
superfluous for the release of the beautiful from the depths 
f h . . . 334 o t e 1magmat10n ... 
Without spiritual ardour, nothing great or beautiful has ever 
been accomplished in this life ... 335 
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An inner singing, not a mere inner feeling, induces the musically gifted 
person to construct a musical artwork. 336 
We often see the listener deeply stirred by a piece of music, 
moved to joy or melancholy, transported in his innermost 
being .... the existence of these effects is undeniable, actual 
and genuine, often reaching the greatest intensity.337 
As we have said, the effects upon the listener outlined in the last passage above are 
attributed by Hanslick mostly to the 'intensive influence of music upon the nervous system',JJ8 the 
nerves themselves being 'obscure organs of the imperceptible telegraph service between body and 
soul' .339 However, this physiological explanation cannot be applied to the musical creation process 
in the composer. In this case, Hanslick speaks of the 'exaltation' necessary to 'release the beautiful 
from the depths of the imagination', and of the 'spiritual ardour' and 'inner singing' necessary to 
the creation process. In the case of performance, 'the emotionally cathartic and stimulating aspect 
of music is situated in the reproductive act, which coaxes the electric spark out of its obscure secret 
place and flashes it across to the listener' .340 The performer may 'fathom and reveal the spirit of the 
composer' 341 but 'in the instant of re-creation' this 'assimilation' is the work of 'the performer's 
spirit' ,342 so there is no direct causal connection between the feelings of the composer and those of 
the listener. 
Thus, Hanslick makes allowances for laudable metaphysical processes which are very 
much associated with feeling, in the acts of composing and performing, but still the main 
mechanism by which the listener is moved, Hanslick insists, is merely physiological.343 How is all 
this to be resolved, or are we to believe that the highest value of music is not in genuinely feeling 
anything, or that anything that is felt in connection with the aesthetic content or spiritual aspects of 
music is merely a product of the listeners mental alertness? 
336 Ibid., p. 47. 
m Ibid., p. 49. 
338 Ibid., p. SI. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid., p. 49. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid., p. 45-57, treatment of the listener begins on p. 49. 
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Surely this is not what we are to believe, and Hanslick's discourse as a whole does not 
support this. Somewhere along the line Hanslick must be using double standards in his assessment 
of what 'feeling' is. This becomes glaringly obvious when he presents one clear synopsis, stage by 
stage, of the scenario he envisaged. A concise presentation of the synopsis is as follows: 




I. All musical elements have 'mysterious bonds and 
affinities among themselves' which regulate rhythm, melody 
and harmony, and are determined by natura/laws. These 
'bonds and affinities' determine what are perceived as good 
musical qualities. Where composition does not comply to 
them, the music is absurd or ugly. 344 
2. The reason we require the obedience of music to these, is 
because they also 'reside instinctively in every cultivated 
ear'. This enables us to perceive the bonds and affinities in 
music without the need of any further conceptual standard of 
judgement.345 
3. The bonds and affinities constitute a 'negative, intrinsic 
rationality in the tonal system by natural law' .346 
4. The ability of tones to contain a beautiful musical content, 
is grounded in the above rationality. 347 
5. Tones are not like 'crude, ponderous stone', but are 
'subtler and more ideal than the material of any other art, 
and 'readily absorb every idea of the composer' .348 
6. Musical beauty is based upon the relationship of tonal 
connections.349 
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7. The composer's art is not in making these relationships 
mechanical, 'but by spontaneous activity of the imagination, 
the spiritual energy and distinctiveness of each composer's 
imagination make their mark upon the product as 
character' .350 
8. 'Accordingly, as the creation of a thinking and feeling 
mind, a musical composition has in high degree the 
capability to be itself full of ideality and feeling. This ideal 
content we demand of every musical artwork. It is to be 
found only in the tone-structure itself, however, and not in 
any other aspect of the work' .351 
This 'feeling' which is associated with the 'ideal content' and the tone structure, and which 
'we demand of every musical artwork', is clearly not the 'feeling' and 'feelings' that Hanslick sets 
out to reject, and which he denies can be embodied in the tone structure. After this synopsis 
Hanslick immediately goes on to reiterate that a composer intends to portray a particular melody, 
not a specific feeling. 352 Not only does Hanslick deny that it is possible to portray specific feelings 
in music,353 he also considers that we are 'even worse off' with the theory that music can represent 
unspecific feeling,354 dismissing it as a contradiction in terms,355 and making a cynical attack upon 
those who respond to music with unspecific feeling. 356 So are we confronted with a paradox? No. 
We are confronted with Hanslick's confused use of the noun 'feeling', and an insufficient depth of 
knowledge, or praecognitum, of what we call 'feeling', 'thought', 'emotion', and their relationship. 
Effectively, Hanslick tried to propose aesthetic principles from a hotchpotch of motives, and was 





352 Ibid., p. 32. 
353 Ibid., p. 9. 
354 Ibid., p. 21. 
355 Ibid., p. 20. 
356 Ibid., pp. 58, 59. 
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associated with the aesthetic or ideal content of music, and the 'feeling' or 'emotional' 
experience associated with what he calls a 'pathological' response to the elemental properties of 
mUSIC. 
Does the alleged difference between these two kinds of 'feeling' evaporate if Hanslick's 
theory of physiological cause and effect through the nervous system, is falsified? If there is no 
physiological causation then how can we say the response is pathological, and hence where is the 
essential difference between response to aesthetic content and response to elemental properties? 
The difference does not evaporate. The assertion that we should distinguish between aesthetic and 
what Hanslick calls pathological response, does not actually demand that Hanslick's theory of 
physiological effects upon the nervous system be correct. All that is necessary is that there are 
elemental properties of music that are capable of efficaciously producing effects upon the human 
subject, in such a way that without knowing better, the theory of physiological effects would be a 
reasonable guess as to how those effects come about. 
Hanslick's theory of physiological cause and effect, even if it were proved to be correct, 
was, after all, only his hypothesis, partially corroborated by Helmholtz's On the Sensations of 
Tone.m The theory conveniently supported Hanslick's essential observations about music, but 
those observations were not actually dependent upon the correctness of the theory. Like many 
scientific paradigms and hypotheses, it served to explain an observation in the absence of any 
deeper understanding. The 'observation' in this case however, was not a scientific one. It was 
Hanslick's awareness that there are base (elemental) properties of music which seem to have 
pathological-like effects. 
Hanslick held that the study of 'aesthetics' should recognise only those effects of music 
which are a 'manifestation of the human spirit'. These effects are created in pure contemplation as 
a 'particular construction' of music's elemental factors. 358 The elemental factors alone are a cause 
of effects in the listener, but from an aesthetical point of view, says Hanslick, music must be 
comprehended more as an effect than a cause.359 This is the essence of the difference between the 
pathological and the aesthetic, independent of the assertion of a physiological mechanism. The 
357 Ibid., p. 54. For a translation of Helmholtz's Lelzre von den Tonempfindungen (2nd Ed.) 1885, see 
Helmholtz, HLF, On the Sensations of Tone, Tr. AJ Ellis, New York, 1954. 
358 Hanslick, op. cit., p. 66. 
m Ibid. 
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elemental factors can be judiciously and creatively used to create effects which according to 
Hanslick are spiritual in origin, but these effects are distinct from the alleged affective force of the 
elemental properties. The spiritual or aesthetic effect is distinct from the sum of its elemental parts. 
The essential idea that Hanslick communicated is that music is made of an artistic medium 
with elemental properties that in themselves have a pathological-like ability to arouse feeling in the 
listener. This basic ability of the medium is not the art. The mt is in the use of the medium in a 
spiritual, creative activity. Over-exploitation of the elemental properties reduces the artwork to a 
display of its elemental properties, and obscures the 'manifestation of the human spirit', in the 
music. What is perceived to be the aesthetic content of the music by the listener is this 
'manifestation of the human spirit'. This is very simple, but very important. Why the elemental 
properties have a pathological-like effect is an important question to which Hanslick merely 
postulated his pseudo-scientific answer. 
If it is possible to recognise both elemental 'causes' and aesthetic 'effects' of music, as 
Hanslick describes them, then we can do so independently of any postulations about how music 
affects the listener. This recognition would be in the first instance, subjective, or a part of our own 
subjective knowledge. Hanslick had not scientifically ascertained the bases of his observations - if 
he was sincere he was speaking according to the best of his subjective knowledge, but attempting 
to validate it by giving it a 'scientific' context. 
The idea that all that is felt is not necessarily emotional experience may seem difficult to 
comprehend conceptually, or as a mentally understood thing, given the whole baggage oftenns that 
are usually thrown unquestioningly under the same generic heading 'emotion', or it may seem like 
nothing more than a word-game. But like feeling and emotion itself, it is no game from which we 
can simply walk away. We have to face the fact that there is no absolute fonnality of definitions to 
fall back on here, simply because there is insufficient subjective knowledge, or no language 
structure to reflect that subjective knowledge or praecognilum of our inner psychical world - the 
reality of experience - to which the tenns like 'feeling', 'emotion', or 'thought' apply. Hanslick 
entangles something called 'feeling' with something else he also calls 'feeling', and entangles both 
with something called 'emotion'. He is not alone. Modem aesthetics is just as confused. Even the 
Oxford English Dictionary makes no real distinctions other than to oppose 'feeling' to 'reason'. 
But distinctions must be made. Those distinctions cannot be made by using language as a tool of 
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analysis. They can only be drawn from actual first-hand knowledge of the inner world of human 
feeling, emotion and experience. The ability to distinguish must arise not from theory but from the 
praecogni/11111 of experience itself. 
The mere suggestion that there is a distinction of the kind Hanslick implied, can be 
subjectively tested for truth only against an individual's reservoir of direct knowledge-from-
experience. Yet this testing is not a pre-ordained affair in which everyone can immediately 
participate simply by virtue of being an experiencing, emotional, feeling human being. A reservoir 
of experience is not necessarily a reservoir of knowledge. The experience of having existed as a 
being with emotion and feeling (as distinct from that thing called experience which is merely the 
acquired skill of surviving and protecting one's position in the world) is a potential resource, that 
may or may not provide the necessary conscious knowledge of the inner world, or reality of 
experience. 
We are not dealing here with an 'objective' physical reality that can be represented by a 
nexus of abstract concepts, but the subjective inner psychical world, - a metaphysical world. It is 
not theoretical metaphysics that is required for the subjective recognition that there may be a 
difference between these aspects of musical experience, but subjective knowledge. 
If we see through the tendency to 'intellectualism' that impeded Hanslick and confused his 
communication, we are left with a valuable distillation from his work: that what can be felt when 
listening to music ranges from the very basic to the very fine; that the basic is like a pathological360 
affection, and is associated with base qualities of music; that the fine is associated with finer 
'aesthetic' qualities in the music, which in turn are associated with a finer human receptivity, and a 
finer artistic or spiritual creativity and perceptive power. It does not follow from this that music's 
basic power of 'pathological-like' effect is reprehensible. What we must recognise is that we have 
within us a spectrum of possible experience. Not only is the spectrum connected in an integral 
whole, as spectrums are, but there may be a dynamic by which our experience in one part of the 
spectrum, may lead to a new sensitivity in the spectrum at another, higher, or finer level. 
360 This word appears frequently in Hanslick, op. cit., and pp. 58-67 is a chapter entitled 'Musical perception: 
Aesthetic versus pathological'. 
106 
Chapter 7 -'Macrocosm-microcosm' relationship in physics 
'The greatest advances in physics will only make the need 
for a system of metaphysics felt more and more, since the 
corrected, extended, and more thorough knowledge of nature 
is the very knowledge that always undermines and finally 
overthrows the metaphysical assumptions that till then have 
prevailed. On the other hand, such knowledge presents the 
problem of metaphysics itself more distinctly, correctly, and 
completely, and separates it more clearly from all that is 
merely physical. In addition the more perfectly and 
accurately known intrinsic essence of individual things 
demands more pressingly the explanation of the whole and 
the universal, and this whole only presents itself as the more 
puzzling and mysterious, the more accurately, thoroughly, 
and completely it is known empirically.' 
Arthur Schopenhauer361 
361 Schopenhauer, A, The world as will and representation, Tr. EFJ Payne, New York, 1966, Vol. 2, pp. 177-
178. 
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Quantum theory 361 
The macrocosm-microcosm relationship is essentially the relationship between 'conscious' 
humanity and the universe, and the relationship of the parts of the universe with the whole. The 
question of these relationships surfaces in modem science, and in particular as a result of quantum 
theory and quantum phenomena. 
Whilst I make here my own comments on the overall situation of quantum theory, the basic 
critical assertions here about what quantum theory means, that is, what it implies about the nature 
of the world, or what has been referred to as 'the nature of reality', are not my assertions. They are 
the assertions of well recognised writers on the subject, and in particular of the specific world-
leading physicists whom I cite verbatim. 
The received 'interpretation' of quantum theory is known as the Copenhagen 
Interpretation, after Niels Bohr's physics institute in Denmark which he founded in the 1920's.363 
As John Gribbin describes in Schrodinger's Killens, according to this interpretation 'an entity such 
as an electron is neither a wave nor a particle, but something different, something we cannot 
describe in everyday language. But it will show us either a particle face or a wave face, depending 
on which measurements we choose to carry out on it... .Indeed, it may have other properties as well, 
that we are not clever enough to measure at all, and know nothing about. ' 364 Furthermore, 
according to the Copenhagen Interpretation, the electron as a wave is not a wave of something, as it 
362 I use the terms quantum theory and quantum mechanics interchangeably, as does Gribbin, J, 
Schrodinger 's Killens and the search for reality, London, 1995. There is now in addition to the 
specialist body of material on this subject, many books written for the general readership of those 
interested in the sciences. The following is a selection closely consulted and from which material has 
been drawn: 
Davies, PCW and Brown, JR (Eds.), The Ghost in the Atom, Cambridge, 1986 
This is largely a transcript of a BBC Radio 3 documentary of the same title and is a good introduction to 
the subject. 
Gribbin, op. cit. 
This is a more detailed up-to-date account for general readership. 
Penrose, Roger, The Emperor's New Mind, Oxford, 1989 
Penrose, Roger, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford, 1994 
The specialist introduction: Greenhow, RC, introductory quantum mechanics, Bristol, 1990, includes 
programmes on floppy disc for simulating experimental results on a pc, which can be very illuminating, 
particularly in respect of the 'two-slit experiment' documented at the beginning of both Davies & 
Brown and Gribbin. 
363 Davies & Brown, op. cif., p. 11. 
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were, or a wave in some medium, but is an abstract wave of mathematical probability, - the 
probability of actually finding the particle at a particular location 'in space'.365 
As Gribbin puts it: 'This interpretation of quantum theory is telling us that entities such as 
electrons are only real in so far as they are observed - that the measuring apparatus is, in some 
sense, 'more real' than the photons and electrons and all the rest....In other words, the atoms of 
which everything in the classical [macro-scale 'everyday'] world is made are somehow less real 
than the things atoms are made into! '366 
A further profound consequence of quantum theory is the notion of' quantum entanglement', 
or 'non-locality'. This means that particles which are well separated in space, or in principle even 
light years apart, can be intrinsically 'connected'. They may be at two distant 'locations' in space, 
but they can behave 'non-locally', as if they were not separate at all. If two particles are 
'entangled', the attributes of one particle can depend upon which attributes a scientist chooses 
(even just on a whim) to measure on the other particle, even if it is well separated in space from the 
first particle. In principle, the 'fate' of one particle is dependent upon observations carried out on 
the other, even if it is light years away. 367 This is a verifiable consequence of quantum theory and 
yet it is difficult to see how one particle could 'know' about the other remote particle unless there 
was some form of simultaneous, i.e. faster than light signalling between them. Yet faster-than-light 
signalling is not possible, according to Einstein's theory of relativity. 
The objectively physical, spatially extended universe consisting of independent separate 
parts, is composed, it seems, of particles that are not necessarily independent and separable, even 
when spatially separated. Also these particles are not 'physically objective', independent of their 
observation. The universe, it has previously been assumed in science, is local and real. Local 
means a local part of the universe cannot be 'in contact with' a remote part, except through the 
transmission of information between the parts, which according to the Theory of Relativity cannot 
take place faster than the velocity of light. Real refers to the nature of the universe- it means that 
an observer of the universe is not a necessary part of the universe. Experimental testing of quantum 
theory seems to have shown that the universe is not 'local and real' even if quantum mechanics is 
364 Gribbin, op. cit., p. 16. 
365 Ibid., p. 10. 
366 1bid., p. 15. 
367 Ibid., pp. 23-30. 
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completely wrong.368 Relativity theory, which is also a successful theory in its own right, shows 
that no signal can travel faster than light. So Gribbin describes the situation as one in which: 
If you want to believe there is a real world out there, you 
cannot do without non-locality; if you want to believe that 
no form of communication takes place faster than the speed 
of light, you cannot have a real world, independent of the 
observer.369 
There is no universal agreement about what quantum theory 'means' for our conception of 
'reality', or how science should proceed in order to move beyond the current paradoxes and 
puzzles, or if indeed it needs to.370 Inevitably, some scientists understate the problems quantum 
theory raises concerning the 'nature of reality', or maintain that there is no real doubt over how 
quantum theory should be interpreted.m The truth is, that the scientific community is fraught with 
controversy and disagreement within itself, as Brown's book The Ghost in the Atom demonstrates. 
It is also manifestly clear from the general body of material pertaining to the subject, which begins 
early in the first half of the 20lh century, that quantum mechanics consistently denies the so-called 
'common-sense' notion that the universe is real (as defined above). The theory is repeatedly 
confirmed by the empirical investigations of quantum phenomena.372 The theory cannot be easily 
doubted. As Davies and Brown emphasise, it is 'a truly remarkable theory - a theory that correctly 
describes the world to a level of precision and detail unprecedented in science. '373 
This 'remarkable theory' and the experiments that have been prompted by it, undermines the 
traditional scientific notion of an 'independent' observer or questioner. Some physicists such as E P 
Wigner374 have already speculated that consciousness, or the mind of the observer play an essential 
role in creating the 'reality' we observe, a view paraphrased by David Bohm as 'saying that only 
368 Ibid., p 158. 
369 Ibid., p 159. 
370 Penrose, in Shadows of the Mind, op. cit., treats puzzles and paradoxes and two distinct kinds mystery (Z-
mysteries and X-mysteries) that quantum theory presents. 
371 0 . &B . av1es rown, op. c1t., p. x. 
372 Ibid., p. 4, state that 'No known experiment has contradicted the predictions of quantum mechanics in the 
last fifty years'. 
373 Ibid. 
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when somebody becomes conscious of a phenomenon is it really 'actual".375 As Heinz Pagels 
(President of the New York Academy of Sciences in 1981) put it: 'There is no meaning to the 
objective existence of the electron at some point in space .... independent of actual observation. The 
electron seems to spring into existence as a real object only when we observe it! ' 376 
Many physicists are endeavouring to develop new interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
some of which would perhaps support the 'intuitive' notion of an independent, objective reality or 
existence 'out there' at the quantum micro-scale. Physicists are prepared to go to considerable 
lengths in order to provide an alternative to the Copenhagen Interpretation. Some interpretations, 
such as the Everett theory377 which claims that there can be an infinite number of 'parallel' 
universes, would seem more bizarre or counter-intuitive than the implications of the Copenhagen 
Interpretation itself.378 
Consciousness and the scientific world view 
Wigner is by no means the only scientist to have recently drawn attention to the issue of 
consciousness, and its place in the scientific world view. Consciousness has now become a 
legitimate focus of attention for scientific enquiry, and, significantly, this has not arisen exclusively 
because of the implications of quantum mechanics. It is part of a wider movement towards the 
addressing of consciousness, mind, and intelligence. Today, it is generally to the brain that science 
looks when addressing consciousness, and the brain, although more complex, is sometimes 
compared with the computer.379 The rapid development of computer technology, and the promise 
of a continuing exponential increase in computer capability has contributed by catalysing the 
question "What is consciousness?" with the seemingly more pragmatic question "Is it possible to 
build an Artificial Intelligence machine that is conscious?". Science is no longer content to accept 
Descartes' edict, which would have mind remaining firmly outside the domain of scientific enquiry 
into the nature of the physical world. Questions concerning the nature of minds, brains, and 
consciousness, which were once reserved for philosophy, are now addressed in connection with the 
374 Wigner, EP, 'Remarks on the mind-body question', in Good, lJ (Ed.), The Scientist Speculates: An 
Anthology of Partly Baked Ideas, London, 1962, pp. 284-302. 
375 Davies & Brown, op. cit., p. 119. 
376 Page Is, H, The Cosmic Code, London, 1982, p. 144, quoted by Gribbin, op. cit., p. 151. 
371 Davies & Brown, op. cit., pp. 83-105. 
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practical aspirations of some scientists, and the lack of answers provided by the current 
scientific world view is seen as a failing which must be rectified. 
Roger Penrose describes the situation in the following passage from Shadows of the Mind: 
A scientific world view which does not profoundly come to 
terms with the problem of conscious minds can have no 
serious pretensions of completeness. Consciousness is part 
of our universe, so any physical theory which makes no 
proper place for it falls fundamentally short of providing a 
. d . . f h Id 380 genu me escnpllon o t e wor . 
The holistic universe 
To sentient life (us) material objects at the everyday macro-scale seem to be substantial enough. 
But what is substantiality, and what is matter, objectively, and independent of our experience? 
What does it mean for matter to be independent? Independent of what? The idea that anything has 
independent existence from the rest of the perceived universe can itself be difficult to reconcile 
both with quantum theory, and the experimental confirmation of some of the theory's 
implications.381 Quantum entanglement seems to imply that there is something wrong with our 
notion of a universe consisting of independent, separate parts. The proposition that the universe 
does not 'really' consist of independent parts, but is holistic in nature, was presented from a 
scientist's point of view in 1980 by David Bohm, an acknowledged world authority on quantum 
378 One of the most accessible discussions of some of these is documented in Davies & Brown, op. cit., in 
particular, p. 34-8 and p. 83 ff. on the 'many universes' interpretation, regarded by Professor John 
Taylor as 'bizarre' (Ibid. p. 116). 
379 This continuing comparison can be traced back at least as far as 1958, when John von Neurnann published 
The Computer and the Brain, London, 1958. A recent discussion of contemporary thinking can be 
found in Lockwood, M, Mind, Brain & the Quantum, Oxford, 1992, p. 240 ff. 
380 Penrose, R, Shadows of the Mind, op. cit., p. 8. 
381 This refers to quantum entanglement and the results of the Aspect experiment which implies 'non-locality' 
and denies 'separability' of particles. See Gribbin op. cit., pp. 23-8; Davies & Brown, op. cit., pp. 40-
44. Penrose considers the opposition to this interpretation of the results of Aspect's experiment, to be 
unfounded. See Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, op. cit., p. 248. 
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mechanics. In his book Wholeness and the Implicate Orde~82 Bohm emphasised the inadequacy 
of a non-holistic world view: 
.... Science itself is demanding a new, non-fragmentary world 
view, in the sense that the present approach of analysis of 
the world into independently existing parts does not work 
very well in modem physics. It is shown that both in 
relativity theory and quantum theory, notions implying the 
undivided wholeness of the universe would provide a much 
more orderly way of considering the general nature of 
reality.383 
But even if the universe is holistic in nature, how can it have an 'undivided wholeness', 
which means a one-ness or non-duality, with respect to the observer, the knower, the thinker, or the 
intelligence behind these questions? Bohm recognises that consciousness and thought itself cannot 
be ignored in addressing the question of reality, and asks: 
What is the relationship of thinking to reality? As careful 
attention shows, thought itself is in an actual process of 
movement. That is to say, one can feel a sense of flow in the 
'stream of consciousness' not dissimilar to the sense of flow 
in the movement of matter in general. May not thought itself 
thus be part of reality as a whole?384 
Bohm's answer to his own question is the notion of a 'higher dimensional' reality, but this is 
still object-orientated. In the above passages Bohm seems to be conceding that there is not anything 
'objective' that we should call 'reality'. However he goes on to develop the idea of the 
382 Bolun, D, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, London, 1980. 
383 Ibid., pp. xi-xii. 
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'multidimensional' reality of which space-time-matter existence and all aspects of it, are merely 
partial projections. The interconnection between the five facets of space, time, matter, thought and 
consciousness are accounted for by considering them as all lower-dimensional 'unfoldments' of the 
higher 'implicate order' already 'enfolded' in the 'immense multidimensional reality' .385 Every 
thing, and everything that happens, at every level, is an unfoldment of order that is intrinsically 
enfolded in the multidimensional reality. This projects into the lower dimensional elements that 
make up the universe we know, and represents a 'behind the scenes' unity and order that accounts 
for things like quantum non-locality and the entanglement of the observer with the observed. 
Bohm recognises some parallels between his 'implicate order' explanation, and the 
philosophies of Leibniz and Whitehead,386 but he is also shadowing Plato closely in some respects. 
In Bohm, both space and time are only projections of the higher dimensional reality. The 'implicate 
order' requires 'a fundamentally new notion of the meaning of time', 387 since all time orders are 
dependent on the multidemensional reality.388 Moments separated in time are only what appears in 
a lower-dimensional unfoldment of what is already enfolded in the higher reality. 
One is reminded here of Plato. In Plato, space and time are unreal representations of the 
higher reality he calls 'Being'. The world of space and time is an unreal moving image of Eternity 
or Reality. 
The human individual, for Bohm, is a 'sub-totality of a yet higher dimension': 
384 Ibid., p. ix. 
385 Ibid., p. 212. 
386 Ibid., p. 207. 
387 Ibid., p. 211. 
... .It will be ultimately misleading and indeed wrong to 
suppose, for example, that each human being is an 
independent actuality who interacts with other human beings 
and with nature. Rather, all these are projections of a single 
totality. As a human being takes part in the process of this 
totality, he is fundamentally changed in the very activity in 
which his aim is to change that reality which is the content 
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of his consciousness. To fail to take this into account must inevitably lead 
one to serious and sustained confusion in all that one does. 
389 
Bohm's higher dimensional reality encapsulates the order behind life, the universe, every 
thing, and everything that 'happens', just as Plato's 'Being' does. Order in lower-dimensional 
manifestation is derived from the implicate order in the higher. Mind and body are mutual 
enfoldments of each other, and both reflect the order implicate in the higher-dimensional reality. 390 
Also, 'the body enfolds not only the mind but also in some sense the entire material universe' .391 
One is reminded of the Platonic hierarchy in which the 'World soul' is the order behind the 
human soul, and the human body, and how even society or the state is modelled on the higher 
order. One is especially reminded of the neo-Platonic and Fluddian correspondences between 
universal order and order in the soul and body. 
The qualitative correlation between Bohm's 'wholeness and implicate order' and the 
macrocosm-microcosm correspondence world-view of the Greeks and the renaissance philosophers 
is unmistakable. The difference is that in the Platonic or renaissance world-views the implicate 
order is explicitly Divine, reality is ontological (God or Being) and the structure of symbolic 
representation of the unfoldment of that order is explicitly 'musical', in the Myth of Er. In Bohm's 
picture there could be 'an infinity offurther development beyond',392 but the top of the hierarchy he 
presents is the 'immense multidimensional reality'. The structure of Bohm's presentation is not 
musical,393 but is explicitly scientific or quasi-scientific and related to physics in particular. 
In all the world-views, the material universe as it appears is the fragmented manifestation in 
a 'lower' form, of a 'higher' order, and it is ultimately a holistic system in which the parts are more 
or less reflective of the whole. 
Bohm's 'implicate order' even allows for 'multidimensional reality' to be musically 
structured in a quasi-Platonic sense, although Bohm is not particularly interested in exploiting this 
possibility. The existence of musical principles as something subjectively meaningful, and to which 
388 Ibid. 
389 Ibid., p. 210. 
390 Ibid., pp. 208-209. 
391 Ibid., p. 209. 
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humans respond in perception, could well indicate the enfoldment of musical principles in 
higher-dimensional reality, and explain their existence in other areas of our own dimensionality. 
The collapse of the wave function 
The Copenhagen Interpretation has not widely been considered as a cue to find an alternative to 
'material realism' as an appropriate way to address ordinary everyday living, which takes place at 
the macro scale and not the micro scale of the quantum. There seems to be a fundamental 
difference between the micro world of the quantum, where it can be argued that particles don't 
exist as particles until they are observed as such, and the macro world in which we live our 
everyday lives, and make indirect observations of particles. 
There is in quantum mechanics a concept which has come to be called 'the collapse of the 
wave function', or 'state vector reduction' which is associated with the point at which the 
deterministic quantum-mechanical description of the micro-world in terms of a wave function, is 
replaced by a probabilistic description in terms applicable to the macro-scale sense-perceivable 
'reality' .394 The quantum particle itself seems not to exist with any of the attributes by which the 
macro-world 'makes sense', as long as it remains 'unobserved' and represented by the wave 
function. But there will always have (conveniently) been a 'collapse of the wave function', by the 
time an observation has been made, so that the particle can then be described as actually having the 
same kind of fixed, definite, measurable, physical properties, as macro-scale objects. 
However, exactly what causes the collapse of the wave function is unclear, and we are still 
left with an unresolved situation. On the one hand, people, observers, and everyday things are taken 
to have an objective existence and location in space, but on the other hand, we cannot say the same 
thing about the particles of which these objects are made. The trouble is, that one cannot simply say 
"obviously quantum theory is wrong", because this is clearly not the case, as is verified both by 
experiment and mathematical necessity. But it can be argued that the theory is somehow 
incomplete, as is our understanding of what we are observing empirically, on the basis that macro-
scale existence must be 'real'. What does not receive so much attention currently, is the cause of 
the latter conviction, or the questioning of it. Anyway, the ordinary everyday world is, as it were, 
392 Ibid., p. 213. 
393 He does use a few musical analogies, vide ibid. pp. 21, 23, 120, 198-200. 
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for the time being seemingly protected from the vagaries of the quantum world by the collapse 
of the wave function. 
Does this mean that 'objective reality' at the classical scale is assured, and that material 
realism need not be questioned. No, it does not. As long ago as 1935, Erwin Schrodinger, one of 
the founders of quantum mechanics, published a theoretical account of an 'experiment' that would 
bring the seemingly paradoxical aspect of the quantum world right up to the macroscopic 
'everyday' scale. This now famous account is known as the Schrodinger's cat paradox. 
In The ghost in the atom, Davies and Brown describe the implications of the Schrodinger's 
cat paradox in the following passage: 
The paradox of the cat demolishes any hope we may have 
had that the ghostliness of the quantum is somehow confined 
to the shadowy microworld of the atom, and that the 
paradoxical nature of reality in the atomic realm is irrelevant 
to daily life and experience. If quantum mechanics is 
accepted as a correct description of all matter, this hope is 
clearly misplaced. Following the logic of quantum theory to 
its ultimate conclusion, most of the physical universe seems 
to dissolve away into a shadowy fantasy. 
Among others, Einstein could never accept this logical 
extreme. Surely, he once asked, the moon exists whether or 
not somebody is looking at it? The idea of making the 
observer the pivotal element in physical reality seems 
contrary to the whole spirit of science as an impersonal, 
objective enterprise. Unless there is a concrete world 'out 
there' for us to experiment on and conjecture about, does not 
all science degenerate into a game of chasing mere images? 
395 
394 Penrose, Shadows of the Mi11d, op. cif., p. 258-9. 
395 Davies & Brown, op. cif., p. 30. 
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This does not actually mean that scientists are encountering a macro-scale 'ghastliness' as 
Davies and Brown call it, in the laboratory. We can carry out experiments showing that a quantum 
particle must have effectively been in two different places at once, which is paradoxical, but we 
have not yet shown a cat being in two places at once. We can even paradoxically control the 
apparent history of a particle after the event, as it were, according to what we choose to measure, 
but we have not yet managed to control or change whether or not a cat had breakfast by measuring 
his stomach in the afternoon. The Schrodinger's cat paradox is what scientists call a 'thought' 
experiment, rather than an actual experiment. It explores what could happen in principle. It is not 
so much designed as a way of bringing quantum paradox into the realm of macro-scale experience, 
as a way of highlighting the devastating contradiction between the laws of the quantum world and 
sensible physical reality as we know it. It seems to illustrate, for example, that in principle, 
according to quantum theory, a cat can be both alive and dead at the same time. This kind of 
extremely unacceptable implication has not overthrown quantum theory, but neither have the facts 
about quantum phenomena so far overthrown our basic assumptions about the nature of physical 
reality, especially the view the it is an independent objective reality, whose very independence and 
objectivity make it somehow more 'real' or worthy to be called 'real', than our subjective 
experience of it. 
Many physicists at the current time do not accept the implication of quantum theory that the 
'intuited', 'objective' nature of reality at the macro-scale should be doubted. As Davies and Brown 
put it, 'They tacitly assume that somewhere, at some level between atoms and Geiger counters, 
quantum physics somehow turns into classical physics, in which the independent reality of tables, 
chairs and moons is never doubted. '396 Brown astutely observed that 'There does seem to be a very 
powerful, even emotional, appeal for believing in concrete reality, or objective reality as Einstein 
would have it; that is, somehow to write ourselves out of the picture.' 397 
Nevertheless, there remains an intrinsic and unsolved problem with this belief as far as 
quantum theory is concerned. Brown put the question 'Do you think that the external world exists 
3% Ibid., p. 31. 
397 Ibid., p. 76. 
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in some sense independently of our existence, and independently of our observations?' to David 
Bohm. Bohm's reply was as follows: 
Every physicist really believes that. For example, he talks 
about the universe having evolved before there was anybody 
around to look at it, except possibly God. Now unless you 
want to attribute it to God, as Bishop Berkeley did (and most 
physicists don't want to do that), you're unable to solve the 
problem of how the universe exists without physicists to 
look at it- or without somebody else to look at it.398 
The position was unequivocally echoed by John Bell: 
One wants to be able to take a realistic view of the world, to 
talk about the world as if it is really there, even when it is 
not being observed. I certainly believe in a world that was 
here before me, and will be here after me, and I believe that 
you are part of it! And I believe that most physicists take this 
point of view when they are pushed into a corner by 
h 'l h 399 p 1 osop ers. 
These two replies actually have nothing to do with scientific fact. Nor do the scientific 
facts mean that there is anything wrong with the replies. The only reason Brown asks the question 
is because the scientific facts easily imply that the observable world is possibly not independent of 
observation. What the replies do plainly indicate is the importance attached by these scientists to 
what they themselves in their answers call belief, belief that obviously arises from their rational 
interpretation of their experience of the world. This is none other than an interpretation of the 
relationship of self and world. Penetrating into matter further and further in the object-orientated 
398 Ibid., p. 119. 
399 Ibid., p. 50. 
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study of physics, finally brings us face to face with the question of this relationship, as an end 
result. This is the question with which, I argue, the Greek philosopher mystics like Empidocles and 
possibly Pythagoras, began their philosophy. 
Notions like quantum entanglement, and many of the other issues explored here, are 
indicative of a need to consider the universe as one complete system, rather than as 'object' and 
'subject', 'observer' and 'observed', 'here' and 'out there', 'here now' and 'here before me', As 
one complete system, even if viewed in an exclusively object-orientated way, we could well 
describe the universe as 'The One', which is indeed how some of the ancient sources do describe it. 
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Chapter 8 -Beyond 'loss of self in perception- Art, Involvement, 
and Beauty 
Brancusi once said: 
It is not the external form that is real, but the essence of 
things. From this truth, it is impossible for anyone to express 
something real by imitating the surface of things. 
I am no longer of this world. I am far from myself and 
detached from my person. I am among the essential 
things.400 
This is an expression of an impersonal depth of perception. What is especially beautiful 
about Brancusi's utterance of this, is his simplicity of statement that is accessible by all, even if 
(and probably especially if) they have never heard of philosophers like Plato, Berkeley, Kant or 
Schopenhauer. What Brancusi said must, if we are to respect him, have came from his own 
perception, and the truth of it, recognisable by the individual alone, must resonate in all individuals 
from those who have merely sensed the truth of which he spoke to those who recognise it in their 
own experience. 
Brancusi was not merely saying that the 'essence of things' is more important than the 
external form. What he said was that the external form is not real, and that the 'essence of things' 
is. This is extremely important, - and not because Plato or Socrates who are a widely recognised as 
philosophers may have said it in their own way, first. It means that inner reality cannot be 
approached by representing external form. Nevertheless, the outermost expression in existence of 
the 'essence of things' is in external form, so external form deserves attention because it is the 
medium through which is symbolised the 'essence of things'. But it is the 'essence' that is real, 
according to Brancusi. What the sculpture communicates is the sculptor's perception of the 
essence, the real, through the medium of the unreal. 
400 Spoken by Brancusi in 1926 during an exhibition at the Brurnner Gallery in New York, and cited by 
Claire Stoullig, 'Symbols and forms' in Bertrand, Pascale (Ed.), Brancusi, Paris, 1995; Quoted by Harry 
Belle!, 'Brancusi and his time', in Bertrand, ibid., p. 8. 
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Brancusi's reference to 'the essential things' is a reference to how the nature of the 
world changes according to the depth of perception that accompanies reducing enmeshment in the 
world and detachment from self. In as much as emotional self is the essence of the person, this 
detachment represents impersonal intelligence and perception, which is what Brancusi is talking 
about. The meaning and nature of the world from the point of view of personal or emotional self, is 
very different from the meaning and nature of the world from the point of view of impersonal 
intelligence and perception. One regards the surface of things, the other, the essence. 
What has hitherto been regarded as any kind of 'loss of se I f 401 in relation to aesthetic 
experience is a good recognition of the relationship between self and perception, but it does not 
generally go far enough. It could be argued that it relates to -a correspondingly lesser depth of 
perception than Brancusi speaks of. Relatively speaking, there is no profundity whatever in the 
'loss of self where this depends upon the contemplation of an art object. No such contemplation is 
going to result in an actual diminution of self. The difference between this kind of 'aesthetic 
experience' of an art object and its relation to the self, and the true perception of aesthetic meaning 
beyond the 'surface of things', is that the latter relates to experience in the world beyond the art 
object, of a self-changing kind. 
No one, not even Brancusi, becomes 'far from their self and detached from their person' 
only through the creation or contemplation of art. Such a suggestion would be immature. The 
experience or creation of art is only important as a part of life experience as a whole. It cannot be 
separated from it. In as much as the perception of life experience is deeper than the surface of 
things, so the contemplation or creation of the art form will also be, but contemplation of the art 
form itself, cannot create this depth of perception on its own. What creates the depth of perception 
able to see beyond the surface of things, able to see through the world of emotional self from a 
position beyond it, able to say that the world of appearances in not real, is not so much 'loss of 
self as 'death of self. This is not something mystical but it is on a level far more profound than the 
proposed 'loss of self that is supposed to accompany 'aesthetic perception', and thus keeps the 
notion of 'aesthetic perception' as something relatively shallow. Everyone at some time has to face 
an impending 'death of self, not generally through the contemplation of art, but rather more 
401 See Collinson's essay in Philosophical Aesthetics: an introduction, op. cit. 
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commonly as the breaking of the attachment to, and freeing from enmeshment in, any part of 
the life circumstances of the person. 
When this happens, there is often a temporary vacuum in the involvement and enmeshment 
in the world and its demands for participation and enmeshment in it. To begin with, any such 
breaking of attachment for anyone usually has emotional pain associated with it, and the only thing 
that prevents the 'death of self I am talking about here is either the deliberate avoidance of this 
pain, through the destruction of the vacuum by reimmersement in the distraction of the world, or 
the cultivating of attachment to what is now the irretrievable past. But contrary to this, it will 
nevertheless be noted by some that the breaking of attachment or enmeshment is followed, 
sometimes even whilst the pain of this 'death of self still persists, by an extraordinary stillness and 
perception of profound impersonal beauty in the world, and a state of considerably heightened 
perception well beyond the 'surface of things' in which the rest of the world and its participants are 
still busily engaged. As soon as self reasserts its effects in the subject, this is lost and now regarded 
as unreality against the reality of the surface of things, in which the self is now again engaged. The 
perception can nevertheless be highly informing about the 'unreality of the world'; that its true 
'nature' is really all about enmeshment in it, or detachment from it, and ultimately, about living in 
it, and self dying from it. Only from the position of having died from enmeshment in it, is the 
impersonal beauty of the world perceivable. This impersonal beauty is the only real 'aesthetic 
perception' in which the beauty of both the parts of the world and the whole are seen together. In it 
they are gloriously and aesthetically resonant in 'proportion' and 'meaning', even where there is no 
rational proportion and no rational meaning. It is the perception from which all other 'aesthetic 
perception' in a lower condition, is derived. 
In the music of the spheres tradition earthly music is seen, as it were, as a lower reflection 
of the music of the spheres itself, and this in turn is a symbol of a great impersonal process beyond 
living and dying. Whatever kind of perception creates this myth in the first instance, it is not a 
perception that is enmeshed and attached to the surface of things - the world of persons and 
emotional self. Rather, it is a perception associated ultimately with death of self. Any suggestion of 
a reflection of it in earthly music is the suggestion that music can relate to what is beyond the world 
perceived as self and not-self, beyond emotional self, beyond the personal. The higher function of 
music thus lies in its ability to reflect aspects of this perception. 
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Impersonal beauty, aesthetic perception and involvement 
Despite the modern arguments that art no longer necessarily needs beauty, beauty remains 
a facet of art so important that we cannot ignore it. It is certainly an extremely important facet of 
music, and I have said it lies behind the power of music to increase perception, but it is sometimes 
misconceived. Beauty can be perceived without attachment to its object, but it is not something 
disconnected from involvement and enmeshment in the world. Also, beauty is not something 
superficial, weak, or merely 'aesthetic'. It is not an attribute. Beauty, I am arguing, is a power, that 
on its perception, can sometimes be so strong that it is capable of dissolving or expurgating 
emotion, stilling and freeing an individual from enmeshment in the past, and bringing the perceiver 
into greater perception of the present. 
Plato suggests that love is the desire for beauty, or the desire to possess beauty, or 'the 
desire and pursuit of the whole'. In Plato's sense this is an equation between love and Socratic 
knowledge, or wisdom, so this desire of the whole, is for return to the undivided Being, and the 
desire of beauty is for the true Form of Beauty, beyond the appearance or surface of things, which 
gives 'complete and unifying knowledge of truth concerning the whole universe' .402 What Plato is 
speaking of here is the impersonal Divine beauty of the whole that nonetheless can appear in the 
specific. However, there is another desire for beauty even where no such Divine beauty is realised. 
The desire of beauty, actual beauty as seen in the world occupied, or the desire to love 
through involvement in the external world, is actually the need of experience - which is the 
'desire', albeit perhaps unconscious, to enter more deeply into the inner, to have more self-
knowledge, by entering experientially more deeply into the outer. The appearance of beauty in the 
outer hemisphere, in the physical world inhabited, and our attraction to that beauty, arises from the 
subtle desire to do just that -to enter more deeply into the subjective, through interaction with what 
appears as beauty in the objective. What Socrates called 'Beauty' ,403 the Form of it, is, like Plato's 
'Ideas', not 'out there' in some abstract Reality - it is in the subject, beneath the self that the 
subject is not. All ideas of 'out there', like those that baffle interpreters of quantum phenomena, are 
only true at the evolutionary level of intelligence in which the logic of a self/not-self duality 
402 Plato, The Symposium, Tr Waiter Hamilton, London, 1951, p. 24. 
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applies. The interaction towards which we may be moved, may be no more than a desired 
'seeing', 'hearing', 'being there', or a 'being with'. rt can be merely seeing nature or art, or 
listening to music, or it may be the need to involve with any of these, but ultimately, as physical 
beings with bodies, the desired interaction or involvement is physical union itself- which is only 
possible in coitus - and it is this that Plato must have recognised as the stumbling ground in the 
process, for the mere physical union of object and subject is not guaranteed to short-circuit time 
and separation, or to make beauty manifest, or to make love manifest. Mere sexual union, is not, as 
Plato recognised, the making of love. So it is that Platonic love comes about - the making or being 
of love without physical union, which is 'above' physical love. But we should not forget the 
context in which this idea appears. 
Plato's exposition of love was written in a society in which homosexuality was apparently 
accepted as normal, in which women were very much subordinate, and in which the male gender 
and everything about it, including love and respect for the male, was considered naturally superior 
to their female-orientated counterparts. Why then - when Plato reports Socrates to have described 
the nature of love in the most expedient possible way, i.e. in terms of non-consummated love 
between men and boys- does Socrates (and of all Plato's characters Socrates always represents the 
epitome of wisdom) say he was taught this nature of love by a woman, Diotima?404 This highly 
symbolic aspect of the story is probably about as far as the significance of Woman could be taken 
by Plato. Plato endorses Platonic love in the homosexual context, but not physical homosexual 
love, as the highest form. Alcibiades' character-sketch of Socrates in the same discourse confirms 
Socrates as being above all temptation to stray from Platonic love into physical sexual relationship, 
but again, this is only in the homosexual context. 
The notable, symbolic position of Diotima m the story seems to indicate that the 
philosopher's knowledge of love actually comes from a woman. Why was this necessary, given the 
subordinate position of women at the time? Is she supposed to have taught Socrates all about non-
physical love through discourse? Does a woman teach a man about love through discourse? Much 
of what Plato says, has more than one level of interpretation. The idea that 'Platonic love' - which 
403 e.g. Phaedo, IOOc-e, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H Tarrant, London, 1954, 
1993, p.l64. 
404 Symposium 202a; The exposition can be found in Plato, The Symposium, Tr Waiter Hamilton, London, 
1951, p. 79 ff. 
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can also apply in the heterosexual context - is above physical relationship, something in which 
we are often subject to the greatest enmeshment, is Plato's way of associating 'higher perception' 
and 'Socratic wisdom' (Plato's highest form of love, the love of wisdom) with non-involvement 
and non-enmeshment. We do not know that Socrates did not make love with the woman who taught 
him love. In the context of Greek society's pre-occupation with male homosexual love this would 
probably have been seen as irrelevant. 
There is a difference between saying this higher perception and knowledge is associated 
with non-involvement, and saying it can be reached through actual non-involvement in the ascetic 
sense. Socrates' behaviour is not a cause of his knowledge, but an effect, as we also see in 
Socrates' participation in the 'drinking parties', in which he drinks, but to the amusement of 
Alcibiades never appears drunk. The effects of Socrates' state of knowledge as equilibrium and 
detachment are indicated again and again up to and including the time of his death. Plato's real 
message is not the merits of asceticism - Socrates is not an ascetic, but drinks in the drinking 
parties - but the state of equilibrium and detachment whilst yet participating and involved in the 
world. The real question is how one attains this state, because it is certainly not through the 
exchange of reasoned dialogue. 
The perception of impersonal beauty, I would argue, is attainable through involvement 
accompanied by loss of self, or involvement which results, eventually (through events) in loss of 
self, and is a state of aesthetic experience in which the emotional self is not involved, but it is a 
state that goes beyond what has been more generally discussed as 'aesthetic experience' in relation 
to art objects. The state we are talking about is akin to Bullough's 'psychical distance', but its 
implications are far more profound, and are related to Plato's indications of the state of Socrates' 
consciousness. As repeatedly indicated by Plato, Socrates is the 'true philosopher' who loves 
wisdom above all else, is immersed in it, and is thus detached from the world, whilst yet 
participating in it. We do not see anything like this in Bullough's 'psychical distance'. What we do 
see, is a certain 'loss of self, providing a certain detachment from self involvement whilst allowing 
involved perception to continue. But in the case of Socrates, we are surely dealing with something 
much deeper, with what I have already attempted to describe not so much as 'loss of self as 'death 
of self. Self is as it were, a 'mass' contained in the surrounding circumstances. Bullough's 
'psychical distance' is a temporary withdrawing of the mass to create the distance that allows the 
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'aesthetic experience' to take place. It is primarily a psychological effect. On the other hand, the 
'death of self I have suggested is not a withdrawing but a change of dissolution. It is psycho-
spiritual. The distance it creates may be only temporary in the sense that self can 'expand' again to 
contact and immerse in the circumstances surrounding it, but, by degrees, the distance could be 
perrnanent. What Plato implies for the highest perception and knowledge of beauty, and indicates 
in Socrates, is a permanent 'psychical distance' from the world. The resulting perception places 
'aesthetic experience' in a much broader, and deeper context. 
We might think we can talk about 'aesthetic perception' as though it is not related to 
perception as whole, and to wider consideration of the whole state of consciousness of the 
perceiver. We might want to consider it as ephemeral, and separate from the perception of beauty, 
which, according to Plato, and as inevitably demonstrated in the truth of our own experience, is 
related to love. This attempt to discuss and understand little bits of our experience and perceptions 
like this in isolation from the whole of life, the whole of its meaning, and the whole meaning of 
experience, and indeed perhaps the universe, I believe is great mistake, -one that Plato to his credit 
does not make. 
It is traditionally thought that Man is somehow separated from his spirituality by his 
involvement in the physical world. He is in this view, as it were, a fallen angel. 'Spiritual' men and 
women have so often seen celibacy and asceticism as their task, their only means of withdrawing 
from the objective world, the world we all inhabit. 'Platonic love' seems to be a part of this wider 
belief. Yet where is the withdrawing to? To another metaphysical world, a spiritual world in yet 
another place, outside ourselves, like the world we inhabit? It is better recognised as a withdrawal 
within, into the subjective. Such withdrawal, might, as the mystics declare, reveal much about the 
unreality of the objective world. But what of the common movement towards more involvement in 
the physical, that so often accompanies the perception of beauty? Is this really all so negative and 
spiritually reprehensible? Or is there something in involvement itself, in the corporeal involvement 
in beauty, some way of being involved, that works towards the same end that the attempt to 
withdraw from it is supposed to? Can it be that the perception of beauty in the world, and the 
involvement with it, is an unrecognised part of the same movement towards freedom from 
enmeshment? Is it not possible to pass through experience, as distinct from going through it and 
gathering it? 
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One does not necessarily have to be lost in the world, or hopelessly enmeshed in it, just 
because one is involved in it. If beauty is known in the subject, but the subject is not involved in the 
world, what is the point of beauty, and what purpose does it serve in the world? Beauty appears in 
the objective world precisely because beauty is in the subject, and because the subject is involved 
in the world. Without involvement, beauty cannot be brought into the world, the world of 
appearances. The causal dimension of all art is involvement, and to the degree it is concerned with 
beauty, or any other state of the subject, it demands involvement, not just will-less-ness, or 
'disinterestedness' (as aestheticians often argue), both in its creator and its perceiver. The 
involvement in the world is involvement in life as a whole, involvement in the subjective, through 
participation in the objective. The distillation of perception is served by this involvement and 
participation. 
Art that reflects depth of perception, must reflect experience and involvement in life, even 
if not explicitly or overtly, both in its creator and in the spectator or auditor. Contrary to what Plato 
might seem to be presenting as Socrates' teaching, beauty and knowledge is very much brought into 
the world through involvement, through enmeshment itself, and especially through physical love, 
and I am now asserting that this involvement with beauty can also be a means of escape from 
enmeshment in physical existence, not least through what I have already described as 'death of 
self. Similarly, art may be about something beyond our concerns with our enmeshment in the 
world, but at the same time it is not something to be put on a pedestal and disconnected from our 
condition of enmeshment in the world. Art can portray the world, and various perceptions of it 
from the position of enmeshment in it, or it can portray the world and its condition from a 
perception beyond enmeshment. It then says something about the world from a position beyond the 
world. 
Beyond personal perceptions, two things are thus arguably essential to the development of 
intelligence capable of art, capable of seeing beyond 'reason', beyond the rational. They are active 
participation, or involvement in experiential living, and impersonal perception of a more permanent 
kind, according to what happens to the self in the world. Both together determine the value of 
experience in the world. In involvement that is limited only to the personal, experience is often 
sought for the sake of experience alone, but the point of experience is not really experience itself. 
The impersonal point of it all is for the distillation of an impersonal perception of something 
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beyond experience itself, beyond what is experienced, in the context of which things, 
experiences and circumstances in the world have a new aesthetic value that gives them significance 
in the whole. Within this, the true aesthetic value of music is detached from emotional form or 
feeling, yet is related to it, and is profoundly connected with impersonal beauty and dimensions of 
aesthetic meaning that reach out to the whole, and to the perceptions in the world from a position 
beyond it. Perhaps as Philolaus suggested, the individual may then be approaching knowledge of 
what he called metaphysical 'Nature itself, as the impersonal, subject-orientated principle behind 
'nature in world'. The phenomenon and structure of music is part of 'nature in the world', but it is 
capable of communicating aspects of 'Nature itself. 
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Chapter 9 - The purpose of music 
We have examined in considerable detail the tradition of the music of the spheres and 
connected it in a contemporary way with the question of music's effects on the psyche. The claims 
in Orphism, Pythagoreanism, and in Plato, that music can be a benevolent influence that can 
increase the consciousness or depth of perception of the auditor, can also be put in a context outside 
the tradition, when the role of experience in the development of perception is recognised. 
Music provides experience. Even in physical and psychical maturity, it may still be said to 
be associated with the need to experience, since the very existence of an individual is as it were, a 
manifestation of the need of experience. However, in maturity the experience of music is finer in 
the sense that there is less need in the auditor of the emotional spectrum that has already been 
experienced sufficiently. We only need to see that at its highest level, it is not the need of emotional 
experience that music finally provides for. At its apex, music begins to provide something quite 
different from anything related in any way to the emotional highs and lows of living in the world, 
or even to emotional feeling of any kind. Paradoxically, or so it seems, it still does this through 
experience, and the experience of the music can be seemingly profound, being as it were, a glass 
door to that which is beyond emotional experience and which could only be reached by passing 
through this final deeply felt experience. 
At this level on the scale of musical possibility, what appears as the content of the music 
may seem profound to the mature recipient, but to experiential adolescence it is as nothing because 
there is simply not enough emotional experience in it. It lacks any excitement or excitation of the 
kind adolescence seeks. It certainly does not satisfy the lowest adolescent need of basic emotional 
experience - emotional highs of excitement (which of course are always followed by inevitable 
lows of negativity) and correlation to the stimulated hormonal and animal part of our being. It 
communicates only to the individual who is already looking beyond emotional experience of the 
kind adolescence of any kind seeks, and probably beyond emotional experience altogether. This 
does not mean looking for intellectual satisfaction of the kind Hanslick said he endorsed, although 
this may be present as part of another dimension of our aesthetic appreciation of music. Beyond 
emotional experience is 'feeling' experience of a less emotional nature and beyond that is 
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experience that can properly be said to be beyond emotion. Experience becomes finer and finer 
until its 'feeling' and 'knowledge' aspects are really two polarities of the same thing, for which we 
have no descriptive language. Neither pole has anything to do with our common emotional or 
intellectual life, nothing to do with what persons describe as their 'feelings' or their 'thoughts', 
except that they are reached by passing through that feeling, thinking, emotional and intellectual 
life. 
What is left is not abstract or intellectual, as Hanslick at times imagined, because it is 
received by a sense that requires no attainment through abstract or intellectual learning. This higher 
sense is entirely natural - it does not require any additional effort of education. Many must 
encounter it at times without realising what it is. It is discovered in any case by any individual who 
reaches the point of having had enough emotional experience, both highs and lows, 'good' and 
'bad', and who now seeks to be free of it all, and for what is beyond. Reaching this point is 
unfortunately not liberation from the emotional, but it is the beginning of the realisation of what is 
natural, though previously obscured by emotional self, it is the beginning of natural, impersonal 
perception. It is only the se Ifs need of experience that separates the subject from this perception. It 
is this need that creates the reality of the emotional world, the personal world, and all art that 
reflects this, rather than what is beyond the world. It is this need that perpetuates discursive 
thinking as a way of relating to and understanding art and the rest of the world. 
The most commonplace music is simply a symbol of the existence of the most 
commonplace emotional conditions. In other words the commonplace, 'collective' emotional 
conditions surface as the most commonplace and readily embraced music. Music is commonly 
listened to because it provides 'emotional' experience, even if only in the form of a background 
'mood' or 'psychical ambience'. It is in effect a more or less weak or strong, sonic, psyche 
affecting influence, and its efficacy lies in its power to affect the psychical and even physical 
condition of the listener. Most music that is listened to, and not just the Wagner that Hanslick 
might have criticised, is 'emotional' in this sense. 
As Hanslick recognised, perhaps the biggest mistake in the history of aesthetic enquiry into 
music is the assumption that music's main function or importance is its ability to affect, represent, 
arouse, etc., emotion. My argument is as follows. This ability is not music's basic psychical 
efficacy. It is something that comes causally later, at the causal stage where we become emotional. 
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Emotion itself is not something inherent by necessity in the relationship between Man and 
music. The psyche itself is not inherently emotional in nature, any more than nature is. Hanslick's 
emotion related 'base' effects of music are actually just the spectrum of effects that are now widely 
'tapped into' in our use of music. The fundamental effects of music are purely psychical - they 
arise from the inherent impersonal integration of self-in-the-world with world-phenomena, an 
evolutionary self-reflexive duality that cannot be split apart. 
'Emotional' music in our 'society' actually comes from this chosen emotionality, even 
though this emotionality is largely primal, or evolutionary. To all those identified with, or 
enmeshed and involved in this emotionality, music's main reason for being, is its relationship with 
this emotionality, and it will no doubt be used more and more as an acoustical form of recreational 
'drug' to accompany and affect the favoured psychological state of the personality, which really 
means personal emotional condition, sometimes even in conjunction with chemical drugs, and 
never will it do anything but reiterate and amplify the same spectrum of emotional sensibility and 
perception from which it comes in the first place. Even a minority genre is not outside this scenario 
whilst the emotionality of its adherents is basically the same commonplace emotionality. 
Despite this, there are of course other sensibilities. Emotional perception is everywhere, it 
is ubiquitous, but despite our identification with it, our high appraisal of it and our attachment to it, 
it is not, I have argued, our highest sensibility. In the emotional perception, 'happy', 'sad', 
'exciting', 'depressing' and so on, all occupy separate 'comprehension centres', both in the way we 
perceive music and the way we interpret events in the world. In reality, that is, in the reality of 
experience, the human condition cannot have happiness without sadness, or excitement without 
depression, because it is all connected in time. The one truly valuable aspect of music in the world 
is not its ability to reiterate this scenario but its ability to take the perception beyond it. 
We do not need the consciousness of Socrates to tap into the beginning of this perception. 
The most modest music, with or without intended 'emotional content', can sufficiently reflect the 
beginning of this perception. One way we can enjoy music is because its 'emotional content' 
correlates to what we know from personal experience in world, which allows self to identify with 
something in the music, but from a safe 'psychical distance'. The 'emotional meaning' then 
becomes 'aesthetic'. Or the experience of the music can trigger stronger emotions in the self which 
have a life of their own because they connect with real life experience to which the self is still 
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attached, in time. None of this is actually necessary to the enjoyable experience of music 
because the relationship of music and psyche does not hinge on this in the first instance. Music's 
basic ability to 'tap into' the psyche is unfettered in itself by the psyche's emotional content, and it 
is from this fact that 'psychical distance' from emotional content perceived in the music can be 
effected. The truly fundamental power of music is a purely psychical thing- music's basic effects 
are psychical in nature, and its efficacy comes from the fact that we are basically psychical in 
nature. 
Where perception comes into music, is where the self is sufficiently absent for the higher 
impersonal intelligence to hear the reflection of itself in the music, which establishes it more, for a 
time, and keeps the emotional self from which arises all real sorrows, troubles, and attachment to 
the world, temporarily at bay. So music can be pleasing, purifying, and self-transcending. As soon 
as emotional self reflects off any emotional content in the music then perception vanishes. 
Music is valued in the world as an entertainment, a communication, a recreation, an 
emotional experience, and even, quite commonly, as an emotional opiate. But among all the artful 
activities we have invented for ourselves music is capable of providing experience on the very edge 
of all need of worldly experience of this kind. The final point of acoustical music is to pass through 
this experience. This is the part of music that is above its place in the process of evolutionary 
survival. The emotional aspect of music relates to the evolutionary forces in our make up, that in 
human intelligence and self-consciousness, become our uniquely human emotionality. The esoteric 
part of music relates to a process in which nothing survives, and hence is only perceivable to the 
degree to which emotional self, the core and cause of being something, is absent. This process is 
the very thing that in music is 'not of this world', but is intelligible in human perception, and can 
manifest in the dimension of musical sensibility, as it can in other ways, because the potential of 
human perception goes beyond evolutionary emotionality. 
How this happens lies inherent in the way the external physical world connects with the 
internal psychical. This is the macrocosm-microcosm relationship, which we will address in more 
detail below. The object-orientated representation of this relationship already exists in the textual 
and diagrammatic symbols of Plato, the neo-Platonists, and many other sources, but treated literally 
as information, these are useless, so they are inevitably either rejected as imaginative nonsense, or 
only accepted at an imaginative level. Nevertheless, this does not automatically mean there is no 
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truth in these symbols in the way they represent the relationship between the physical and 
psychical. If there is any truth in them, and I am not suggesting there is not, then we have to 
remember that none of this means there is no distortion and corruption in the symbols. 
It seems to me that a great deal of what was accepted at various points in the past as 
esoteric information of this kind, including attestations concerning Pythagorean ism, and much, but 
by no means all of what appears in the Hermetica and Corpus Hermeticum, is merely repetition of 
what has been previously heard or read, that has only partially, if at all, been aligned in actual self-
knowledge and experience, so that much of it, just like some of the pre-Socratic discourses, is 
confusion or nonsense in the trappings of the language of esoteric mysticism. On the other hand, it 
is probably true that much of what has been said by writers like Plato and Empidocles that are 
clearly genuine expressions of esoteric spirituality, have not always been recognised for what they 
are. Where similar material appears in sources labelled as 'patristic' or 'religious', they do not 
suffer the same fate. 
There is one last, important facet of perception that should be mentioned. Perception 
particularly of something in music, can be confused with the emotion on which it can act. The 
'Orphic' effects of music are in this respect not all myth from the past but a reality now, and are not 
so much an opiate power of music on the condition of the self, but lie in music's power to reflect 
back the potential depth of perception inherent in the auditor. It can be sufficiently powerful that it 
can result in the cathartic expurgation of the emotional energy of self, in a visible, physical form 
that to the merely mental understanding is indistinguishable from the expression of emotion itself. 
Thus it is that the true Orphic laclzrymae of music comes into being, not by arousing or imitating 
the emotions, not because it is sad, but by dissolving and expurgating the emotional self. So it is we 
can indeed weep at beauty without being emotional. But emotional self and the thinking rationality 
that arises from it, seeing it in another, will call it emotion, and experiencing it in the self, will 
loose it by emotionalising it. The physical clue in either case, the 'presentational symbol' 405 both in 
the auditor's response to the music and in the music itself, is the same. 
405 Langer, SK, Philosophy in a New Key, Cambridge Massachusetts; London, 1942, 1979. 
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Chapter 10- The Pythagorean Circle- a symbol of harmonia 
The Pythagorean Circle, or Great Circle of Fifths, is a diagram representing the harmonia, 
or scale. The use of diagrams for communicating ideas and as a way of understanding things, 
implies and invites the use of what might appropriately be called our 'diagrammatical 
understanding' modus operandi of intelligence, that is a part of discursive, conceptual, object-
orientated thinking. Object-orientated thinking relates readily to diagrams. Mathematical formulae 
are in effect abstract diagrams of quantity and relationship between quantities. If we can draw a 
diagram of something, then we understand it in the way that the diagram encapsulates the 
relationships between symbolised concepts. Conversely, subject-orientated understanding is not 
information about concepts and their relationships. It does not arise from concept structures. You 
cannot draw a diagram of loss of self, or death of self, or absence of self. Actually, you can, 
because you can draw a diagram of anything you can conceptualise, and anything that can be 
named, including self, can be conceptualised. But if you do it will be a diagram of a 
conceptualisation, which is object-orientated, and it will only relate to object-orientated thinking 
and the reality it creates. 
Nevertheless, I am going to present some diagrams to illustrate a proposition for the 
connection of harmony, self, musical scale and universe. Diagrams of a mixed nature, that are 
supposed to represent something beyond the literal relationship of concepts that appear in them, are 
found in all kinds of sources especially those primarily concerned with subject-orientated 
knowledge. They appear in the form of magical symbols, hieroglyphs, mandalas, cabalistic and 
arcanic diagrams and symbols, in Hermetic manuscripts, quite frequently as pictures of labyrinths 
and spirals, and in many other ways.406 Diagrams that are part of the music of the spheres tradition, 
such as those of Robert Fludd, may in particular include numbers, mathematics, or quasi-
mathematics.407 Plato's description of the creation of the 'world soul' in Timeous is essentially such 
a 'mixed' diagram in textual form. The diagrams below are less profound in their implications than 
this. They represents how apparently separate 'elements' that we turn into 'concept centres' in 
406 Surveys can be found in Godwin, J, Robert Fludd Hermetic philosopher and surveyor of two worlds, 
London, 1979, and Puree, J, The Mystic Spiral, London, 1974, 1980. 
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object-orientated thinking, can be interconnected not only because they are part of an overall 
'concept-structure ', but more importantly because they are part of the subject-orientated 'structure' 
of a whole. We connect the concepts through thinking, but in doing so, we arrive at an object-
orientated 'structure' in thought. The diagrams I have used are derived from the Pythagorean 
Circle. Like the Greek textual 'diagrams', the Pythagorean Circle is not just an object-orientated 
diagram, because it has a another level of interpretation. 
The early Greek harmonia is something that 'fits together opposites ' and at the same time, 
or at least in later usage, refers to what we would now call the musical scale, in fact, a tuning or 
temperament. Roughly speaking, harmony itself, as the whole number ratios that appear in the 
science of harmonics, cannot be used to form the structure of a harmonia or scale of twelve 
intervals to the octave, without introducing disharmony between some notes. This is a consequence 
of the nature of the Great Circle, and the factual illustration of this is as follows. 
Mathematically, harmonic musical intervals are expressed as certain integer ratios.408 It is 
said that Pythagoras discovered the harmonic ratios of the ' perfect' intervals and was responsible 
for call ing them ' perfect '. The ratio of the Pythagorean or perfect fifth is 3:2 (or 2:3) and this can 






' Like ' mathematics in appearance, or inclusive of some mathematics, but not really the science of 
mathematics itself. 
408 The harmonic ratio of a musical interval is the integer ratios corresponding to the ratios of the 
fundamental frequencies of the notes forming the interval. Traditionally the ratios were expressed as the 
ratios of the string lengths of a monochord required to produce the interval. 
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Clockwise progression round the circle represents ascending fifths (or descending fourths), 
and anticlockwise represents descending fifths (or ascending fourths). 409 The distance progressed in 
each direction is arbitrary- there is no absolute rule. 
Circulation in this particular instance is made clockwise from C round to G# and 
anticlockwise from C round to Eb. Even in terms of modem musical grammar an 'imperfection' 
now occurs in the interval from G# to Eh. This is a diminished minor sixth, not a perfect fifth. We 
could alternatively have continued from C clockwise right around the circle and back to the top, but 
we would then finish on 8#, not C. Grammatically, the circle does not 'close' -if only one note 
occupies each position around the circle, then to close the circle it must contain at least one interval 
that is not a perfect fifth. 
The discrepancy is not merely grammatical. Acoustically, the Circle represents the tuning 
of consecutive fifths (or alternating ascending and descending fourths and fifths within an octave). 
If eleven fifths are tuned 'perfect', the remaining interval will be smaller than a perfect fifth by an 
amount known as the comma of Pythagoras.410 Similarly, if twelve consecutive ascending perfect 
fifths are tuned, the final note will not quite be seven perfect octaves above the starting note. It will 
be sharp from this, again, by the Pythagorean comma. 
Mathematically the harmonic ratio of the octave is 2: I and that of the perfect fifth, 3:2. A 
seven octave interval thus has the harmonic ratio 2 7 and an interval of twelve perfect fifths has the 
ratio (3/2} 12 • The Pythagorean comma is an interval with the ratio {(3/2)12}: {27}. 
A scale of twelve intervals to the octave tuned by so-called 'Pythagorean tuning' respects 
only the perfect fifth (and its inversion the perfect fourth). Twelve fifths contained in the scale can 
be tuned perfect and the last must by acoustical and mathematical necessity remain a 'wolf411 
interval, smaller than a perfect fifth by the Pythagorean comma. 
Diagram I is the Pythagorean Circle but it also shows straight lines connecting notes 
defining (clockwise) what we would now call major thirds. Again, grammatically, four of these are 
409 In the science of harmonics the 'direction', ascending or descending, of an interval, is merely relative. 
Intervals and their associated ratios can be handled in any way according to chosen convention. A fourth is 
merely an inverted fifth and vice versa, a major third is an inverted minor sixth, etc. Consequently the Circle 
can equally represent alternating ascending fifths and descending fourths, clockwise, and descending fifths 
and ascending fourths, anticlockwise. The entire Circle then represents a scale of twelve tones in one octave. 
410 A comma is a microtonal interval. The Pythagorean comma is also called the diatonic comma. 
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'incorrect'- they are grammatically diminished fourths. Any one of the straight lines subtends 
clockwise an arc of four fifths (or diminished minor sixths). The arc clockwise from C toE is an 
interval defined by four perfect fifths. This simultaneously defines two octaves and a major third C 
to E. Because the harmonic ratio of a perfect fifth is 3:2, such an interval has a ratio of (3:2)4 = 
5.0625. The harmonic ratio for two octaves is 4:1, and so the ratio for two octaves and a major 
third, is (4:l)X(5:4) = 5. Thus the two octaves and a 'third' defined by the four perfect fifths in the 
arc of the Circle is an interval greater than two octaves and a harmonic (or 'pure') third. It is wider 
than two octaves and a harmonic third by the ratio 5.0625 : 5, an interval known as the syntonic 
comma (the comma of Didymus), which is more usually expressed as the harmonic ratio 81:80. 
Thus, a third defined by perfect fifths is greater than a harmonic third by the syntonic comma. This 
wide third has subsequently been called the Pythagorean Third. Although the syntonic and 
Pythagorean commas differ, for practical tuning purposes they can be considered the same size. 
The other differences may look small, mathematically, but they are substantial, 
acoustically. The modem musical ear not versed in early music is conditioned to accept all major 
thirds considerably wider than a harmonic major third, because of the now widely accepted tuning 
convention called Equal Temperament. On a modem piano which is tuned this way, all major 
thirds are the same size, and all are wider than the harmonic third. However, Pythagorean thirds 
would be unacceptably wide even to modem ears, if they were tuned on the piano. 
In modem terms, a Pythagorean scale contains three perfectly good, harmonic triads related 
as I, IV, V, in the major key whose tonic is two semitones below the lowest note of the wolf 
diminished minor sixth. However, this I, IV, V relationship of modem major tonality is not likely 
to have been musically significant to Pythagoras, as it is to us. It only arises because the diminished 
fourths that fall across the 'wolf, which in our diagram is placed between G sharp and E flat, each 
have practically the same ratio as a harmonic major third.412 They are acoustically, for all practical 
purposes, harmonic major thirds, otherwise known as 'pure' thirds. The other thirds defined by the 
straight lines are Pythagorean Thirds. There are no attestations that the Pythagoreans ascribed any 
particular significance to this duality in the 'thirds'. It seems thirds were relatively unimportant to 
the Pythagoreans. 
411 it 'howls' unpleasantly 'out of tune'. 
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Thirds, however, became important in time, in musical practice. The size of the wide 
thirds in a scale can be reduced, and even the unpleasantly narrow 'wolf can be widened, by 
deliberately 'tempering' some or all of the 'fifths' so as to 'absorb' some of the adverse effect of 
the commas. If, for example, each of the twelve intervals around the circle were to be narrowed by 
1/12 of a Pythagorean comma, no 'wolf interval would appear, and all the thirds would be wider 
than a harmonic third by only 2/3 of the Pythagorean comma. This is precisely the strategy adopted 
in the modem convention of Equal Temperament.413 I have said only 2/3 of a Pythagorean comma, 
because this is a improvement on the size of the Pythagorean third, which is a whole syntonic 
comma wider than the harmonic 'pure third'. However, many experienced performers or lovers of 
early music would declare that this equally tempered third is ugly because it is too wide. 
Once one has been initiated into the substantial physical sonority and beauty of true 
harmonic intervals (which one cannot be whilst confined only to equally tempered musical 
practice), the significance of all intervals and their intonation shines through to a sensibility now 
lost to the modem ear conditioned to accept Equal Temperament. To this sensibility there is a place 
for the piquancy and colour of tempered intervals, but only in relief against the sonmity of true 
harmonic intervals, or intervals that are close to this. True harmonic intervals are said to be Justly 
Intoned. Just Intonation is a performance possibility for any given interval or vertical harmony, but 
it is not (as often misunderstood), a method of tuning 'the perfect scale' or a temperament, and no 
Great Circle or scale of twelve fixed notes can be constructed in which all the relations of the notes 
are Justly Intoned harmonic intervals. As a performance possibility for music involving free 
harmonic progression, polyphony or counterpoint, it requires the use of more than one note per 
position in the scale or Great Circle, or more than one possible pitch per note. The pursuit of Just 
Intonation using a fixed pitch scale is the reason why Western microtonal scales for practical use 
are not an invention of the twentieth century as might be supposed, but were of interest even in the 
sixteenth century.414 
412 The difference between these thirds and true harmonic major thirds is the difference between the syntonic 
and ditonic (Pythagorean) commas- about 2 cents, or a 50th of a semitone. 
413 Equal temperament, as a proposed system of tuning, is not a modem idea, but its adoption as a 'universal' 
standard is modem. 
414 For example, Vicentino's 31 note Equal Temperament, Vicentino, Nicola, L 'mrtica musica ridotta alia 
moderna prattica, Rome, 1555. 
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Now we can address the Circle is a less objective way, to glean its symbolic properties. 
The Great Circle showing the full complexity and interdependence of all the note pitches and every 




The lines are also lines of cause and effect in the harmonia, the scale or temperament. No 
note can be altered without affecting its relationship to every other note, and this affects the 
harmonia or temperament. The diagonals across the circle, are the tritones - the augmented fourths 
or diminished fifths , the diabolus in musica of early theory that was studiously avoided in practice. 
In modem music of course, every interval is equally acceptable including that of the diabolus in 
musica which simply becomes another discord that can be prepared and resolved. Nevertheless, in 
terms of early theory the greatest symbolic disharmony lies in the opposites. Turning the theory on 
its head, and looking at the circle in an unconventional way, we can see it is constructed of 
disharmonious opposites, arranged such that the result creates harmony along the other lines of 
relationship, according to the harmonia, the tuning or temperament employed. In keeping with the 
pre-Socratic notion, harmonia creates the harmony by fitting together the disharmonious opposites. 
The whole circle represents the perfection of the unison or octaves, on which the other 
relationships depend, and without which the Circle would loose its meaning. The unison, the 
octave, the multiple octave, and the fifths, before arrangement in the Circle, are 'perfect ' . But the 
Circle is not. As a consequence of the mathematics behind the structure it must contain the commas 
- ' imperfection' in the relationships is inherent in the harmonia. Some relationships may be perfect 
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or pure, but it must always be that some will not. Perfect harmony, where it occurs, is the direct 
result of the harmonia, but it is not the harmonia itself. The harmonia itself, as a means of 
tempering, applies to the whole, and is necessary in the first instance because the whole Circle of 
perfect fifths in actuality cannot ever be the perfect unison or octave that it represents. Starting with 
C, it circulates not back to C, but to notes of actual, different pitches, B# or D double flat, 
depending on which way we go. 
Why is there discrepancy or imperfection in the mathematical structure behind it all? It 
would have been very elegant of nature if twelve perfect fifths could have exactly equalled seven 
octaves, and very convenient if four perfect fifths could have exactly equalled two octaves and a 
harmonic major third. The inelegance and inconvenience is not of nature - it comes from the fact 
that the scale, or Circle, is not natural. Harmony, as intervals governed by integer ratios, is a part of 
natural phenomena, complete with its own imperfections and complications that arise when it is 
exhibited in physical media. Mathematically, Western harmony begins with the harmonic number 
series- 1,2,3,4,5,6 etc. The attempt to arrange harmony in a scale or Circle is Man's. The scale 
itself, if all the notes are heard simultaneously, is a cacophony. In contrast, the harmonic series 
itself, exhibited in say the natural behaviour of the monochord, even with all its physical 
imperfections, inharmonicity and complications, is unmistakably heard as both harmony and 
unison. The acoustical harmonic series has been called 'the chord of nature', and it occurs 
everywhere in nature that there is complex periodic phenomena, though not always acoustically. 
There is no equivalent twelve interval to the octave 'scale of nature' in natural phenomena. 
The cacophony of the scale whose notes are sounded simultaneously is a reminder of the 
Man-made function of the scale. It is not designed (originally) to be sounded simultaneously. It is 
designed to diffract natural vertical harmony through time, to provide a set of acoustical reference 
points for the activity of extending harmony through time, in what we call music. When we study 
acoustical harmony in the scientific, object-orientated way, we deal with it in the context of space 
and time, and say it is oscillatory phenomena in time. But really, from the musical point of view, 
any given vertical harmony itself is not in time at all. Unlike melody, unchanging continuous 
harmony is not a musical function of time. From the subject-orientated position, pure unchanging 
continuous harmony does not have an 'objective' time element to it. Any change in it introduces 
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time, not as the clock implies, but as persisting relationship in the awareness, of what was, to 
what is. 
In order to 'crystallise' harmony into a set of fixtures, in order to condition it so that it can 
be recreated across time, a harmonia is necessary, whether deliberately 'worked out' or not. 
Harmonia is a static principle of the whole, that fits everything together, allowing harmony that 
constantly changes, in time, and necessarily includes disharmony. This much about both senses of 
the word harmonia is clearly present in the symbol of the Pythagorean Circle. 
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Chapter 11 -Harmonia, the universe and the soul415 
It is reported that the Pythagoreans considered the soul to be a kind of harmonia, or an 
'attunement'. It was said to be 'in' the body as the harmonia is 'in' the lyre, when the lyre is in 
tune. This raised questions concerning other arguments for the immortality of the soul. If a 
harmonia is a consequence of right relationship {proportion) between the strings, then it vanishes 
when the lyre is destroyed, or the strings go out of tune. Thus, by analogy the soul must be 
destroyed when the body, or the condition of right relationship between its vital parts or elements is 
destroyed, in what is called death. On the other hand, the Pythagoreans are supposed by some of 
their interpreters to have held there to be a mathematical Reality that is transcendental to the 
material world. On this basis, the harmonia survives unaffected in mathematical Reality when the 
lyre is detuned or destroyed, and consideration of the soul as a harmonia does not affect its 
immortality. 
In Phaedo Socrates argues that the soul is immortal and is not a kind of harmonia. The 
argument rests on the notion that a lyre can be more or less in tune, and contain more or less of a 
harmonia, whereas a soul cannot be more or less of a soul.416 Also, different souls can possess 
different qualities of intelligence, goodness, ignorance and wickedness etc., whereas this kind of 
differentiation and combination of qualities does not exist between harmonias.417 Clearly the 
meaning of harmonia in the musical context here is that there is but one harmonia, one tuning. 
This does not mean that Socrates did not relate the concept of harmonia to the concept of 
the soul. He did so but in another way. The idea of harmonia occurs in the Myth of Er related by 
Socrates, but here it is 'transcendental' to the material world, in that it is beyond death - it is not of 
this world - but rather, it is depicted as the 'harmony' of the great system in which souls are by 
necessity involved in the cycle of life and death. However, since it is generally not sensible to take 
the content of myth literally, and for the reasons I have already argued, we are at liberty to say that 
in the Myth of Er the transmigration of the soul as a continuing entity from one incarnation to the 
next, is not a literal 'diagram' of the truth that the myth supposedly stands for. The actual 
415 For this chapter, cf. Plato, Phaedo 84a- 95a, Plato, The Last Days of Socrates, Tr. H Tredennick and H 
Tarrant, London, 1954, 1993, pp. 143-157. 
416 Ibid., 93b-c. 
417 Ibid., 93c-d. 
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transmigration of the soul as a continuing entity is not really what reincarnation in the Myth 
necessarily means. What stands unaltered from Socrates is that there is a connection between the 
idea of harmonia and death, and that the difference between a living body and a dead one is that 
there is life 'in' it. What should we say is the relationship between life, death, harmonia and 'soul'? 
I have already argued that the source of Socrates' wisdom is not discursive thought, and 
that his engagement in this as a means of communication is a 'top down' activity of attempting to 
express self-knowledge in the logical space of thinking. Whether we credit Socrates, Plato, or both 
for this, matters not- it is the principle that is important. Unfortunately, Plato is usually interpreted 
in terms of his 'theories' and 'arguments' and the tenability of the relationships between them. It 
seems perfectly clear that in Plato 'Reason' as practised by the philosophers, is not merely an 
intellectual search for knowledge, but includes the practice of self control, self responsibility, the 
pursuit of self-knowledge, and ultimately is about finding the truth of death. In the arena of 
discursive argument Socrates utilises all kinds of ideas and pre-existent beliefs as the medium of 
communication. When the discussion enters the area of knowledge beyond death, the discursive 
method in Plato is abandoned, and communication through direct mythical discourse takes over. 
In Phaedo Socrates' argument that the soul existed previously to its current incarnation 
stands fast in Plato's discourse, in that it is accepted by the other philosophers. Socrates' reasoned 
argument for the immortality of the soul also stands- but only in that the soul is 'un-dying', not in 
that it continues after death.418 The nature of 'the soul' as a continuous surviving entity that 
transmigrates from one incarnation to the next is still not established as a consequence of its 
immortality. This is never satisfactorily confirmed outside the context of mythical discourse. The 
reason this state of affairs is patched together by Plato's interpreters into a scenario in which 
Socrates is supposed to believe souls circulate intact in and out of bodies in a manner akin to taking 
the Myth of Er419 quite literally, is, I propose, a consequence of understanding Plato in an object-
orientated way, that does not befit the implied subject-orientated source of Socrates' wisdom. 
418 Ibid., I OOb-1 06a, pp. 163- 172. 
419 And Socrates' account in Phaedo, I 07e-d. 
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Now for a contemporary reflection on this. To begin with, from the subjec/-orienlated 
point of view there is no meaningful object called 'the soul'. The thing called 'the soul', is a 
mentally postulated proposition. The 'soul' may be meaningful but if it has any subject-orientated 
meaning it has to be known from the subject-orientated point of view as the subject, through self-
knowledge. In this case, we might as well talk about self. There are numerous different ways one 
could translate the contents of Plato or earlier sources into more contemporary terms for a 
relationship between harmonia, universe and soul. I offer one in what follows, but rather than 
addressing soul, what we address here is self. If anything about 'the soul' is to be known through 
self-knowledge, then we have to address self first. 
Self and thinking are related. For thinking to take place there has to be a self. The first 
thing to be said is that the knowledge beyond death mentioned above is observed by Socrates in the 
intellect, but unlike everything else, it evidently will not lend itself to demonstration in dialogue 
with the other philosophers, through the apparent process of reasoned deduction. The scenario for 
the truth of death Plato indicates, especially in the Myth of Er, certainly does not pass the test of 
Occam's Razor- for example as a 'logical' extension of what is otherwise established by the 
philosophers in so-called Reason, we do not need the harmonia between the Fates and the 
implications about planets and planetary characteristics. This is an unnecessary proliferation of 
entities. At the same time, it would be wholly out of character for Socrates to have merely accepted 
these details from pre-existing beliefs as correct. He soon rejected the popular belief that the soul is 
like a harmonia! 
The 'logical space' of the developing dialogue is, in effect, the employed 'logical space' of 
thinking. Plato is implying that not everything that can be observed in the intellect can be arrived at 
through the 'logical space' of thinking, although it can expressed in the logical space of thinking, 
once observed. In dialogue, the other philosophers test what Socrates says against experience and 
the intellect, approached through the logical space of thinking in which the dialogue takes place. 
Why does Socrates see more readily solutions in the intellect than the other philosophers? 
If Socrates has a superior intellect, why does he say that he alone knows he knows 
nothing? If what he sees is only of his intellect, why do the other philosophers come to agree with 
---------
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him? Presumably because they share the same 'logical space' of thinking as Socrates, and agree 
what he says makes sense in the 'logical space' of thinking. 
What I want to lead onto now is this - and it requires abandoning the mental association of 
the concepts 'logical space of thinking' and 'the intellect', with individual, organic animal brains. 
Rather, we have to consider something more universal, at least at the scale of the species that we 
constitute. What I now propose is this - the philosophers share the same intellect as Socrates.420 If 
we feel an immediate objection to this it is because we consider the intellect to be an individual 
faculty of thinking in 'logical space' (the space of thinking in which things 'make sense'). But I 
suggested above that things can be observed in the intellect that cannot be approached through the 
'logical space' of thinking. In this sense the intellect is not itself the faculty of thinking in 'logical 
space'. The idea that there is one intellect is not so far removed from the idea that there is only one 
logical space for the behaviour of natural phenomena, or only one species that we can be. 
However, if the philosophers share the same intellect, as I have just proposed, why is 
Socrates more able than the others? The answer, as this thesis proposes, is twofold. Firstly the 
ability to think in 'logical space' of any kind is individual, and the intellect is, in the case of 
evolutionary self, normally approached through thinking. Secondly, the intellect can be 'looked 
into' directly without the need of thinking in 'logical space', and the impediment to this is actually 
the action of evolutionary self thinking. Socrates knows he knows nothing, yet he is the wisest man 
in Greece. This does not just mean he alone has sufficient self-knowledge to know his own 
ignorance. It means he has the power to know nothing - which is the power to look into the 
intellect without the impediment of evolutionary self, and its need of evolutionary thinking and 
knowing, based on the evolutionary self/not-self duality. This is where Socrates, with his 
immediate self-knowledge of The One, or Being, differs from the other philosophers. Plato does 
not indicate this power comes from cogitation. It comes from the practice of 'philosophy', which is 
not to be confused with the discussion of philosophy or the discursive arguments for what it 
reveals, as it occurs in Socratic dialogue. The power is distilled from the reducing need of 
experience in, and reducing attachment to the material world. This is participation in a process in 
which already nothing survives, and it correlates to the reducing need to fear evolutionary death -
420 This is not an original proposition of mine. c. f. Long, B, The Origins of Man and the Universe, London, 
1984, 1998, p. 105. 
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the end of involvement in the material world -self in form. It is no wonder Socrates has no fear 
of death - he already knows his self, the world in form, and knowing it, with sufficient self-
knowledge to know the truth of it, he sees through it. He sees through his evolutionary self, through 
the evolutionary world, and through evolutionary death. The intellect is the ability to perceive the 
truth of the universe through whatever impeding medium evolutionary intelligence provides. The 
result does not approach the truth of the universe or knowledge of the intellect itself, until the 
impeding medium is sufficiently aligned with the intellect, sufficiently ready to transcend its own 
evolutionary position and see through itself, and through time. We can say the intellect does not 
'belong' to Socrates, to any of the other philosophers, or to the reader of these words- it is free of 
human self, it 'belongs' to humanity, or if we like, the universe. 
In subject-orientation the experience of life is as self. We know that the evolutionary 
survival principle out of which the brain-body system arises, requires instinctual 'drives' for self 
survival at the individual animal level -survival and protection of the body- as a pre-requisite at 
least for a time, before other mechanisms such as self sacrifice for the propagation of the species 
could possibly take place. The survival instinct transposed up into self-consciousness becomes the 
urge for self survival, but self in this case is now no longer just the body. It is a psycho-emotional 
entity also. Nevertheless, it is identified with the animal body. 
The human se If does not just see other human bodies - it sees other human selfs like itself. 
Not questioning its own reality, it sees the death of other bodies as the death of other selfs, and the 
threat of death to its own body, as the threat of self-annihilation. It is not really the death of body 
that self fears, but rather it is a) the death of self, and b) the loss of the world. The two amount to 
the same thing from the subject-orientated position, but self, thinking in 'logical space' often denies 
that it fears its own death, whilst it still fears anything that threatens the end of the world. This is 
the taking of an evolutionary position, it is a lack of knowledge of self beyond its evolutionary 
position in time. 
This situation creates the psychological and emotional need of the idea of survival of self 
beyond physical death. But in humans, it is not just fear of self annihilation that creates this need, 
or this need of belief in endless survival. It is also the unconscious knowledge that the appearance 
of the necessary, evolutionary event of annihilation by death, is actually an illusion. This 
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knowledge comes from unconscious but direct, natural contact with the intellect, in which it is 
possible to see that evolutionary self is entirely illusory, and that therefore death of evolutionary 
self is possible without annihilation of the consciousness on which it depends. However, 
consciousness as evolutionary self knows it, is obviously not what consciousness is, without 
evolutionary self. 
The attempt to escape death by inventing in thinking, self-survival after death, is not 
necessary, because the death we are trying to escape only relates to the evolutionary scenario of 
psychical and physical survival of the person, which is not real anyway. It obscures the intellect, 
which is outside time and evolution, and prevents consciousness of the time-independent process in 
which nothing survives. 
That death of self is annihilation, is a deduction in the (self-conscious) evolutionary logical 
space of thinking, that arises out of evolutionary self. It is not a part of self-knowledge. The object-
orientated thinking processes are movement and activity that tend to obscure the subject-orientated 
potential to observe that even in life, in time, death of self already happens by degrees, especially 
when the subject consciously participates in a process in which nothing survives. When self is 
involved in a process in which it is constantly changing by not surviving, then it is seen that the 
burden of ensuring survival of self is actually not necessary because there is no 'annihilation of 
life' to avoid - there are only physical processes of living and dying, and the greater process in 
which nothing survives - the process of coming to know what is not of this world. This is seen 
using the intellect. At the same time it is seen that the intellect on which all thinking relies is not a 
consequence of self thinking, but is transcendental to thought. 
Nothing surviving in the Myth of Er 
The content of Plato's Myth of Er can be related in the following way. Like all Myths, the 
Myth of Er can be considered as an example of what Schopenhauer called a 'comprehensible 
substitute for the truth'. Every element in the story is a mythical symbol. In particular, the myth as 
Socrates tells it appears to be a scenario of metempsychosis - the transmigration of the 'soul' from 
incarnation, through a process between incarnations, and back again into incarnation. Thus, in the 
scenario as it appears, there is a self-entity, the 'soul' that survives throughout the process. The 
elements of the story dealing with this correspond with the general principle of the Buddhist and 
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Hindu religions, in which life and death are cyclic. The doctrine of reincarnation as it is widely 
understood allows for this survival of self as 'soul', the form of each life being determined by the 
actions in the previous life. 
I have asserted that music is ultimately part of a process of which survival is not the point. 
Thus, it could be argued that this thesis is fundamentally at variance with the account of the music 
of the spheres encapsulated in the Myth of Er. My answer to this is that as Schopenhauer 
perceptively recognised, the notion of ultimate self survival in the doctrine of reincarnation, is 
itself, like any doctrine, also supposed to be a comprehensible substitute for the truth, all the more 
appealing because it promises self survival. The Myth of Er is in the class of the general doctrine of 
reincarnation, which Schopenhauer adequately addresses. The doctrine of reincarnation as the 
transmigration of a surviving self from one incarnation to the next, can be understood as merely a 
simple conceptual representation of a process in which reincarnation, as Schopenhauer puts it, is 
really through a psychical version of palengenisis. In biological palengenisis no individual self 
survives - the species which we say survives, is a concept whose reality in matter at any time is 
only through the physical individual members who ultimately do not survive. The reality of 'the 
species' outside material form, is abstract. Only in as much as a member's identity is with the 
abstract thing called the species does that member 'survive'. No individual member passes from 
death to birth, but births continue to arise. By analogy, in reincarnation, only in as much as the 
identity of a 'soul' is not with a given 'incarnation', but with the great process in which nothing 
'survives', governed by harmonia and the Fates, does the notion of 'survival' in continual 
incarnations, have any meaning. To put it another way, only when a soul enjoys a state of 
consciousness in which nothing survives, and in which reincarnation is obvious, but an illusion, 
does reincarnation have any truth in it. Where there is no such consciousness, there is only the 
notion of survival from one birth to the next, and no truth in it. 
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Diagram 3 : 
The nature of the Pythagorean Circle and its relationship to harmony can be used as a 
symbol in a more extended context than that related to musical scales. Each element round this 
circle in diagram 3 now represents a concept in thought. Everything round the circle is related to 
everything else, either round the circle or along the straight lines of connection. Like the Great 
Circle of fifths, it is a diagram of a harmonia, in the sense that something fits it all together, but 
here, the harmonia fits together the concepts in thinking. It is a harmonia of thought - of 
understanding in human thought. The diagram could equally well have had any number of 
elements. The twelve it has are not special. The diagonals connect conceptual pairs or opposites, as 
I have presented them in this discourse, but this is not important. 
The harmonia the circle represents can be whatever ' temperament', that is, theory, science 
or philosophy, that thinking applies to the conceptual elements- it depends on the philosopher, the 
scientific theories, or the chosen arguments. All kinds of conceptual equivalents of ' commas' may 
be introduced as a result of the way the concepts relate, sometimes confirmed by observation of 
natural phenomena - all kinds of puzzles, paradoxes and problems - but that part of the universe 
itself, the part the Circle purports to represent, like the natural harmonic series, has, so to speak, no 
' problem' or ' puzzle' in itself. 
The whole thing is a diagram of thinking relationships between the elements. We can say it 
is the human brain that does this thinking- but we can also view that as only one of many working 
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hypotheses, given the complexity and variety of object-orientated theoretical possibilities for 
explaining things like consciousness, human intelligence and thought. We can just as validly say, 
from the subject-orientated point of view, that it is self that thinks. 
So the whole thing is a diagram of something self does. It is a diagram of all the elements, 
the relationship between the concepts, from the point of view of self. What I said above could 'not 
be drawn' ·the absence of self- could be diagrammatically 'drawn' as the disappearance of this 
diagram. This might seem rather Zen, but it is not Zen, because unlike Zen I have more to say about 
what it means, but it certainly shares with Zen a relationship to what is intelligible, but 
unapproachable through rational thinking. 
The disappearance of the diagram would not necessarily mean the disappearance of self, 
but it would represent the disappearance of the self thinking. The disappearance of the diagram 
would represent the disappearance of the elements as concepts, like the disappearance of the 
implied scale design and its notes from a vanishing Great Circle. The harmonic series behind the 
notes of a scale still remains in nature as a natural 'structure' when all scales and Circles made in 
human thought vanish, but this remaining 'structure' is not the same thing as the notes of any scale 
or temperament- it is just the natural harmonic series. If we now, metaphorically speaking, jump to 
the next octave, the 'structure' I am proposing to which the concepts round the circle actually 
correlate, still remains when the diagram vanishes and the thinking stops. But this 'structure', 
again, is not 'made' of the concepts, just as at the lower metaphorical octave the natural harmonic 
series is not made from the temperament or scale. The structure the circle represents is not 
necessarily an objective thing, but we objectify it in thinking, because we necessarily make it a 
concept-structure in order to think about it. 
Let us say that in principle we could put round the circle all the concepts we need to map 
out the entire universe conceptually. It would have to include things like mind, consciousness, 
gravity, self, life, quantum, love, matter, death etc, and unless the harmonia, so to speak, really was 
a 'theory of life the universe and everything' we would expect some connecting lines to have zero 
'knowability'. Again, this would be a concept-structure, but one that is supported never more than a 
part at a time by actual observation. The whole conceptualised universe, is never observable at 
once. 
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The very term 'whole universe', meaning absolutely and completely everything, is a 
presumption in the first instance. It begins as a concept in thought, and then ends as a concept in 
thought. In between, it is partially supported by observations of the behaviour of parts, but the 
conviction that there is such a thing and that we should gather data on the basis of this presumption 
is only psychological in the first instance- the object in thought named 'the universe' as implying 
the inclusion of the unobserved, the possibly unobservable, the unknown, and the possibly 
unknowable, is a proposition, not a fact. It is felt to be the 'logical' extension of the immediate 
world perceived by self-consciousness occupying a world of not-self, but it can only be only 
presumed in thought, that such a thing is either known now, or remotely knowable. 
The word 'universe', as we know, means everything turned into one, and in object-
orientated thinking this is a thought, a concept, named 'the universe', that is equivalent to fii, the 
Universal Set, the concept in mathematical thinking. The whole process works as follows: 
As soon as we think about 'the universe' we instigate object-orientation- the object called 
'the universe' is literally instantiated in thinking. Having instantiated the object we can talk about 
its properties and 'methods' etc. In this respect the analogy with object-orientated computer 
programming is quite close. The actual instantiation of the object in thinking can be observed in 
practice, at the moment thinking about the universe begins. It may begin as an 'empty' object with 
no properties, on some suggestion like 'let's think about the universe', or it may begin with all 
kinds of pre-conceived ideas as its properties and 'methods' etc. It may or may not include the 
thinking subject. The critical step is the tacit ascription of the unique property fii, which is that the 
object 'the universe' has the property of being the set of everything. We do not have to take this 
step, but generally, if we are employing critical thinking, we do. 
The concept fii, is 'intuitively compelling' in thinking, and arises, let us say, as an extension 
of a subconscious knowledge from practical experience, which when made conscious is the notion 
of sets. The basic relational principles of sets, seem to be an incontrovertible pillar of reason itself. 
However we now know that the principles of sets inevitably contain antinomies such as Bertrand 
Russell's famous paradox, and that sets are not an axiomatic foundation for a system of certainty, 
even after a theory is formalised in a way that attempts to avoid antinomies. 
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We can observe the mind in action, that is, in the action of object-orientated thinking. 
Consider the Russell paradox itself. We define an R set as a set of sets that includes itself. For 
example, the set of all objects describable in exactly eleven English words is an R set.421 Now we 
define a set M as the set of all possible sets except the R sets. Now we ask is M an R set? 
It is not the paradox that is important here, it is the observation of what the mind does as it 
attempts to 'work out' the answer to that last question, and the quicker it answers, the quicker one 
has to be to see it in action. I am assuming one tackles the problem as one of 'intuitive logic' and 
not as one of mere algebraic operation. Even if one already knows the answer, it is necessary to 
actually watch what the mind does in checking out the answer again. The action of the logical 
process in the thinking, takes place in a pre-existing 'logical space' in this part of the human mind, 
in which this kind of thinking logic 'makes sense'. One needs to watch it. Once observed in action, 
the process could almost be called mechanical. 
The process of creating the concept 'the universe' to mean absolutely everything (rather 
than just the observable cosmos), is observable as another process, but one that happens in the 
same, or similar 'logical space', with a similar mechanicalness. This logical space is in the mind, 
determining 'reason' and 'what makes sense', in the current field of thought-objects. The mind, 
connected with the brain, connected with the physical senses, connected with the animal, 
evolutionary body, is connected with existence and survival in the sense-perceived physical world, 
and so there is a certain correlation between the 'rules' of this logical space and the 'rules' of local 
phenomena in the sense-perceived physical world. This logical space we can observe in 
consciousness, is part of self. The sense-perceived physical world for the survival purposes of the 
evolutionary animal is not-self. The experience of this state of affairs in human self-consciousness 
is a duality between self thinking in logical space, and the sense-perceived physical world of not-
self. 
Human enquiry into natural phenomena is a process that uses experiment, study, education 
and learning. Through these we change our concept structures and thinking methods in logical 
space, and attempt to improve their correlation with natural phenomena. Study, education and 
learning shortcuts the need to repeat the experience that produced the information now available for 
421 Davies, JD; Hersh, R, The Mathematical Experience, Middlesex, UK, 1981, p. 332. 
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learning. At the same time this has been a process towards emphasis on object-orientation, and 
elimination of self from the enquiry. This has the effect of putting an increasing p~ychical distance 
between logical space and other aspects of self, so that conscious attention can generally only be in 
one or the other. Thus mathematical thought appears abstract and 'objective', and not related to 
say, emotional self and thinking consideration in this area. This is an illusion due to this psychical 
distance, because emotions, emotional thinking and syllogistic logical thinking are all proximate in 
self, all being part of selfs activity. Nevertheless mathematical thinking does take place in logical 
space remote from the space pertaining to say, emotional thinking. 
This psychical distance is necessary. Without a good psychical distance between logical 
space and the rest of self, logical space becomes easily infected by other aspects of self, especially 
emotion. So without this distance, the rational and reasonable nature of logical space becomes 
corrupted by active emotions, and the capacity to think rationally and reasonably is lost. Perhaps 
because of a sun,ival advantage offered by the capacity to think rationally and reasonably despite 
emotional activity, the potential in us to increase this psychical distance through applied effort, 
exists in us in the first instance. 
Homo sapiens, the physical animal with the amazing brain, the vehicle of self-conscious 
self, is itself, brain and all, a part of the sense-perceived physical world from which, so to speak, it 
is actually made. There is only one physical system, one set of matter, one set of natural 
phenomena, but there is duality of self and not self, from the subject-orientated position. From the 
point of view of the universe, there is no such duality. 
Logical space can be explored away from the physical senses, 'in the abstract', which 
really means in thinking. Thinking is not really abstract at all, we only think it is. Thinking takes 
place in self (which is not 'abstract' at all) including this kind of thinking in logical space that 
instantiates objects of thinking, and assists the thinking processes by using symbols to stand for the 
objects, as in mathematics. The 'rules' of logical space then become 'externalised' in symbols, and 
logical space can be explored beyond its natural presentation in sensory experience. So it is we can 
explore things like the topological properties of 'exotic spheres' with multiple dimensions, that we 
have never experienced except in remote logical space. It seems that the contents of this part of 
logical space are 'abstract', - that we discover them outside self, through this tool called 
mathematics that is outside self, that deals with what some mathematicians think of as an abstract 
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'Platonic Reality' (Plato never said Reality was mathematical, or abstract. What he said was 
that Reality is Being). 
What we actually do is externalise or 'discover' what is inherently already present, but 
unrealised, in unbounded logical space in the mind. Because what we learn, has been externalised 
through the process of accumulative objectification (mathematical and conceptual 'discovery' over 
thousands of years), we first consciously encounter it in the objectified external form, usually 
expressed in object-symbols like those of mathematics, and think it is absolutely not-self. The truth 
is, that as long as we understand it, it is just as much self as it is not-self. Otherwise it is nothing 
more than a lot of meaningless symbols. 
Now the 'universe' that my Circle of concepts, or any nexus of concepts represents, 
consists of facts and relationships in logical space, but this logical space is as much a part of self as 
a part of not-self. Neither exotic spheres or quantum phenomena 'break the rules' of logical space, 
which is well separated from the rest of self. They are both logically sound. Quantum phenomena is 
perfectly consistent with mathematical logic. But this logic is the logic of remote logical space, 
space well psychically distanced from the rest of self. Exotic spheres in logical space do not (as far 
as I know at the time of writing) correlate to physical phenomena, but at some time they may, 
because logical space and physical phenomena are all part of the same, single system, and there are 
many examples of esoteric areas of pure mathematics subsequently finding application in physical 
science and thus becoming better known. Quantum theory however does correlate to quantum 
phenomena. Quantum phenomena is observable by self, as a part of not-self, but not directly 
through the senses. It is observable in phenomena through its effects, through apparatus, which is in 
correlation with thinking in lower (not remote) logical space, space that correlates well to everyday 
phenomena in the world of animal survival. Exactly the same thing can be said of Relativity 
Theory, which occupies a different part of remote logical space. Quanta, large gravitational fields, 
and things moving close to light velocity, have not been pertinent in the scenario of sense-
perception and animal evolution. This is something to which only lower logical space is required to 
correlate. The so-called 'collapse of the wave function' in relation to quantum theory is actually a 
'quantum jump' from remote logical space to lower logical space. 
The lower 'logical space' correlates to the world as presented through the animal senses 
but with no appreciable psychical separation from the rest of self-space. Its 'logic', the 'logic' of 
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thinking in it, correlates to the logic of local natural phenomena, but it is also the native space of 
the 'logic' of the self to not-self relationship. This 'logic' is mutable, depending on the emotional 
and psychological condition of self. This is a most unreliable space, in which even the perception 
of the nature of natural phenomena is easily distorted. Only to the degree to which the 'logic' of the 
self to not-self relationship is distanced or absent does thinking in logical space become less 
troublesome, tricky, and liable to mislead. The greatest distancing is achieved by thinking in 
remote logical space, and externalising the 'logic' in algebraic symbols. However, this all still takes 
place in logical space, which is still in self. The whole scenario, the whole 'world' that is being 
'understood' is a 'universe' of logical space accessible only in the evolutionary mind, and natural 
physical phenomena. 
This is not yet evetything, because there is also the rest of psychical space, in self. In a 
sense, if we want to say that animals think, then we can say they do so in a 'logical space' that 
pertains to the 'logic' of animal behaviour, survival, etc. This psychical space exists as an 
underlying area in our own psyche to the extent to which the human brain includes the animal past 
in its structure. However, because we humans have self-consciousness, we also have the area of 
psychical space pertaining to our own 'self-logic', the 'logic' of self-conscious self that the animals 
do not have. This is the 'logic' of human psychical self, the 'logic' of the world of persons. 
'Person' is our rational word for human psychical self. The 'logical space' of the person is at its 
base, the 'logic' of animal self in the world of survival 'projected' or raised into the higher 
psychical space created by our ability for self-reflection - the space of self-consciousness. Its 
principles are an 'image' of those in the lower logical space that serve the world of animal survival. 
One of the effects of this is that all kinds of scenarios and behaviours that occur in the world of 
animal competition for survival, now occur again in the uniquely human world of persons. 
However, here it is no longer just the survival of the animal that is being served, but the survival of 
the person, the human psychical self. The world of persons is operating on a bed of principles 
derived from those pertaining to the survival of animals in the wild, but it becomes complicated by 
self-consciousness and our ability to think in higher logical spaces. This thinking is often used as a 
tool in the struggle for survival of the person, against the competition of other persons, as quite 
distinct from survival of the body. This might manifest climactically as what is colloquially called a 
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battle of egos, but really, ego, literally meaning the individual 'I' necessary for the body's 
protection, is not the cause. The cause is self. 
Not all of these logical spaces are remote like the logical space of mathematics. There is, 
for example, the 'logic of law', not the laws of natural phenomena, which pertain to a more remote 
logical space, but human laws, both unwritten sociological 'laws' and fonnal statutes. The 'logic' 
of the nature of this space is of course related to higher logical space, but at the same time its 
nature is so different to that of remote 'logical space' in which we think about pure mathematical 
problems, that it can hardly be called 'logical' at all. It is the 'logic' of the collective world relative 
to self-reference, self interest and self protection. In it, the 'logical' relationship of self and not-self 
is highly pertinent. 
Then there is the 'logic' of dreamstuff- only very partially does it correlate to natural 
physical phenomena, and sometimes not at all. Deeper down even all concepts and objecls 
disappear, and there are only presences or 'energies', the stuff of nightmares or ecstasies. In object-
orientation we would call this deep brain phenomena, the phenomena of the subconscious or id. 
From the subject-orientated position, it is just what it is experienced to be. In here, the 'psychical 
distance' from lower self we achieved in remote logical space is lost, although the 'dream' image 
of it can remain - we can do algebra in a dream but the results may not correlate so well. We are 
now immersed in self. All this, from the very remote to the unconscious id is the only 'universe' we 
can conceive and think about. Even the conception of God or any 'other world', or the thinking 
about it, is all in !his 'universe', this 'set of everylhing'. 
Diagram 3 is an object in logical space. The fonn of my diagram may not truly represent 
how the concepts of the nexus would be related for describing a given aspect of the universe. 
However, we could say the general fonn of the diagram is F. F may even be non-integral, 
unrepresentable or unknown or unknowable, for we do not necessarily know in thought the fonn or 
complexity of our own concept-structures and mechanisms of thinking. The 'structure' that lies 
behind F, the 'structure' that is independent ofF, is a part of whatever it is that we give the object 
name 'the universe'. We could 'object-orientate' it, objectify it, give it a symbol, and call it UP" Up 
does not 'exist in logical space', or include things like Euclidean space, Hilbert space or 
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Relativistic space-time, because these are all parts of the object-orientated concept-structure. It 
does not exist in any kind of mathematical space which makes sense in the processes of thinking. 
Without the diagram, the space in which this 'structure' Up still exists, is the space I have 
called perception, that distils in the subject, from the disappearing need of experience, and the 
consequent disappearing need of thinking as a process with which to try to work it all out. The 
relationship of the subject-orientated universe to the object-orientated concepts used in describing 
and understanding the universe in human thinking, would then be like the relationship of the 
Beauty of the harmonic series to notes in objective scale tunings or temperaments. It would also be 
like the relationship of Socrates' knowledge, to the apparent flow of thinking in the Socratic 
dialogues. This Up is the universe that is appearing as both macrocosm and microcosm. 
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Chapter 12 - Symbols of macrocosm-microcosm correspondence 
An object-orientated macrocosm-microcosm ' correspondence' 
The concept of a whole (macrocosm) that contains parts (microcosm) that themselves 
contain the image of the whole, is encountered in an object-orientated way in fractals . The well 
known Mandelbrot set figure is an example of fractal geometry: 
The figure is actually a mathematical mapping of a set of complex number values on the complex 
plane, so in principle the figure itself has no limit of resolution determined by reprographical 
considerations like rastor (pixels per cm). ln principle it is possible to 'zoom in ' on any part and 
examine it in more detail. In practice this is achieved by computer regeneration of any chosen part. 
lt is already possible to see that the whole set contains parts that look rather like the whole set 
itself. A close-up of one particular area between two dark areas looks like this: 
Again, the ' buds ' on the side of the large curves resemble the entire set. Many examples of fractal 
geometry also occur in nature, and are frequently seen in sea and plant life where fractal spirals are 
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common. This kind of microcosm-macrocosm relationship exists in logical space but is one 
sided- it is object-orientated only. The figures above are object-orientated diagrams of an object-
orientated relationship between quantities. A diagram conceived from the subject-orientated point 
of view would be in essence, quite different, even though it might be presented in terms of object-
orientated relationships between the objects that appear in it. We come next to this kind of diagram. 
Subject-orientated correspondence 
The macrocosm-microcosm relationship that provides for the relationship of music with 
perception that this discourse has explored, is a relationship in logical space, but it is of a different 
kind, because it is fundamentally subject-orientated. The relationship of microcosm to macrocosm 
from the subject-orientated position can also be drawn in diagrams, and was, by the neo-Platonists. 
We look at an example here by Robert Fludd: 
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This is one of a number of diagrams by Robert Fludd (1574-1637), from his Histmy of the 
Macrocosm and Microcosm .422 Fludd is one of many proponents of Christian esoteric spirituality 
including Origen, Hildegard, Eckhart, Ficino, Boehme, Emerson and Steiner.423 
422 Utriusque Cosmi majoris scilicet et Minoris Metaphysica, Physica Atque Technica Historia ... , Tomus 
Secundus De Supernatural;, Naturali, Praetematurali Et Contranaturali Microcosmi historia, in Tractatus 
tres distributa, Oppenheim, 1619, p. 275. 
423 Godwin, J, Robert Fludd, op. cit., p. 19. 
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This is a diagram with metaphysical meaning that appears to show how the macrocosm 
is contained within the microcosm. At the top of the diagram is the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, the 
mystical (and unpronounceable) Word or Logos. From it extends a harmonising monochord string 
through the 'light microcosm' (consciousness, knowledge), down to the bottom of the 'dark 
microcosm' (relatively unconscious matter). The legs are a 'mass of microcosmic earth ... by which 
the universe is supported at right angles'. The microcosm is encompassed by three concentric 
spheres corresponding to the Empyrean, Aetherial and Elemental heavens (c.f. Philolaus' three 
suns). The sun and heart divide the aetherial microcosm on their clockwise paths. The 'light 
microcosm' is proportioned (right relationship) as the harmonic proportions of the monochord. 
The node points on the monochord correlate to the same positions on the body associated 
with the chakras (psychic centres in which the attention is immersed in Buddhist, Hindu, and other 
forms of meditation), except that the Eastern chakras include the Mu/adhara chakra at the base of 
the spine and the Swathisthana chakra at the genitals, whereas in Fludd 's diagram there is a single 
point at C. The relationship between the Sun and Heart (at the heart position, the Anahata chakra) 
is one that occurs in Western astrology. There is a certain amount of confusion over Sun, heart, and 
positions represented in the external body, both in Fludd and between more modem systems like 
theosophy and Eastern tradition. The Manipura chakra is sometimes located at the navel and 
sometimes at the Solar Plexus, but navel and Solar Plexus are always two distinct centres with 
distinct associations and qualities. We could also ask 'why is the Sun not associated with the Solar 
Plexus'? 
We are dealing here with a quasi-science and as is also the case with astrology, this means 
the understanding of the quasi-science should not be solely object-orientated. If there is any truth at 
all in the representation, it is not supposed to lie in the informational objects. The centre of this 
system of concepts is not an object - it is the subject, the microcosm, which in external sensory 
form appears as the material symbol -the body in the diagram. 
The diagram is not specifically about the effects of harmony (and music) on the psyche, but 
it demonstrates in diagrammatical form the means, which is that the microcosm already 'contains' 
the macrocosm. What appears as a cause in the macrocosm is already in the microcosm itself. The 
correspondence is not the mere correlation of symbols, any more than is Schopenhauer's 
representation (Vorste//ung). The microcosm is self, and as Fludd depicts in the diagram, it is an 
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ascent of self-consciousness from Nox Microcosmica upward to the unnameable Absolute or 
One, the Tetragramrnaton always above even the highest Dies Microcosmicus. The self-conscious 
microcosm, harmonised in this ascent by the monochord of the Tetragrammaton that holds it all 
together and draws the microcosm up towards itself, aspires in the ascent, to become the conscious 
macrocosm, the Tetragramrnaton. 
The harmonic proportions between the clzakras represent 'harmony in the microcosm', and 
if this seems rather abstract, it is only because the diagram does not explicitly state in words what is 
implicit in it. The clzakras, the positions on the body and the monochord, are not part of abstract 
theory but are practical positions used for conscious entry into the psyche (the microcosm) in many 
meditation practices. Every instance of psyche begins with a body-brain system, through which the 
subconscious and unconscious is naturally entered in every case, in a cycle corresponding to the 
rotation of the Earth (or Sun, if you use a geocentric system), in sleep. Thus we can see without any 
kind of esoteric meditation practice that our ordinary knowledge and encountering of psyche 
already corresponds to the celestial system in some way. The 'psychic centres' or chakras as 
positions inside the body into which attention can be immersed, are foci for conscious entry into 
the psyche 'through the body', whereas in sleep attention withdraws away from the externally 
focused senses and into the body, in a manner of 'freefall' so to speak, that allows mental and 
dream activity to take over. 
This aspect of the diagram is not in itself mystical. There is nothing 'mystical' about sleep, 
nor is there about the fact that one can make a similar descent of awareness into the body, 
consciously, without allowing dream activity to occur. In Eastern disciplines the relationships 
between chakras are in terms of such things as mantric vibrations, elements, colours, etc. Fludd's 
labelling of the relationships between these centres in terms of the octave, perfect fifth and perfect 
fourth, indicates a relationship of musical harmony and psyche, according to his own discipline of 
esoteric spirituality, and no doubt, his own neo-Platonic beliefs. 
The diagram as a whole is Fludd's description of the microcosm being one with the 
macrocosm. This correlates to the non-duality of subject and universe in Eastern religion and 
meditation disciplines, such as advaita. However, the diagram is a form that is itself object-
orientated in appearance to the degree that it can even be mistaken for a theory of objective 
structure. Fludd's expression of his 'theology' in diagrams and symbols, many of which contain 
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quantification, led to his dispute with Kepler, in which Fludd said he held the head of 
knowledge, whilst Kepler with his scientific quantification, held only the tail.424 More poetical 
expressions ofFludd's philosophy appear in his Tractatus Theologo-Philosophicus.425 
424 See Pauli, W, 'The influence of archetypal ideas on the scientific theories of Kepler', in CG Jung & Pauli 
W, The inte1pretation of nature and the psyche, London, 1955. 
425 Fludd, R, Tractatus Theo/ogo-Philosophicus, Oppenheim, 1617. 
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Chapter 13 - Further contemporary considerations on the macrocosm-
microcosm 
Reality 
The questions raised in the earlier discussion about the implications of quantum theory 
regarding 'reality' can now be re-assessed. Bohm's 'multidimensional reality' is an object in 
thinking. We can approach this, and the situation regarding the interpretation of quantum theory, in 
another way. 
Let us return to Bohm's question about thinking and reality. Bohm asked: 
What is the relationship of thinking to reality? As careful 
attention shows, thought itself is in an actual process of 
movement. That is to say, one can feel a sense of flow in the 
'stream of consciousness' not dissimilar to the sense of flow 
in the movement of matter in general. May not thought itself 
thus be part of reality as a whole?426 
Bohm is talking here about thinking as a mentation - a deliberate mental contemplation 
and cogitation over a problem. This thinking, like the endeavour of science, is object-orientated, 
even though it reflects on the selfs activity of thinking. This means the 'reality' in Bohm's last 
sentence is an object in thought. But it also means trying to use thinking to see behind thinking, and 
it cannot be done. It is like trying to make stillness through movement. Referring to this same 
thinking, one subject-orientated answer to Bohm's question is as follows: 
'Reality as a whole', includes thought and self. The relationship of thinking to reality is 
that any such 'whole reality' that thinking can know, includes the thinker thinking about it. This 
'reality' is never fully understood as a whole, unless that understanding includes understanding the 
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thinker. Trying to understand the thinker by first understanding this so-called 'reality as a 
whole' that arises in thinking, is a tail-chasing exercise. It is like trying to understand the computer 
code writer, through the code itself. What is needed is not a concept of 'reality as a whole' but self-
knowledge of the nature of thinking. 
Bohm's 'careful attention' that he mentions, and what it reveals about thought and 
movement, is not itself a product of his thinking. It is a form of his self-knowledge. If Bohm had 
realised this, he would have realised that thinking is not necessary for the solution to the question. 
Also, his description lacks accuracy. It is thought that self-evidently flows, not consciousness. 
Consciousness is not thought. Cogito ergo sum does not mean I am because I think. It does not 
mean consciousness is thinking. The closest ally the thinker has to knowledge of consciousness, is 
knowledge of self. The 'stream of consciousness' to which Bohm refers, is actually a stream of 
thought, and the similarity of its 'flow' to the movement of matter in general is because both 
happen in time. Time is fundamental to the nature of physical reality, or existence, as presented to 
the evolutionary brain. The only 'reality as a whole', as Bohm calls it, that thinking can know, must 
still include time and self, and thus movement, even if only as the thinker thinking it. Only if 
thinking stopped and self ceased could we get beyond this. 
As I have proposed, the only thing available to us outside the evolutionary survival system 
of which we are a part is the intellect. Only the concept of the intellect, the object instantiated in 
thinking, is part of the thinker and thinking. The intellect itself has to be discovered, not deduced in 
thinking. While approached through thinking, it is being used without being discovered. It is a 
'quantum jump' from the evolutionary part of intelligence associated with the animal brain of the 
species, to direct perception of the intellect through the medium of the phenomena that the intellect 
itself produces, without the need of any movement of thinking in logical space. 
My suggestion about how this can happen, has been simply presented as follows: It 
happens through experience, which is subject-orientated. The only subject-orientated reality we 
know is the reality of experience. The perception I am talking about·begins to arise when the need 
to experience is sufficiently reduced by having passed through sufficient experience in time, in the 
physical. 
426 Bohm, D, Wholeness and the lmp/ica/e Order, London, 1980, p. ix. 
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All the noise about 'reality' is really nothing more than entertainment. The emphasis in 
Bohm's discussion is about the 'reality' of the world, or what is observed. What we should be 
doing is questioning the assumed 'reality' of the observer. The 'observer' is self, and from the point 
of view of the evolutionary intelligence identified as self, what this intelligence is studying in 
physics is 'not-self. The concept of the duality of 'observer' and 'observed' is an object-orientated 
description of the evolutionary experience of self and not-self. It is, in effect, a concept produced 
by an evolutionary brain-body system, based on its experience of its own existence in the 
evolutionary world. This is no way to understand the impersonal, natural world as a whole, which 
is what science is aiming at, because from the point of view of the impersonal, natural world as a 
whole, this duality of self and not-self is non-existent. 
Why should we be uncomfortable with knowing that the world is non-local, such that there 
can be instantaneous communication between parts? Only because the theory of relativity forbids 
it. If relativity is 'correct', then, says Gribbin, the world is not 'independent of the observer'. Why 
should we be uncomfortable with this? Only because it means that if the observer disappears, the 
world disappears also, and that seems to conflict with our understanding of the world. It does not 
actually conflict with simple, subject-orientated experience, in which the world does disappear 
when the observer disappears into deep dreamless sleep. The conceptual problem arises because of 
the way Gribbin, and we, think. We think the way the evolutionary survival system has made us 
think and experience, that is, egocentrically, as self in a world that is not-self, which when we 
conceptualise and objectify this in thought, becomes the duality of a) 'the observer' and b) the 
world that is 'independent of the observer'. 
If relativity is 'correct' then we must put the conclusion the other way around, with 
'observer' first. We must give up the 'logical' need of self or 'observer' to be independent of the 
world. We must say the observer is not independent of the world, which is simply that self and 
world are one system. Now the original statement that 'the universe is not independent of the 
observer', is the same thing as saying the observer is not independent of the universe. 
We feel this explains nothing and does not address 'the problem of consciousness' because 
we demand special status for our consciousness, and consider that the mineral universe, for 
example, is not conscious. Out of our own knowledge from experience we quite rightly demand 
this special status, but for the wrong reasons. Our consciousness does have a special status in the 
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universe but this special status does not lie in any fact of us being independent of the universe, 
or the universe being independent of us. That is not a consequence of consciousness - it is a 
consequence of evolutionary self-consciousness. 
The notion of a 'real world out there', implying a duality of self here and not-self there, is 
meaningless except from the evolutionary egocentric point of view, where it is important in the 
system of conflict, survival and hence evolution, in time. In physics there is no 'real world out 
there', there are just the mathematical facts and physical phenomena with which physics deals. 
The world of phenomena that we can perceive and study in physics is not 'real', nor is it 
'unreal'. The judgement of 'reality' is not a part of the remit of physics. The world of phenomena 
creates the evolutionary human subject, the observer, the self, which then thinks it is independent of 
the world, and gets disturbed when the nature of the world suggests that it is not. It then invents the 
concepts 'real' and 'unreal', based on its evolutionary ego position, and applies them to the world. 
But as Wittgenstein said, the thinking, presenting, subject, there is no such thing.427 Only in self-
knowledge can the subject, observer, or self, discover what is unreal about itself- only here does 
'real' and 'unreal' have any meaning. Only from here comes the knowledge that our consciousness 
does have special status in the universe. 
In relation to the interpretation of quantum theory 'Reality' is the name of an object we 
have invented. When we question the sense perceived macro-scale world to ask if it is 'reality', we 
are testing the sense perceived world against an object called 'reality' that so far has no properties 
different to what we are testing. Unless, that is, we have given 'reality' the property 'not-self, and 
have also given 'not-self the property of persisting in time when not observed by my self. If we do 
this, then quantum particles must be called 'not real'. The macro-scale world behaves perfectly in 
accordance with this persistence when not observed, and so must be called 'real'. And yet the 
macro-world is supposed to be made from quantum particles. The reason for this apparent 
discrepancy is simply that we are approaching what is, through thinking about it, in inappropriate 
logical space, rather than using the intellect. 
427 Wittgenstein, L, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.631. 
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Beyond thinking- the Intellect 
Thinking, of course, is not necessarily an a priori process. The relationship between 
objects in thinking is not necessarily a priori in nature. However, if thinking makes sense, then the 
sense comes from the relationship between the objects of thought. The relationship between the 
objects is the 'logical space' of thinking. When what we think about does not make sense, the 
relationship between the objects does not conform to the current logical space of thinking, 'set up' 
buy other object relationships, or previous object relationships. We do not normally think a tree can 
be in two places at once - it does not make sense. The logical space of thinking we are using here is 
founded on the logical space of the material world. If, hypothetically, we could find a logical space 
of thinking in which it makes sense for a tree to be in two places at once, our understanding of the 
material world would have changed. The change from accepted geocentricity from heliocentricity, 
against the logical space of religious and political conviction (for at the time the Church was of 
course a political force), was most important as a change in the logical space of thinking. The 
universe did not change, in retrospect. However, the universe did change. The nature of the 
universe as we know it is only ever how we conceive it in the current logical space of thinking. We 
can never know what it is beyond this, unless the universe has some meaning beyond thinking. 
The deductive process can of course only explore what follows a priori from what is 
already presented to intelligence. A priori reasoning is a limited method of extending knowledge of 
logical space from what is already known. Even in science operating in remote logical space, we 
have to break out of this limitation. So in science, it is not always deduction, but also postulation 
that is important, as in the case with the wave equation of quantum theory, which cannot be derived 
from the evidence but has to be postulated. Once postulated it leads to a theory of real predictive 
power.428 Philosophical statements cannot necessarily be tested empirically like scientific 
postulates, or judged on the basis of their predictive power. Nevertheless statements in philosophy 
are frequently not derived a priori from what is already known, and do not necessarily have to 
agree with what is already considered tenable by consensus. 
Schopenhauer's T11e world is my representation is an example of such a statement, but one 
that requires considerable 'explanation'. Other statements seem not to need 'explanation' because 
they are 'intuitively compelling'. We have, however, no certainty that what is 'intuitively 
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compelling' is not misleading. Another measure of philosophical assertions is whether they are 
true in our experience. Descartes' cogito ergo sum follows a priori from experience, and seems to 
be straightforward and compelling. However, as is often the case, all it not what it seems. As stated 
earlier, cogito ergo sum does not mean I am because I think. It means I think therefore I am. It is 
the deduction of being from the fact that there is thinking taking place. This does not necessarily 
make thinking the cause of being. If thinking is not the cause of being then it might be possible to 
discover being without thinking. Discovery is not the same thing as deduction. This being is not 
necessarily dependent upon thinking. If however thinking is the cause of the being that thinking 
deduces, then this being is dependent upon thinking. And so on. Cogito ergo swn is not as 
straightforward as it seems.429 
Wittgenstein 's Tractatus logico-philosophicus begins with the statement The world is all 
that is also 'intuitively compelling', but not necessarily as straightforward an axiom as it seems. 
The Tractatus concludes that the 'problems of philosophy' expressed in language evaporate into 
the problems of language, limited by the logic of thinking and the logic of language. I now refer to 
the Tractatus because despite certain conflicts, I see its conclusion as being in essence concurrent 
with this thesis. The difference is that whilst the Tractatus asserts we should remain silent on the 
issues with which I deal, I have not remained silent, but like many others, speak of them. In this 
sense I go beyond the Tractatus but still respect its conclusion that the logic of thinking is limiting. 
To a great extent thinking in logical space prevents discovery. We need to include discovery in 
philosophy. 
Language should be a servant in communication. The same is true of thought, which it is 
possible to use to communicate what does not require a priori thinking to reach. The entire lexicon 
is a finite set of words with the consequence that there is a vast but finite number of word 
combinations and pemmtations that obey the logic of language. Any word can only be defined 
using other words. This does not mean that what language can communicate is finite and ultimately 
428 Greenhow, RC, Introductory quantum mechanics, Bristol, 1990, p. 17. 
429 What Descartes declared as the single, indubitable starting point for philosophy, 'I think therefore I exist', 
appeared in the Discourse published in French in 1637. It was not untill644 that the Latin version was 
published at Amsterdam. In Principles of Philosophy published in Latin in 1644, Descartes states (Part I, 9) 
"By the term 'thought', I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, ins far as we 
have awareness of it..." Retrospectively we can say Descartes' meaning was 'I am aware therefore I am', or 
even 'I am aware that I am aware, therefore I am'. This effectively means that Descartes was saying: "The 
indubitable starting point of my philosophy is that I am", which is not a deduction at all. This does not 
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nothing more than recursive in terms of the lexicon. Meaning is apprehendable from the context 
of word usage rather than from the 'logical' structure of what is said. Language does not paint a 
picture of the world, it paints a picture of how we interpret the world presented to our intelligence, 
and that interpretation and intelligence is part of psyche. Language is primarily an indication of the 
nature of psyche. 
Wittgenstein concluded in the Tractatus that 'the philosophical I' is not a part of the world. 
In the terminology of this thesis, that means the 'the philosophical I' is 'not of this world'. This is 
why the philosophical I lies behind every endeavour of self to express through art, anything that is 
not merely a reiteration of the world. The philosophical I is the reflexive corollary of the intellect-
it is necessary before you can have an evolving intelligence that understands its world. In a manner 
of speaking, the world creates the philosophical I at the centre that comes to know the world, and 
then when it comes to knowledge of its self, sees through it. 
In column I below is a pertinent statement from Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Column 2 
contains a commentary on the statement, or an alternative that is consistent with this thesis. 
however provide that any thinking deduction following this is beyond doubt. See Descartes, R, The 
philosophical writings ofDescartes, op. cit., pp. 109-110; 127; 177; 195. 
I The world is everything, I. This defines 'the world' as everything. As a proposition it comes from what 
that is the case. amounts to informal, 'set logical' thinking. lt effectively defines 'The 
world' as the universal set, which is itself a conceptual object in the logical 
space of thinking. 
2. The whole world presented to intelligence includes everything in thought, 
and all our concepts. 
3. The concept of the universal set is part of the whole world presented to 
intelligence, but the whole world presented to intelligence is less than 
everything 'the universal set' is supposed to include. lt is supposed to 
include also what we do not know and cannot know - that which is not 
presented to intelligence. 
4. At any time, the whole world presented to our intelligence is only the 
totality of what we know and what we think we know (e.g. through sense 
and knowledge of logical space), plus the total of our conceptualisations of 
our ignorance. This is the whole world presented to intelligence at any time. 
5. The universal set cannot be formd anywhere outside the world presented to 
our intelligence. 
6. The world is everything presented to our intelligence, that is the case. 
7. What is not presented to our intelligence, is not of this world. lt is of a world 
we do not occupy, or do not yet occupy. 
8. There is no Kantian world 'in itself -the world is only a reflection of the 
condition of our collective knowing, made possible because of the one 
intellect, that cannot be deduced in thinking. 
9. Only when we break out of the condition of knowing, knowing through the 
world presented to intelligence, can we perceive what is not of this world. 
10. The intelligence to which this world is presented, is actually a condition of 
knowing that is maintained by the activity of thinking in evolutionary 
logical space. 
1.1 The world is the totality 1. 'Fact' is the name of a thought object"" we instantiate in the logical space 
of facts, not of things. 
430 See appendix. 
of thinking. The thought-object 'Fact' is always instantiated with the 
condition 'true'. 'There are no 'false' facts, only propositions purporting to 
be facts when they are not. 
2. Facts arc the class of relationships of objects and conditions in the world 
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presented to intelligence, that can be labelled 'true'. 
3. The label 'True' is a condition in the logical space of thinking. 
4. The logical space in which we think the 'fact' object and its 'true' condition 
is part of psyche. 
5. The facts of the world are relevant only to the relationship of psyche and 
world - not to a world without psyche. 
5.6 The limits of my I. The logic of language as used, reflects the nature of the logical space in 
language mean the limits of 
my world. 
5.621 The world and life arc 
one. 
which the mind using the language is operating. 
2. The logic of language or the evolutionary world, is only part of the logical 
space in which the mind can operate. 
3. The limits of language are not fixed by the logic of language. They are more 
like the limits of stone for the sculptor. The physical properties of stone are 
its logic. One cannot do with it what does not work physically - its physical 
limits are the limits of its logic. Despite this, stone is not limited by its logic, 
because it can convey something of the sculptor's world, and the sculptor's 
world is not limited by the limits of the world of stone. 
The world and life are one. We do not know how vast life is. The 
conception in the evolutionary mind of 'everything', is not a true conception 
of life, or the world. The world is the diminishing ignorance of life 
presented to evolutionary intelligence. 
5.63 I am my world (The 1. I always arise from what surrounds I. Only in the world am I the self in the 
microcosm). world. I always take my identity in the world from what is not what I am, 
but as I come to knowledge of this I sec through my self and by necessity 
the world then changes. Even in the microcosm this is true. Thus in both the 
microcosm and the macrocosm I am my diminishing self. The statement I 
am my world (The microcosm) just means I am my self. 
2. The macrocosm-microcosm correspondence of the ancients does not mean 
the microcosm is the representation of the macrocosm. It means the 
macrocosm is the microcosm presented to intelligence. Intelligence is 
always trying to connect with the intellect, through the impediment of 
thinking and self. 
3. Schopenhauer's position the world is my representation or The world is my 
will means the macrocosm is my self(the microcosm); what he calls Will is 
actually self and necessity. This is one 'quantum jump' above the position 
of evolutionary self-consciousness, but it is only the beginning, and not the 
end of the matter or the end of necessity as Schopenhauer presents it. When 
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5.631 The thinking, 
presenting subject, there is no 
such thing ... 
5.633 Where in the world is 
the metaphysical 
subjcct...? .... from nothing in 
the field of sight can it be 
concluded that it is seen from 
an eye. 
5.64 .. solipsism strictly 
carried out coincides with 
pure realism. The I in 
solipsism shrinks to an 
extcnsionless point and there 
remains the reality eo-
ordinated with it. 
I see the world is my will I have not yet escaped my se( f. The new closer 
proximity to the intellect reveals this, despite the fact that self and its 
attendant self-consciousness, the evolutionary thing, remains. 
This is true, as the intellect reveals. The thinking, presenting subject, is self. 
This self is part of the evolutionary self/not-self duality, which is a 
necessary function of the 'soil' out of which springs intelligence able to use 
the intellect, before realising the intellect. 
(Logically) the metaphysical subject, self, is 11ot a11ywhere in the world of 
not-self. In studying a world that is not-self, we find it does not exist there. 
Also, it is correct that self cannot be deduced (concluded) from the world of 
not-self (the field of sight). However, self does not need to be deduced from 
the world of not-self because it is already psychically substantial. It is this 
that creates the reality of experie11ce. 
The I in actual solipsism is not real because it is self. Solipsism is self 
declaring it is the only self. The 'I' in solipsism does not spontaneously 
'shrink to an extensionless point' because it is ego surrounded by self. The 
psychical reality ofsclfalways remains as a substantial body at the centre of 
the surrounding world-phenomena, unless it is escaped in some way. 
Solipsism is incorrect, but not because self cannot be concluded or deduced 
from the world of not-self (the field of sight). It is untrue, because despite 
selfs psychical substantiality, it is ultimately unreal, from the point of view 
of I, and even from the point of view of the pure ego, the evolutionary I. 
The I in solipsism, like the I in the person, could only shrink as a 
consequence of participation in the process in which nothing survives. What 
remains after the 'I' in the person shrinks, is the phenome11a co-ordinated 
with it. We cannot call this 'reality' because it is then seen to be the 
reflection in the intellect of the unreal self. 
5.641 The I occurs in 1. The I in philosophical thinking is self. It occurs because the experience of 
philosophy through the fact the world is 'my experience' of the world. 
that the "world is my world". 2. When 'philosophy' is a 'coming to knowledge of the process in which 
The philosophical I is not the 
man, not the human body or 
the human soul of which 
psychology treats, but the 
metaphysical subject, the 
limit - not a part of the 3. 
nothing survives' (including self) then the philosophical I is not self, and the 
second sentence is absolutely correct - I am in the world but not of it. 
Experience, even past experience, is then just experience, and not 'my' 
experience, even though I am still subject to it (because of my continuing 
self and enmeshment). 
If 'the philosophical I' means the deductive thinker, then what the second 
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world. sentence says, is not so, because the I is then in effect the Cartesian mind, 
which is not abstract, but part of self which is a psychically substantial part 
of the world. 
Thinking in logical space is intelligence operating in, or understanding the world or parts 
of it. Our intelligence thinking is evolutionary. 'Evolutionary' is a contemporary word that 
corresponds to the Platonic concept that this world is a world that is 'always becoming but never 
is', and happens in time. This is, ultimately, a process of intelligence moving towards knowledge of 
eternity or Reality (the intellect). In Plato Timaeus says that knowledge of the Reality, the eternal, 
changeless world that 'always is and never becomes', is reached through 'intelligence with the aid 
of reasoning' _431 However there is a confusion that arises because of the use of the word 'reason', 
with which I have already dealt. What Timaeus surely should have said, was that knowledge of it is 
reached through philosophy, which is what Plato's characters are supposed to be engaged in. 
Philosophy, as demonstrated both by what Socrates says, and in Plato's portrayal of Socrates and 
his life, is more than its exoteric expression in reasonable dialogue. Reason is not mere syllogistical 
thinking, but is better understood as that which transcends the soul's enmeshment in the 'world of 
becoming', which I have said is evolutionary and emotional self. This is the ability to observe 
directly in the intellect without evolutionary self, or at least the ability to think in logical space 
unaffected by the logic of the evolutionary self/not-self duality. In Timaeus all evolutionary beings 
in time are resemblances of the 'perfect Living Creature', which is the universe,432 but they live in a 
world of duality and multiplicity whereas the Being or the universe is One.433 In other words, all 
creatures are sel fs, but ultimately each is the universe, which Plato indicates is the one supreme 
Being. In this is implicit the macrocosm-microcosm correspondence. 
More than two thousand years before Hanslick, Plato said in Timaeus: 
... musical sound is given us for the sake of harmony, 
431 Plato, Timaeus, 28, in Timaeus and Critias, Tr. D Lee, London, 1965, 1977, p. 40. 
432 Plato, Timaeus, 31-40, Ibid., 43-55. 
433 Timaeus 31, Ibid., p. 43. 
which has motions akin to the orbits in our soul, 
and which, as anyone who makes intelligent use of the arts 
knows, is not to be used, as is commonly thought, to give 
irrational pleasure, but as a heaven-sent ally in reducing to 
order and harmony any disharmony in the revolutions within 
us ... 434 
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Timaeus's 'order and harmony' is psychical. What can 'disharmony in the revolutions 
within us' be other than disharmony, or disturbance of self? This may very well be physical 
disharmony as well as psychical. In my interpretation the reduction to 'order and harmony' 
amounts to the aligning of self with what is beyond it, through its dissolution, even if only 
temporarily. This dissolution is synonymous with the increasing presence of what I have called 
perception, associated with simultaneous detachment from, and involvement in, the world. Using 
music to give what Timeaus calls 'irrational pleasure' is the exploitation of what Hanslick called 
the base effects of music- its 'pathological', 'material moment'. This, I have said is the use of 
music, in effect to satisfy of the need of experience. 
Much of what makes music subjectively meaningful to self might in principle be expressed 
in the logical space of thinking and understood in terms of relationships between concepts. But not 
all, because music, and other art forms, also connect with what is not of this world, that is, it 
connects with what is not presented through evolutionary intelligence. 
Intelligence thinking, is the evolutionary method of our coming to knowledge of the world, 
using the intellect. 'I' and the intellect are mutual - there is no I without intellect and no intellect 
without I. Like Wittgenstein's 'eye', the intellect cannot be deduced from what is in intelligence's 
field of sight. The intellect is not of this world, but it is what enables this world to be presented to 
intelligence. Being not of this world the intellect can also reflect what the evolutionary intelligence 
cannot relate to, because evolutionary intelligence, represented by our animal brain, only 'fits' the 
reality of the world in which it arises. Nevertheless, the intellect is our intellect, as the universe is 
our universe. The universe, or great process in which nothing survives is seen in the intellect, and 
subsequently interpreted by intelligence. 
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Behind musical sensibility (and the sensibility in any art) is the intellect. Looking 
straight onto the intellect without passing through evolutionary intelligence, and reflecting from the 
intellect back into the world and into intelligence, produces what above I called perception -
sensitivity to the world and its conditions beyond the evolutionary and emotional interpretation. It 
can only happen to the degree to which self is not an obstruction. As self is always present in some 
degree, this then relates to what is of this world, including our emotional attachments, relationships 
and experiences, from a position beyond the world, communicated through a position still in the 
world, but not one unconsciously enmeshed. In art presenting concepts, the artist's perception can 
then present concepts as symbols for 'higher' meaning or essence, in literature or visual arts, 
according to the artist's depth of perception. In music, as in some more 'abstract' forms of art, we 
are not necessarily dealing with presented concepts. The form must 'speak directly to the intellect' 
and although the form is entirely of this world, which means it may be 'emotional' in content, it 
may highlight the recipient's potential of conscious connection with what is not of this world, as 
seen through aspects of the world and self. This means that in music, what is beyond emotion, and 
is 'not of this world', is approached through the evolutionary connection of music and psyche, and 
therefore in some degree through music and emotion, where these connections are the medium, but 
not the message. 
In any art form, whatever is presented, or represented, is the artist's or composer's 
presentation of what he or she perceives, through the mediums of technical genius, sensory 
phenomena, representation, and personal self. The expression from the genius of perception has to 
come through all these mediums. 
Hanslick's 'pathological effects' are a consequence of the evolutionary connection between 
musical phenomena and psyche, which in turn is a consequence of the connection between all 
phenomena and psyche. We have to remember that if mind has evolved, then its evolution includes 
psychical evolution. What is 'in' psyche is as much a consequence of what psychical self 'puts 
there' as of what 'the universe' or 'the world' has 'put there' through the principles of physical 
evolution and survival of the species. Our psyche includes all the emotion and all the music we 
have ever made or experienced. 
434 Timaeus 31, Ibid., p. 65. 
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Plato's Myth of Er, and his portrayal of Socrates, each symbolise a state of harmony 
that is in the world but not of it. The cycle of life and death, and the life of a man on Earth, is 'held 
together' in the Myth of Er by the cosmic harmonia, the harmony of the spheres. Socrates' 
equilibrium is the harmony of his knowing nothing. In both cases, there is harmonia. The effects of 
the cosmic harmonia which must also include Socrates' own destiny, comes to be seen as it is, by 
both Er and Socrates by the passing through of its effects. Er's passing through is magical, 
Socrates' is through experience coupled with the practice of 'philosophy'. In both cases, to see 
harmonia as it is, is to see through death, which is to perceive what is 'not of this world'. 
The evolutionary effects of music and emotion, the 'pathological effects' of music that 
Hanslick speaks of, are a long way from the harmony and equilibrium of Socrates, or of the cosmic 
system in the Myth of Er that Socrates communicated. They do not need to be relished for their 
own sake, because they are only the effects of harmonia on evolutionary self, in their specifically 
musical manifestation. They are only 'there' as a medium through which what is beyond them, 
what is not of this world, is approached. What is beyond them, is the perception of harmonia itself, 
which never appears in the music, just as it never appears in the actual structure and movement of 
the universe, but it connects them both, through the perception in the auditor. 
178 
Appendix on 'object-orientated' and 'subject-orientated'. 
Object orientated knowledge in the discourse means what we know of, or know about, 
objects. An object is not only physical. To illustrate this an analogy with object orientated 
computer language is useful. 
In current object orientated computer programming languages any 'object' in addition to 
those 'built in' to a given programming language can be instantiated, which in effect means 
created in the code, at the will of the programmer even before any properties or methods are 
ascribed to it. The act of instantiating an object may involve no more than naming it, with correct 
syntax. Once instantiated an object could have any number of properties and methods subsequently 
ascribed to it. Objects can be derived or invented at will and will be successfully handled by the 
language as long as the rules of the language are observed. An object could be anything- a section 
of code that handles a physical event or a data condition, code representing a connection with 
another data source, or perhaps code representing a visible object on a monitor screen. The object 
does not necessarily have to represent anything physical like a printer or a screen object, but it 
might. The language is a powerful data management environment in which objects are manipulated 
and handled within the logic of the language. 
Apart from certain aspects of syntax the only generic thing that all the objects actually have 
in common is code. The concept of code itself is something with which the programmer is familiar, 
and as a concept she may frequently refer to it in communication with other programmers. 
However, in most simple programming the actual concept of code is meaningless or irrelevant 
within the environment of the language itself, or in the execution of that code.m The concept of 
code, as distinct from the code itself, is meaningful to the programmer because she not only 
understands the code, but also the code in a context beyond the code- the context of the whole, the 
context of programming in general, the context of other codes with which she may not be familiar 
but would still recognise as code, and the purpose of the whole programme that she is 
endeavouring to develop and has probably already conceived before it has been developed. 
4J5 In some kinds of 'artificial intelligence' and more advanced software this is arguably not the case, since 
one of consequences of code execution may be the writing of more code or the modification of a programme 
by itself. 
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The human mind, it can be argued, is incomparably more complex in its operations than 
computer code, and I certainly would not want to imply that human thought is analogous to the 
execution of a Java programme. Nevertheless a potentially helpful analogy may be drawn 
regarding objects. In the execution of computer code the objects are addressed by the code. Objects 
are a part of the code - they are code objects, even when the objects do represent something 
beyond code itself. As I am using the word 'object' in the context of thinking, anything that the 
thinking mind addresses is an object in the thinking mind, whether single or composite. 
Human thinking is not fixed like computer code, but there is a limiting factor determining 
what makes sense in any area of thinking. For any area of thinking, or for any set of objects, what 
makes sense in terms of the relationships that could be expressed between the thoughts or objects, 
are relationships that conform to the 'logical space' of this given area of thinking. The relationships 
themselves, as seen in the intellect, are not limited by the logic of the human language used in the 
attempt to express them. Human language can only limit the expression and communication. Being 
in contact with the intellect, the intelligent recipient often tries to get 'behind' the human language 
expression back into the relationships themselves. 
The nature of this 'logical space' is not necessarily fixed and may change as the 
relationships are explored. By analogy, it is a mutable version of the logic and syntax of an object-
orientated computer language. The object-orientated computer language is a 'logical space' m 
which the language objects have relationships. The relationship of thinking to the objects in 
thinking, which are the things in thinking that can be named, would be roughly like the relationship 
of a mutable object-orientated computer language, to its objects. 
The logical space of language is not the same as the logical space of thinking. The logical 
space of language evolved long before we entered some of the logical spaces in which we can now 
think. We constantly change language to align it with the logical space of thinking, and even invent 
new language. Human thinking is not the same thing as human language, or thinking in language. 
Human thinking is thinking not in the logical space of language, but in the logical space of 
thinking. Nevertheless, all the logical space of thinking is part of evolutionary intelligence, and all 
logical space is connected in psyche. 
Any so-called 'subject of thought' is in this context actually an object of thought. Even ifl 
think about myself, the subject, I have made an object of the subject I am in order to think about it. 
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However it can be perceived from experience that even when making an object of the subject 
the mind can subtly connect with something that is not the object in thought. For example, the 
subjective accumulation of experience that my self is or includes, is not a thought object until I 
think about it. Indeed, the very experience I am is not an object, as long as I do not think about it. 
Similarly if I am emotional, the emotion is not an object in thought until the instant I think about it, 
even though I may then think it was always an object before I thought about it. In the first instance 
the emotion is myself or a part thereof- it is a part of self. When I am angry I am in effect being 
that anger even if! may say I am just expressing it, except to the degree there is something else by 
which the anger is observed, and perhaps contained and not allowed to fully have its way, through 
which I may well then ask whether this emotion really is what I really am, or a part of what I really 
am. This question of the reality of myself, is in this context a question of what my self is, which, 
precisely, is a question of self knowledge. Object-orientated thinking begins when I begin to think 
about anything, including my self, conceptually or discursively, the act of thinking being distinct 
from what I know in my own experience, without having to think about it. As soon as I think about 
any of this or try to work anything out, I enter object orientated thought and knowledge which 
often leads into a 'philosophical' labyrinth of thought, which is again not the same thing as self-
knowledge. The labyrinth arises from the attempt to reach self-knowledge through the act of 
thinking about. It is the attempt to reach subjective knowledge through object orientated mental 
procedures. Object orientated thought proceeds towards object orientated 'knowledge', but not 
towards subjective knowledge. 
Subjective knowledge on the other hand, is the subject's knowledge of the subject and 
subjective experience without the absolute need of object reference, even though it may be 
communicated about using object orientated terms of reference. Subjective knowledge of emotion 
is knowledge of emotion arising from the subjective (subject-orientated) experience of it. Those 
who have experienced that there is a connection of music and emotion in themselves have 
subjective knowledge of this connection as a ground to any object orientated thought or knowledge 
of it. Those who have never experienced it may know about it through what they have read and 
heard, but they will have no subjective knowledge of it. 
Subjective knowledge and thinking, or subjective knowledge and object-orientated 
knowledge, are related, even connected. Saying "whatever we think about is an object " does not 
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mean thought itself is an object. Thought is movement in the mind. Even though computer code 
does not move and thought may not work in the way computer code does, thought is still like the 
computer code in another way. However, the relationship of the subjective knowledge of thought to 
thought itself is not normally like the relationship between the programmer and the programme or 
code. The programmer usually knows far more about the details of code operation than the subject 
knows in subjective knowledge about the mechanisms of his own thought. It is like the relationship 
of the programmer's knowledge of the concept of code, to the code itself. The programmer does 
not need code itself to recognise what is code or not code, but as soon as she starts the activity of 
coding she 'gets into it' and its logic and ways, and is dealing in problems that code is needed to 
solve. Similarly, we do not need thinking to recognise thinking and no thinking, and the instant we 
think about it we are thinking. 
There is surely only one way to have real subjective knowledge of thinking and how it 
works, and this cannot be through thinking itself. It can only be by observing the movement of 
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